

The Month in Review

AS THE WORLD'S headlines followed the Foreign Ministers in their one-step-below-the-summit negotiations (including the Soviet attempt to bring in Poland and Czechoslovakia as major participants), the East European Soviet orbit concentrated on consolidation of control in a most vital area: youth. The shock of the leading role played by youth, particularly students, in the 1956 Hungarian Revolt is still vivid for the regimes; the cream of the younger generation, brought up under Communism and destined to be the leaders of Communist society, proved overwhelmingly to be among the system's most dedicated opponents. Now, in the general withdrawal of the tide of post-Revolt reforms and liberalizations, special efforts are being made to impose "Party-mindedness" on the young, and to point their schooling more closely and directly to Party-directed aims. As for the latter, the model is the Soviet system of "polytechnicism" in which major emphasis is given to on-the-job training in factory and farm during schooling at the pre-university level. In both Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, Party Committee meetings in April laid plans for the reorganization of the school system to these ends. In addition to introducing polytechnicism, the projected Czechoslovak changes include lengthening compulsory school attendance from eight to nine years (as it was before 1953) and of university preparation from eleven to twelve years (it was thirteen years before 1953). Bulgarian plans are more advanced; the new system is to be introduced beginning with the 1959-60 school year. Here, too, the university preparation course is extended a year, to twelve years, in secondary schools. At least one-third of this time, however, will be spent at factory or farm work—contributing to the grandiose Bulgarian plans for a Chinese-style "great leap forward." In addition, greater stress is to be placed on the teaching of Marxism-Leninism throughout the entire curriculum; thus, as the Party paper *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), April 25, put it, "the entire educational training and work activities will . . . instill the high moral principles of a Socialist society—fidelity to Communism and hatred of its enemies."



The influence of the Hungarian uprising on students was explicitly raised in Romania, where there have been many reports of unrest in the Autonomous Hungarian Region, Transylvania. This unrest has been labelled "rotten bourgeois nationalism" by the regime, and there have been several recent official meetings of students and teachers where the sin was denounced. Further, there have been proposals to close down the separate schools for Hungarians in Romania, in an attempt to dilute the continued bitterness and dissatisfaction among these young people.

Increasing pressure is also being put on youth of the area to take part in "voluntary" labor programs. In Hungary, students are being exhorted to donate their summer vacations to such work. In Romania, according to an official Yugoslav press agency report, the Communist-run youth organization is putting on a campaign to get its members to join work brigades (the press service also reported the introduction of three hours of obligatory physical work per week in all Romanian secondary schools and universities; there has been no Romanian substantiation of this). In Czechoslovakia, the Tenth Anniversary of the Pioneers, the Youth Union section for children from nine to fifteen years old, was celebrated with calls for more voluntary work to surpass the record of the past when, Radio Bratislava, April 26, stated with

warm praise, the Pioneers since 1957 did "14.5 million hours of voluntary brigade work," which included cleaning "3.5 million old bricks."

In Poland, too, where areas of freedom, although waning, are still greater than elsewhere, the circling ring of social and economic forces intended to control the young is being tightened. The Party-run ZMS (Socialist Youth Union, successor to the Stalinist ZMP dissolved in 1956) charted a campaign to boost its low membership in the universities; of 260,000 members, a paltry 4,000 are university students. To do this it intends to utilize a new scholarship policy (and almost all Polish students depend on scholarships) which ties student stipends to the proper "social attitude"; the ZMS hopefully (and no doubt accurately) expects that numbers of students will of necessity swallow their distaste for the flatulent conformisms of the youth organization as the price of an education. For, in the words of the ZMS Secretary, "hostile, anti-social and demoralized individuals are not deserving of State aid."

Another recent ZMS encroachment on the liberties of student youth was even more strikingly symbolic of the erosion of the "Polish way": a Warsaw report stated that student cabarets—institutions unique in the Soviet orbit, where since 1956 in skit and song the students carried on the tradition of social and political satire—have been put under the aegis of the youth organization. They are henceforth to refrain from treating political subjects.

And even for the Polish Scouting movement the pattern is the same; this too was rejuvenated by the 1956 upheaval, and this too is now feeling the restrictions of growing Party control. To an organization which had for the last few years flourished largely in the hope of remaining a non-political enclave in a politics-ridden society, Party leader Gomulka himself laid down the line: "The leading motive in the activities of the Polish Scouts' Union should be the winning over of youth for Socialism. . . ."

* * *

The reorganization of agriculture continued as a prime concern of the bloc. Bulgaria, which in recent months has come closest to the complete collectivization of the Soviet Union (in addition to emulating the Chinese in their agglomeration of kolkhozes into massive units), has further followed Soviet practice in the abolition of compulsory deliveries, substituting a system of contract purchases. The new prices to be paid for produce are markedly higher than the old quota prices, but lower than free market prices. An incentive for the regime's change in the system appeared to be the widespread black market, by which collective farms evaded their contractual obligations and sold their goods to institutions and individuals at better prices than the State offered. This was so widespread, the regime admitted, that "a serious shortage of meat" developed in the cities and larger towns.

Hungary, and to a slightly lesser extent Romania, have both just finished intense collectivization drives. In a few winter months, the number of hectares in Hungarian collectives doubled—rising from 848,000 at the end of December 1958 to 1,659,000 at the end of March. In the first three months of this year, according to official Romanian sources, 214,000 families "joined" collective farms.

In Poland, where so far forced collectivization has been forsworn and independent peasants dominate agriculture, the situation is much less clear-cut. Considerable attention is currently being paid to the farmers' circles, those prewar organizations of mutual help which the regime is seeking to use as a kind of back door to large-scale agriculture. On the one hand, the expansion of farmers' circles is being urged; on the other, peasants are being warned against the existence of "rightist elements" and "speculating capitalist groups" in the circles, and Gomulka has used strong language to indicate that the circles must be amenable to the Party's will. Revealingly, in one of the honest and undoctinaire press reports which still mark off Poland from the rest of the area, a Warsaw paper stated that its investigations had shown that most peasants suspect the circles are a first step toward hated collectivization.

Poland's Economy

Second of two articles covering economic developments in Poland since October 1956. The previous article (May issue) described the financial crisis of 1956-58; this one analyzes some of the attempts at institutional reform and the controversy over the new economic plan for 1959-1965.

"The New Economic Model"

MUCH OF THE INITIAL BACKING Gomulka received in his return to power came from economists, industrial managers and factory workers who wanted thoroughgoing reforms in the planning and operation of industry. The lumbering engine of Bierut and Minc had been run almost entirely by the ministries in Warsaw, where a swarm of bureaucrats ground out directives covering everything from tractors to dill pickles. Factory managers were little more than agents of the central boards, charged with fulfilling the quantitative tasks assigned by the Plan. Prices were likewise governed from the center, and had no necessary relation to the real costs of production. The consequence of all this artifice was an economy which lacked incentives for efficiency, effort or initiative.

The goads which impel private businessmen to improve their operations—competition, desire for profits, fear of bankruptcy—had ceased to exist in the Polish economy. Their place had been taken by political and propaganda devices similar to those employed in a modern army to enforce discipline and raise morale. Workers were exhorted to improve the quality of their products, to fulfill pledges, to save material, etc., but only by their quantitative performance in fulfilling output targets did they stand to gain or lose anything tangible. Eventually, and quite naturally, they ceased to listen to moral appeals and proceeded to follow their own interests. By the end of the Six Year Plan the corruption and cynicism of the "new Socialist man" had become a national scandal, and the palpable absurdities of this barracks-room economy provided Gomulka's supporters with powerful arguments for reform.

Liberals' Program

The intellectuals looked to the West or—in a safer direction—to Yugoslavia, where they found a theoretical basis for a radically decentralized economy. Among the



Poland under Gomulka publishes far more economic information and statistics, and is far more frank about the performance of the economy, than any other country in the area. Pictured above is Z. Padowicz, head of the Main Statistical Office, holding an IBM-type card on which data is collected and the 1958 copy of the Statistical Annual.

Photo from *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), March 8, 1959

leading Polish economists there was no lack of familiarity with democratic Socialist ideas on how to combine economic planning with freedom, although they were careful to translate these ideas into Communist jargon. In the summer of 1956 they found support in the current respectability of Tito's Yugoslavia, where far-reaching economic reforms had been made several years earlier. The Yugoslav workers' councils, which purported to give the workers a say in the operation of their factories, were tied to a decentralized economy in which the functions of the State planning board had been reduced to a minimum. Factory managers in Yugoslavia, though servants of the State, had powers in planning, pricing and trading that aroused the envy of their Polish counterparts.

The program of reform that was evolved by the "liberals" in Poland emphasized three major changes: decentralization of industrial management; workers' councils in the factories; and an overhaul of the price system to make it a useful tool for controlling the economy. This program was summarized by Professor Oscar Lange in the following words:

"[The Polish economic model] will be formed on the basis of experience; it must grow out of life, it cannot be decreed from above. . . . It can nevertheless be said that certain trends are beginning to crystallize. Firstly, this model

will aim to combine central planning and direction of the national economy with as much decentralization in management as possible. Secondly, the management of the economy will be based on workers' self-government and partly on cooperative self-government functioning within the framework of central planning and direction of the entire economy. . . . This of course calls for a greater independence of establishments, or else the workers' councils and management would have nothing to decide and self-government would be a fiction. . . . I believe that consequently this will lead to a situation where the basic index of the effectiveness of an establishment will be its profitability. Today we have the difficulty that factories would rather produce profitable items than necessary ones, and that is simply because we have a faulty price range. . . . That is why we are faced with the whole question of price policy, a revision of the price structure. . . . As far as I know the government estimates that it will need two years for a gradual transformation of our price system. . . . This cannot be done at once because it would provoke an upheaval capable of producing many unfavorable results."^{*}


Workers' Councils Suppressed

What happened to this program during 1957 and 1958 is characteristic of Gomulka's Poland. The workers' councils, which had aroused great hopes among those who favored a more liberal economic system, were never given significant powers. To the contrary, while the Party has rendered them lip-service, it has at the same time taken elaborate steps to prevent them from acquiring autonomy and a direction of their own. At the Ninth Plenum of the Party Central Committee in May, 1957, Gomulka attacked the proponents of more power for the workers' councils and told them to stop "muddling your own heads and those of the workers." He made it plain that the Party would not delegate its power to groups it could not control, and that the aims of those who hoped for a decentralized, price-governed economy were not shared by his regime. He argued that such a reform would mean the destruction of a planned economy.

"Prices of goods produced by the various factories would be determined by the market in an elementary way on the basis of the law of supply and demand. Every factory would determine its production independently of other factories. Investment would also be dictated by the market, only with a worse result than under capitalism, because a capitalist is himself the owner of the factory and can thus devote an overwhelming part of the profits to investment—because even the smallest part of the profits used for his personal needs insures him as high a standard of living as he could want. On the other hand, workers as collective owners of the factory, having a low standard of living, would always have a tendency to raise their earnings as much as possible, without giving thought to investment."

In the spring of 1958 the Party introduced a new institution called the Workers' Self-Government Conference. It was an enlargement of the workers' council to include representatives of the Party and the trade union, and was clearly intended to insure that the control of the factories

^{*} From the lecture cited above. (*Some Problems Relating to the Polish Road to Socialism*, Warsaw, 1957.)



The recently-completed Atomic Research Center in Swierk, outside Warsaw.

Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 1, 1958

would remain in the hands of those who had run them previously—the administrative staff and the Party activists, working in the bureaucratic framework of a centrally planned economy. While the workers' council remains as a factory institution, its functions are very similar to those of the "production conferences" of other Communist countries: meetings of the workers conducted under the auspices of the trade unions, in which various problems of production are discussed—or explained—and the workers are exhorted to apply themselves with vigor and intelligence to the tasks set forth for them.**

By the middle of 1958 those who had nourished hopes of a radical change in Poland's economic institutions had been thoroughly defeated. The course set by Gomulka lay in a fundamentally conservative direction which, except for the encouragement given to private farming, was essentially the same as that enunciated by Nikita Khrushchev in Moscow. Khrushchev's course allowed for changes in economic institutions, but only insofar as these would enable "democratic centralism" to function more efficiently. Decentralization of control over the economy was not to weaken the authority of the centralized Party. Thus the range of possibilities open to the Polish economy was narrowed to a point where the most that could be done was to tinker with the existing machine. This conservative course

** For an account of the rise and decline of the workers' councils, see the article "Workers and the State," *East Europe*, January 1959.

was dictated not only by the political climate but also by the weakness of the economy, which did not allow for the luxury of experiment.

Price Reform Delayed

A most pressing problem in the eyes of economists was an overhaul of the price system. The prices of many important industrial products had little to do with their real cost, and the relation between the prices of different products was hopelessly arbitrary. This situation, which the economic journal *Zycie Gospodarcze* described on January 7, 1957, as "complete chaos," meant that the price system could not be depended on to allocate resources efficiently among competing uses—an essential function of any price system. In consequence, producers were frequently given an incentive to use a scarce material which was underpriced in preference to a more suitable or plentiful, but overpriced, material. Most of the basic industries had large book-keeping losses which were made up through State subsidies. On a national scale, the distorted price system made it difficult for even the planners to estimate the relative advantages of different investments, since there was no accurate way of determining their costs.

The ramifications of the problem were complex, but it was an almost inevitable result of a centrally planned economy in which capitalist notions of profitability were not considered important and in which years of suppressed inflation had pushed costs far above the fixed level of prices. The problem was common to all the East European Com-



"Machines are the future of the countryside. The countryside is using them more and more. It is easier to get tractors and other more expensive machines for collective farms and for those independent peasants who are organized in agricultural circles." The mechanization of agriculture is a major task of the Polish economy. As the caption indicates, this mechanization is being used as inducement to farm collectivization, despite the generally permissive attitude of the Gomulka regime toward independent farmers.

Photo and quoted caption from *Swiat* (Warsaw), March 8, 1959

Changing Structure of Investment

	1956-60	1961-65	1961-1965 as percent of 1956-60
Total (billion <i>zloty</i> at 1958 prices)	345.3	514.4	149.0%
Percent going to:			
Industry	39.0%	36.8%	140.8
Agriculture	13.4	13.8	153.0
Forestry	0.3	0.4	166.7
Building	2.4	2.2	132.1
Transportation and communication	9.0	9.1	150.6
Housing	21.4	24.0	167.6
Municipalities	4.1	4.4	160.0
Domestic trade	2.7	2.2	121.3
Social and cultural facilities	6.2	6.4	153.5
Other	1.5	0.7	74.5

Of the total sums invested in 1961-65, 36.8 percent or 189.5 billion *zloty* is to be spent on industry, or 140.8 percent of the amount devoted to that purpose in the period 1956-60. For comparison with earlier years, see the similar table in the previous installment of this article, May issue, p. 21.

Source: *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 22, 1959. Some of the percentages in the third column were evidently in error and have been corrected.

munist countries, which periodically revised their wholesale prices in an effort to remove some of the worst anomalies. A thoroughgoing attack on it would have been an enormous and probably impossible undertaking, requiring price adjustments in all sectors of the economy and creating widespread uncertainty as to prices in the future, particularly on consumer markets.

The government's Economic Council, headed by Oscar Lange and Czeslaw Bobrowski, made a brave attempt to formulate a new price policy late in 1957. The Council's theses on prices, as published by *Zycie Gospodarcze* in its issue of December 22-29, 1957, cited all the classical economic functions of a good price system and stressed particularly that the prices of domestic raw materials ought to bear some reasonable relation to prices in world trade. Official circles took no clear-cut position on the matter, except to recognize its importance and to promise that some action would be taken during 1959, when the economy would be in better condition to withstand the stresses of price adjustment. It seemed doubtful however that the sweeping reforms once hoped for by the economists would ever be carried out, and most likely that the changes would be similar to the occasional revisions of industrial prices made in other Communist countries.

Management Decentralized

However, the government took steps to break up the rigid overcentralization which had hobbled the economy in

the past. The changes were similar to those made in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, by which individual enterprises, industries and municipal authorities were given greater economic power without compromising the ultimate power of the central planners. The central planning machinery was stripped of all administrative functions and directed to concentrate on determining the major indices of the annual and long-term plans.

During 1958 the industrial ministries were reorganized and their managerial functions given to groups of enterprises, organized on the trust or cartel principle. The idea was to allow factories which produced similar or related products to form an association for their common management, thus replacing the more distant and mechanical system of ministerial direction. The ministries were to confine themselves to long-range planning and other work of a general nature, with a substantial reduction in staff. At the same time individual enterprises were given more power over their own finances: the State was to provide only the major investment funds, and the enterprises were to finance other capital expenditures out of their profits—subject to the control of their association. Some exporting enterprises were allowed to participate directly in foreign transactions instead of routing their business through the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Along with the greater financial autonomy given to municipal authorities (people's councils), the government moved to turn over to them various factories and other enterprises considered suitable for local administration.

Meanwhile, on the fringe of the State's economic empire, there was a burgeoning of the private industry that had been almost wiped out during the years of "class struggle" after 1950. Small private factories, handicraft shops and independent artisans were encouraged with State credits and other concessions to expand the production of consumer goods (shoes, clothing, etc.), building materials and export products (canned food, toys, etc.). The number of handicraft workshops rose from 96,000 in September 1956 to nearly 140,000 in mid-1958, and private industrial plants employing several people increased from less than 5,000 to more than 8,000. The private sector is still growing and will probably soon be as large as it was in 1950, but in the long run it cannot expect to have more than a residual share in the national economy.*

The Human Element

Some of Poland's economic problems defy analysis, for under the facts and figures lie habits compounded of tradition and necessity. In their readiness for industrial civilization the Poles are far behind their neighbors in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The big factories built since 1950 contain workers largely of peasant origin, not bred to the routine of urban life. To this must be added the political and moral apathy resulting from war, revolution, grinding poverty and the ideological bankruptcy of Polish Communism. Theft and embezzlement on all levels of society are so widespread as to constitute a major source

* For a full account of private enterprise in Gomulka's Poland, see *East Europe*, February 1959, pp. 20-31.



The new Polish small car, the Mikrus, with the engineers and technicians of its production staff. The Mikrus has a two-cylinder, rear-mounted, air-cooled engine, is said to average 50 miles per gallon, have a maximum speed of 57 mph and seat two adults and two children. Five thousand cars are scheduled for production in 1959, as the Polish economy attempts to satisfy some of the people's craving for consumer goods.

Photo from Poland (Warsaw), No. 9, 1958

of livelihood: one estimate in 1957 predicted that the total loss to the State would run to 20 billion *zloty*—or about half the State's net capital investment in that year. (*Zycie Literackie* [Cracow], August 25, 1957.) Whatever the estimate's value, the mere fact that it was published testifies to the magnitude of the problem.

The Party theoretical journal, *Nowe Drogi*, September 1957, advanced three reasons for this mass speculation: the irrational structure of wages and prices which provided a built-in incentive for black marketeering with stolen goods; the bad housing situation which led to bribery and corruption; and a general breakdown in public morale as a result of low living standards and "the pernicious activities of certain elements in the bureaucracy." Another disturbing symptom is the high rate of absenteeism among factory workers, which, according to estimates in the press, rose to heights of 20 percent or more in the summer of 1957. This is caused by various factors: the desire to go home and help harvest the crops, the attraction of higher wages in private construction projects, and a breakdown of labor discipline that makes long absences possible.**

If despite this state of affairs the industrial machine has continued to grind ahead, achieving increases in gross production of 9.6 percent in 1957 and 9.5 percent in 1958, the explanation lies in the fact that such conditions are not new. Moreover, the quantities of manpower wasted in Polish factories are apparently so great that losses from absenteeism do not affect production. The leading economic

** For a discussion of the absenteeism problem, see *East Europe*, July 1958, pp. 19-25.

weekly *Zycie Gospodarcze* editorialized on January 19, 1958, that the "existence of large reserves of workers in industrial establishments seems to be undeniable. . . . Estimates vary from 10 to 40 percent." The paper attacked those who regarded the phenomenon as "normal" under Socialism, or "even profitable."

"A new conception of employment 'within the State framework' has arisen. . . . namely that, although surplus employment is not profitable to a particular enterprise, it is profitable within the State framework. In Socialism—

the propounders of this theory maintain—there is not, and cannot be, unemployment. Thus everything must be done to prevent it. It is better to have excess employment in the enterprise than unemployed outside the gate."

The Party recognized overemployment as a problem at the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1958. In the following months a campaign was launched to move surplus workers out of the big factories and industrial towns to building projects and other places where labor was said to be scarce. Workers of pensionable age

The Seven Year Plan (1959-65)

Product	Unit	1958 Actual	1960 Plan	1965 Plan
Bituminous coal	million tons	95.0	103.0	112-113
Brown coal	" "	7.5	9.0	27.0
Crude steel	" "	5.6	6.4	9.0
Cement	" "	5.1	6.6	10.0
Electric power	billion kwh	23.9	28.8	43.5-45.0
Zinc	thousand tons	162.6	170.0	215-230
Lead	" "	35.1	40.0	52.0
Electrolytic copper	" "	17.4	15.8	35.0
Aluminum	" "	22.4	23.0	75.0
Steam turbines	megawatts	52	255	550
Trucks	thousands	10.1	17.2	35.0
Tractors (except single-axle)	" "	4.4	8.6	20.0
Buses	units	670	2,100	3,700
Agricultural machinery and tools	million <i>zloty</i>	1,269	1,320	2,200
Ocean ships	deadweight tons	174.8	265.0	450.0
Sulfur	thousand tons	13.3	40.8	410.0
Sulfuric acid (100 percent)	" "	572.5	657.0	1,140.0
Caustic soda (96 per cent)	" "	150.0	169.0	255.0
Calcined soda (98 percent)	" "	379.4	520.0	660.0
Nitrogenous fertilizers	" "	227.5	280.0	480.0
Phosphorous fertilizers	" "	153.8	205.0	360.0
Synthetic rubber	" "	nil	15.0	50.0
Synthetic fibers	" "	66.3	79.0	113.5
From organic synthesis	" "	2.3	4.5	29.0
Plastics	" "	30.7	62.7	185.0
Wall materials	million pieces	4,483.0	6,015.0	9,380.0
Paper and cardboard	thousand tons	555.4	637.0	822.0
Cotton fabrics	million meters	598.4	640.0	790.0
Woolen fabrics	" "	78.3	83.7	101.0
Silk fabrics	" "	96.8	111.5	140.5
Knit wear	million pieces	92.9	115.5	183.0
Leather footwear	million pairs	34.1	40.0	48.0
Meat, slaughtered	thousand tons	1,052.3	1,195.0	1,500-1,600
Butter	" "	87.8	115.0	165.0
Sugar	" "	1,095	1,200	1,500-1,550
Washing machines	thousands	200.5	410	600
Refrigerators	" "	24.8	75	240
Radio sets	" "	789.5	900	1,100
TV sets	" "	57.1	200	440
Bicycles	" "	309.7	700	750
Motorcycles and motorbikes	" "	85.7	165	300
Automobiles	" "	11.3	16.5	22.5

Source: *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 22, 1959. For comparable figures for 1949 and 1955, see the similar table in the previous installment of this article, May issue, p. 17.

were encouraged to quit by increasing the minimum pension from 200-260 *zloty* per month to 500 (as compared to the average industrial wage of 1,300-1,400 *zloty* per month). An effort was also made to correct the sick leave abuses which had made absenteeism profitable.

While the number of workers to be dismissed was estimated unofficially at hundreds of thousands, the campaign turned out to be one of the half-lost causes so common in Gomulka's Poland. At the Twelfth Plenum in October 1958 the First Secretary reported that, in August, State industry had 15,725 fewer on its payrolls than a year before, although production had risen by 10 percent. He estimated that 80,000 pensioners had been released. Nevertheless, he conceded that the campaign had run into strong opposition from industrial managers who "strive to maintain reserves of manpower," and much remained to be done.

The Prospect Ahead

ONE OF THE NET RESULTS of the "Polish October" has been a shift away from totalitarian dogma toward Western habits of thought, or, more exactly, a tilting of the cultural balance in favor of Western ideas. The Gomulka regime has tried to counteract this by imposing a ban on "revisionist" ideas and by censoring writers and other intellectuals having heretical viewpoints, but a pervasive difference in attitudes remains even in the topmost circles of the Party itself. There are few Communists in Poland today who would approach economic planning with the sanguine abandon of the early 1950's, or who do not shudder at the thought of imitating the Chinese or the Bulgarians. Every discussion of the past begins with the admission of "mistakes" made by the Party, and includes a fairly objective survey of the difficulties and problems with which the economy must now contend. The Twelfth Plenum, held in October 1958 for the purpose of approving the draft economic directives for the coming seven years, made a point of inserting a lengthy passage setting forth the "complications, difficulties and disproportions" which arose during the Six Year Plan.

"These disproportions and difficulties arose chiefly because of the excessive strain caused by capital investments accompanied by a failure to carry out the tasks involved in increasing the output of farm products, as well as tasks in the field of increasing supplies of basic food commodities to the population. This state of affairs was brought on in particular by mistakes in agricultural policy, inadequate [State] assistance to the development of agriculture, and the underestimation of construction costs in various large-scale investment projects. A considerable part was also played by unanticipated increases in defense expenditure, in connection with increased international tension [the Korean War—Ed.]. . . . The final results . . . of the Six Year Plan showed, along with a great development in industrial production—which increased 2.8 times—, only a small increase in agricultural production in comparison with 1949. The targets with respect to real wages remained largely unfulfilled. . . ."

The Next Seven Years

The program set forth at the Plenum for the years 1959-1965 differed markedly from that of the Six Year Plan, both in its realism and in its greater attention to living standards and foreign trade. The average annual rate of industrial growth was set at 8.6 percent annually, a rate slightly below that achieved in 1957 and 1958 but identical with the target set by Soviet planners for the same period. There was to be a slow increase in the proportion of national income devoted to investment, but it was not to reach the staggering heights of the early 1950's. Agricultural production was slated to increase by 30 percent in the seven years, an optimistic figure in the light of previous experience but fairly cautious when compared with the goals set in other Communist countries (more than 30 percent in Czechoslovakia, 70 percent in the USSR, several hundred percent in Bulgaria and China).

A basic consideration was Poland's swelling population, expected to reach 30 million in 1960 and 32.3 million in 1965. The planners aimed at providing a million jobs outside agriculture in the years 1961-1965, and at the same time raising average real incomes by 33-35 percent above those of 1958. Urban housing would be expanded by two million rooms in 1961-1965 so that "the average housing density in urban areas will decline from 1.75 persons per room in 1960 to 1.54 persons per room in 1965." By 1965 "about 70 percent of the families will own a bicycle and 20 percent will own a motorcycle, a scooter or a motor-driven bicycle."


Stalinists Criticize the Plan

The sober tone of the document disappointed several prominent members of the Central Committee, who felt that the goals should be higher and the Party's attitude more strenuous. Eugeniusz Szyr, an economist who played an active role in the Stalinist years, argued that "the rate of economic development during the next seven years can and should be faster."* He charged that the planners had been influenced "in a passive way" by the mistakes and shortcomings of the Six Year Plan, so that they thought mainly of problems to be solved and errors to be avoided rather than searching for new ways to mobilize the economy. He cited China as an example of a country that had overcome "the contradictions hindering the development of the forces of production."

"In 1958 they achieved the output of steel previously planned for 1962, agricultural production previously planned for a period of 10 to 12 years, and an increase in industrial production of about 57 percent as compared with the 100 percent increase planned for 1958-1962.

"Of course, the proportion of investment to national income has also increased enormously—the whole vast mass of unutilized labor power has been taken advantage of—but at the same time consumption has increased at a much faster rate, and the proposal to increase real wages by 35 percent during the period 1958-1962 will be considerably exceeded. Summing up these figures, I am not trying to

* This and the quotations that follow are taken from the minutes of the Twelfth Plenum, which were published as a book for the use of Party activists.



A factor exacerbating the severe housing shortage is the extremely high postwar Polish birth-rate. The cartoon shows, left, the opening of "A house for bachelors, 1960"; right, "... and one year later." Cartoon from *Szpilki* (Warsaw), April 12, 1959

suggest anything, and, to anticipate counter-arguments by my opponents, I want to state that I am not looking for any analogy here, for I realize quite as well as they do that Poland and China are two different things."

Szyr also invoked the example of other Communist countries which he said were forging ahead faster than Poland.

"The Soviet Union is revising the primary targets of the plan for 1959-1965 . . . in the production of steel, electric power, oil, grain and many other fields. This means that the span between the economic indices of our country and those of the Soviet Union will widen considerably. The German Democratic Republic, with a minimum rate of population growth, is planning to increase production by at least 50 percent. At the same time, labor productivity is to increase by 50 percent (as against our target of 34 percent) . . .

"Czechoslovakia . . . intends to increase industrial production, according to the preliminary data, by about 57-60 percent. This includes the production of 9.6 million tons of steel, against 8.8 million in Poland where technical and economic conditions are more favorable for the production of steel than in Czechoslovakia, which, incidentally, has only half of Poland's population. . . . Every percent of

increase in industrial production in Czechoslovakia or the GDR means almost twice as much per capita as in Poland, and thus, with an equal rate of increase, the span between ourselves and those countries widens every year.

"Now I'll deal with countries having a lower level of productive development than Poland. In all these countries—in Bulgaria and Romania, not to mention China—the proposed rate of development provides for a narrowing of the span between these countries and ourselves."

Szyr contended that the planners had been intimidated by the widespread fear that a more ambitious rate of industrialization would affect the standard of living and create bottlenecks in the economy. Such a fear, he said, was not reflected in the planning of other Communist countries, and it stemmed from an "exaggerated and one-sided criticism" of Poland's experience during the Six Year Plan. He argued that a realistic appraisal of Poland's present economic conditions would show that "it is possible to achieve simultaneously a faster rate of increase in production [than proposed], a higher level of capital investment and a greater increase in the standard of living."

Szyr called for "a tremendous political and organizational effort through the mass activities of the Party and the State apparatus." He said that production costs could be cut by much more than the 2.6 percent proposed in the years 1961-1965, that investment should be concentrated on the most effective projects, that planning methods should be overhauled and brought down to the factory and community level.

The Regime Defends

The general tendency of Szyr's remarks won support from several other speakers at the Plenum, including Boleslaw Ruminski and Zenon Nowak. A rough division seemed to exist between those who thought in terms of national economic power, and were in favor of using social and political pressures to achieve it, and the Gomulka group which preferred to rely cautiously on economic incentives. Ignacy Loga-Sowinski pointed out, in rebuttal to Szyr, that "in this country there is always a very long distance between the possible and the real." Stefan Jedrychowski, the regime's chief economic planner, said: "Comrade Szyr expressed a striking formula from this platform: a larger national income, larger investments, more consumption. An attractive formula, it is true, but one that is logical only in part." His counter-arguments ran as follows:

"Realization of this formula is possible only insofar as it will be possible to achieve a bigger increase [in production] or a decrease in the use of materials, but without raising investment. Furthermore, one must not only prove from this platform that such possibilities exist in theory, but prove in practice that we are able to exploit and realize these possibilities. . . . The other factor that has to be taken into account when determining the rate of development is the foreign trade and payments balance. This [foreign trade] situation is causing us serious difficulties to this very day and constitutes a certain threat to the rationality of our plans. . . . I fully share Comrade Szyr's views regarding the necessity for seeking reserves in the



The center of Warsaw to-be, as seen in one of the entries in a recent architectural contest. *Swiat* (Warsaw), January 25, 1959

national economy, I . . . consider that we should develop maximum efforts to discover these reserves. . . . But it would be too early today to anticipate the results of these efforts and, counting on them, to raise the basic indices of the Plan. Especially so since it will be necessary to mobilize all forces anyway for the execution of this Plan . . . and a number of weak points will no doubt still become evident in it, lack of balance and many other difficulties. . . .

"And one further concluding remark. Comrade Szyr . . . said that we ought to make the greatest possible contribution to the world competition between the capitalist and Socialist systems. Comrade Ruminski said . . . that our arrears with respect to other countries of the Socialist bloc make it necessary for us to increase our pace. I believe this to be a highly simplified picture of our international obligations. No one demands from us or imposes upon us any kind of pace for industrial development. . . . We should define our pace of economic development ourselves, on the basis of our own very conscientious appraisal of our conditions, needs and possibilities . . . [a pace] which will enable us to develop our economy, raise the prosperity of our working masses without shocks and stumbles—without Poznań—and at the same time fulfill conscientiously the obligations toward other Socialist countries which we have taken upon ourselves."

Means and Ends

The discussion at the Twelfth Plenum was an illustration of the contradictory pressures that beset Poland's economic planners. On the one hand are the more orthodox Communists who feel that the Party must be dynamic if it is to have even a limited appeal to its constituents, and who

know that Party workers themselves are always happier in the position of generals leading troops into battle. A more ambitious program would justify a return to some of the uncompromising tactics of former years, which in turn would help to overcome some of the obstacles—such as poor labor discipline and the irrational deployment of manpower—which now stand in the way of more rapid progress. Communists of this persuasion feel that the Six Year Plan was not such a failure as Gomułka has represented it to be, and would like to continue in a similar style but without repeating the more obvious "mistakes." Their position has been strengthened in the last year by the examples of Bulgaria and China, which are engaging in a "big leap forward," and by other developments in the Soviet bloc indicating that speed is the order of the day.

Gomułka's supporters have no taste for this thinking, which would mean declaring war upon the Polish people. They prefer to rely upon rational economic planning, with its calculated statement of means and possibilities. They are not willing to set ambitious goals based upon optimistic assumptions as to human behavior. In this they have the support of a large segment of the intelligentsia who are

Polish Machinery

"AMONG THE MORE important new machine industry products during 1961-1965 will be: 15 types of modern ships powered by internal combustion engines; a universal electric locomotive, type b-zero, capable of doing 140 kilometers per hour; internal combustion engines of 350, 800 and 1,600 horsepower; self-propelled railway cars; several new types of railroad passenger cars and freight cars; boilers with a capacity of 230 to 375, and 600 tons of steam per hour; steam turbines of 120 megawatts; new types of combines, cutting machines, loaders and other mining machinery and equipment; four new types of paper-making machines; carbon-making machines; two new types of machines for the production of wall-board; complete equipment for the cement, gypsum and ceramic industries; several types of excavators and cranes; about 180 new universal lathes as well as specialized lathes for metals and plastics; about 25 types of lathes for woodworking; new types of textile machinery; and new types of machinery for steel mills. In the field of agricultural machinery we shall produce, among others, two new grain combines adapted to our conditions; a potato combine, a combine for sugar beet, and new types of tractors.

"The motor vehicle industry must modernize the Warszawa and Syrena cars, as well as the motorcycles now in production and the San buses. It must start producing motorcycles of 250 cubic centimeters, the Star car with a high-compression engine, buses based on a Czechoslovak chassis, and an eight-ton truck." (Planner Stefan Jedrychowski to the Third Party Congress *Trybuna Ludu*, March 13, 1959.)

no longer able to express their views in the carefully censored Polish press, but whose attitude can be gathered from many articles published in the period 1955-1957.

However, by the time the Third Party Congress met in March, five months after the Twelfth Plenum, the draft of the economic program had been revised and the sights for 1965 slightly raised. Jedrychowski told the Congress that this was mainly the result of a more optimistic prognosis for the years 1959 and 1960. (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 13.) There were slight increases in the targets for electric power, metallurgy, machinery, basic chemicals and certain consumer durables. Net capital investment was to rise to 18.5 percent of the national income in 1965, instead of 18 percent. The targets for housing, real income and agricultural production remained unchanged. The Congress resolution on "Directives for the Development of Poland in the Period 1959-1965" stated that the targets were "preliminary estimates" subject to change, and set forth the hope that further study would permit a faster rate of industrial growth based on greater efficiency and lower production costs. (*Trybuna Ludu*, March 24.)


Targets for Industry

The plan continues Poland's industrial revolution at a rate that is bound to have important consequences. Machinery exports are to be trebled by 1965. The chemical industry is to expand its production by 160 percent. Other provisions:

Coal: In addition to the 13 bituminous coal mines now under construction, 7 new ones will be started, 6 of them for coking coal. Faced with the impossibility of expanding the bituminous coal industry fast enough to keep up with the country's rising fuel requirements, the government will begin a large-scale exploitation of Poland's brown coal deposits in Lower Silesia and the province of Poznan. Since brown coal can be mined by the open cast method, production is expected to rise fast enough to provide the fuel for 28.5 percent of Poland's electric power in 1965, as compared to only 1.6 percent in 1958. Thus, the expected 84 percent rise in electricity output will be achieved with only an 11 percent increase in the demand for valuable bituminous coal.

Oil: The construction, with Soviet assistance, of a large oil refinery at Plock in central Poland to process crude oil delivered by pipeline from the USSR, will enable Poland to produce its own refined products instead of importing them.

Steel: A 60 percent increase in steel production will be based mainly on the expansion of Nowa Huta to a capacity of 3.5 million tons, as well as on the completion of the plant for special steels in Warsaw, and expansion of the old Silesian plants. The profitability of the deficit-ridden iron



For over 30 years, the Cegielski Works in Poland was one of Europe's leading manufacturers of steam locomotives. Now, with the obsolescence of these machines, the factory has turned to the production of large marine engines on license from a Swiss firm. Above, in production. Workers at the Cegielski plant were among the leaders of the Poznan riots in the summer of 1956 which were a forerunner of the October upheaval.

Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1958

and steel industry is scheduled to rise by 20 to 25 percent, as a result of hoped-for savings in raw materials of 10 to 15 percent and an increase in labor productivity of 40 to 50 percent.

Copper: Rich deposits of copper have been discovered in the Glogow area in Western Poland, and the development of these will begin. For the present, however, production will be based on existing mines; the new copper foundry at Legnica in Lower Silesia is to double its output.

Sulfur: The sulfur deposits in the Tarnobrzeg area in the southeast, thought to be the largest in the world, will attain large-scale production by 1965 and become the basis of Poland's new chemical industry.

Church, "Peace Priests" and State

Hungarian Priest's Eyewitness Account

By

Andras Muranyi

Andras Muranyi is the pseudonym of a Hungarian Roman Catholic priest, who fled his country after the 1956 Revolt; fears for the safety of relatives still in Hungary forbid him from using his own name.

Editor's Note

ON MARCH 8 this year *Katolikus Szo* (Budapest), the official bi-monthly organ of the Catholic "Priests' Peace Movement" announced that 14 novices had been dismissed from the Central Theological College and the Theological Academy. "It is well-known," said the regime-directed paper, "that the novices in question were dismissed because of their political attitude. Unfortunately this political attitude was not restricted to the 14 novices; with organized activity the chief culprits infected other students. . . ."

The Catholic Church in Hungary continues to be harassed. Usually, however, indications of pressure and interference are not stated as openly as in the extract above. The Kadar regime, unlike that of Rakosi, goes to great length to create the impression that Church-State relations are not only outwardly correct but also that they rest on a firm basis of mutual understanding and cooperation. Two techniques of propaganda are used. The first consists in extracting from the Bench of Bishops ambiguous declarations which can be construed as endorsement of official policies. The second, more direct in approach, involves the use of priests enlisted in the so-called Peace Movement, a regime-controlled organization led in part by priests who have been excommunicated for their cooperation with Communist authorities.

Pressure on the official hierarchy was indicated in a pastoral letter "drafted and passed" at a conference of the Bench of Bishops on October 17, 1958, published in the official organ of the Bench, *Magyar Kurir*, and then broadcast, in French, for external propaganda. Part of the pastoral letter ran as follows:

"We know that the National Assembly [puppet parliament] will wish to act in the interest of our working people, just as the previous one did when it achieved good results. . . . As priests we shall not cease to preach about the value of the immortality of the soul. We bishops and priests work, first of all, for the soul. It is, on the other hand, the natural mission of the State to work for the earthly wel-

fare of the people. We regard this mission of the State as complementary to ours. . . . As a result, we shall approve and help those activities of the National Assembly and the local councils which serve the interests of the citizens and aim at easing the worries and ills of the people."

The following are a few random notices of the activities of the "Peace Movement":

Radio Budapest, November 13, 1958:

"At the Danube Theater in Budapest an electoral meeting took place the morning of November 13 with the participation of several hundred Catholic priests. After the opening by Richard Horvath [a leader in the movement, excommunicated by the Vatican], the meeting was addressed by Dr. Ortutay [a Secretary of the parent People's Patriotic Front]. Comparing present life . . . with that before the liberation, he stressed his conviction that 'the Roman Catholic clergy approves of the fact that power today is held by the Hungarian workers, who are now leading a life worthy of man, and that the clergy also approves the harmony between individual and common interests.'"

Radio Budapest, December 4, 1958:

"At a meeting, December 4, in Budapest, of Opus Pacis, the Church Peace Movement, and the Catholic Committee of the Hungarian Peace Movement, Catholic priests of Hungary adopted, at the proposal of Msgr. Jozsef Grosz, Archbishop of Kalocsa, a declaration addressed to the Geneva conference demanding the absolute termination of nuclear tests. . . ."

Radio Budapest, January 23, 1959:

"The administrative committee of the Catholic Peace Movement, Opus Pacis, met in Budapest on January 22, with Msgr. Endre Hamvas, Bishop of Csanad and Chairman of the Catholic committee of the Hungarian National Peace Council, in the chair. The meeting passed the text of a declaration of the Hungarian Bench of Bishops. . . .

"The second part of the declaration points out that, as an integral part of the camp of the People's Democracies,



A propaganda cartoon after the 1950 "agreement" between the regime and the Catholic Church described by the author. Title: "After the Agreement." Caption: "John Reactionary: 'It isn't even worth while going to church any more.'"

Cartoon from *Ludas Matyi* (Budapest), September 8, 1950

Hungary belongs to the nations opposed to war and is putting all its power into the struggle to safeguard peace and raise the living standard of the population."

These are but a few examples, out of many recently available, of official pressure on the Catholic clergy and the hierarchy and of their response to this pressure. These, however, are only the outward manifestations of a prolonged and fierce struggle between Church and State in Hungary. Behind these declarations—behind the imprisonment of some, of continued resistance by others and surrender by yet another group—there is a decade of bloody and relentless repression. The following is an account by one who lived through it.

* * *

ALTHOUGH the AVH [State Security Police] had been actively engaged in intimidating the Hungarian clergy in the year following the Communist take-over in 1948, trying to force individual priests to act as spies for the government, it was not until 1949, with the establishment of the State Office for Church Affairs, that the persecution of the clergy was systematized.

My first experience with the representatives of the Church Office came one morning in the late fall of 1949 when I arrived, as usual, at the Veszprem episcopal palace for my weekly visit with the Bishop. That day, the Bishop's Second Deputy, who had been waiting for me in the street, accosted me and warned me not to enter the palace, as it was filled with members of the AVH. He also informed me that the Vicar-General, Joseph Hoss, and the Chancellor had already been relieved of their offices. Nevertheless, I decided to enter the palace and see for myself if they were in any danger.

At the entrance to the palace I was met by the security police, who asked me where I was going; without replying, I walked into the office and was confronted by two more members of the AVH, attached to the State Office for Church Affairs. At the sound of my voice the Chancellor appeared from an inner room and explained to the AVH agents that I came once a week to the palace to discuss church affairs. After talking with the Chancellor for five minutes, I turned to the AVH man and asked him to let me speak privately with my friend. Oddly enough he granted this request.

In the next half hour I learned the details of the *coup*. Apparently, the AVH and members of the State Office for Church Affairs had appeared in the afternoon the day before and insisted on speaking with the Bishop. At the end of an hour's conversation with these men the Bishop had called in the Chancellor and Vicar-General and told them they were to be dismissed and replaced. Everything was in a state of grave uncertainty. I was told that the Seal of the Bishop had been confiscated by the State Office for Church Affairs; in this way, His Eminence was prevented from exercising his authority. I was further informed that in the future the Seal would remain in the hands of a representative of the State Office, a non-Catholic, who would also supervise the episcopal office. The Bishop would thus have to obtain a permit each time he wished to leave his residence; his mail and correspondence would be censored; and all instructions issued would have to be approved by the State Office's representative.

After this conversation I left the palace, although I was briefly detained by the AVH and urged to tell my parishioners to comply with all government orders and to pay their taxes. In following months I learned that the State representative had begun to edit and censor the sermon outlines which were handed down from the episcopal office to the local clergy within the diocese. Each time the Bishop left his residence he was accompanied by his new Chancellor and Vicar-General, both priests who were working hand-in-glove with the regime. These men assumed the reins of the episcopacy and directly supervised the work of the local clergy. No private audiences were permitted with

the Bishop, since the new Chancellor insisted on being present at all times.

One of the rare occasions when the Bishop made a private visit to a priest occurred when the State representative of the Church Office, the Vicar-General and Chancellor were all absent. The Bishop at this time took it on himself to leave the palace; on his return he was informed that an AVH man had followed him and knew exactly what he had done and whom he had seen. Later, restrictions were relaxed to the extent that private audiences with the Bishop were permitted; however, any priest granted such an audience was carefully questioned afterward by either a State representative or a "regime priest." In fact, the Bishop himself requested this in order to clear himself of any suspicion. Needless to say, these practices soon emptied the episcopal palace of visiting clergymen.

Pressures on the Parish Priests

SINCE THE PARISH PRIESTS now visited the episcopal palace only in cases of extreme urgency, the State representatives decided to pay calls on them. An auxiliary purpose of these visits was to supervise the local councils and magistrates who had been directed by the State to make careful reports on the religious activities in their respective communities. These municipal officials, therefore, noted who attended church regularly, who observed closely all the rules of the Church, and what teachers introduced religious practices or discussions in the classrooms.

Civil servants and teachers could be dismissed from their positions if they practiced their religion openly. It was more difficult to intimidate tradesmen, but by 1951 the government found means to discourage their religious activities, such as revoking their licenses; farmers who dared to proclaim their religious beliefs were also threatened. Special attention was paid by the State Office to young people: in order to hinder their attendance at church, sports festivals, excursions and movies were organized to conflict with the religious holidays and Sunday Masses.

If a local priest tried to interfere with the plans of the State representative, he was immediately reported to the State Office in his area; in such cases, they might punish him either by transferring him to another parish, prohibiting him from officiating at the Mass, or, in the most extreme instance, by having him arrested by the AVH.

Methods of the AVH

Since the aim of the regime was to make the priest a willing tool of the State, the security police began their process of intimidation by trying to persuade the priest to spy on other clergymen in his district. They would order him to talk to other priests about politics and then report the conversation to the AVH. Every week he was to make such reports. If the priest accepted the assignment, he was left at his post and even financially supported. On the other hand, if he refused, it was quite easy for the AVH to find an excuse to have him arrested. After arrest he would not be heard from for months or even years; on his release he would freely admit his former "anti-democratic"

attitudes. The aim of torture during imprisonment was to "convert" the priest, not to kill him. In my acquaintance the case of Miklos Beresztoczy showed the result of this last method of coercion.

In 1948 Beresztoczy was a well-known priest, Director of the *Actio-Catholica* organization in Budapest and a Canon of the Archdiocese of Esztergom. He was arrested in December of that year. Three years later he re-appeared on the scene as the leader of the Communist-inspired "peace movement." Although it would be almost impossible for me to dramatize even a small percentage of his sufferings, I did receive information from his close friends describing some of the treatment he underwent at the hands of the AVH, and his subsequent attitude toward the regime.

Initially he was taken to the notorious prison at 60 Andrassy Street, Budapest, where he was physically tortured; at one point his toenails were torn off and he was forced to wash the lavatory floors with lye water. On another occasion he was brutally beaten. After his release he was a totally changed man, apparently a willing servant of the regime. For example, after a conversation with him the County Bishop asked him directly: "Would you report what we have just now discussed in confidence?" Beresztoczy replied without hesitation: "Should they ask me, I certainly would do so." Soon after his release, Dr. Beresztoczy became Vicar-General of Esztergom. In 1957 Pope Pius XII excommunicated him when he became a member of Parliament.

Coercion on the Local Level

My own experience with the State Office for Church Affairs and the AVH came in the spring of 1949 when I



Janos Mate, center, one of the three priests recently excommunicated for cooperating with the Hungarian regime.

Photo from *Beke es Szabadsag* (Budapest), July 8, 1953



Miklos Beresztoczy, center, now a leading regime Catholic "peace priest" (despite his recent excommunication). The author describes how Beresztoczy was coerced into support of the Communists. He is shown here receiving a decoration from the Orthodox Metropolitan of Moscow.

Photo from *Beke es Szabadsag* (Budapest), June 17, 1953

was sent to the village of Berzence to replace the parish priest who had been arrested by the AVH. Apparently the excuse used by the local Communist officials to arrest this priest was to charge him with inciting the people to rebel against the public order. This frame-up was effected in the following manner: one Sunday afternoon the District Secretary of the Communist Party appeared in the village shouting that the parish priest had been arrested. On hearing this the people took up hoes, sticks, brooms and other "weapons" and rushed to the parish-house. The priest was not at home. Finally they found him peacefully visiting a friend; he advised them to go home and tell everyone that nothing had happened to him. At the same time, however, another group who had been searching for him encountered the police, started to argue with them, and ended up by threatening them. The police used their weapons, killing a woman, the mother of three children. A minor riot broke out in the village; this was the excuse the Communists had been looking for: the priest and many of his most faithful followers were arrested.

As soon as I got to Berzence the leader of the local Communist Party, a member of the AVH, and a representative of the State Office for Church Affairs came to see me. I was instructed by the government representative to urge the population to vote for the Party at the forthcoming elections, May 10. "I have the right," he explained, "to arrest anybody. I should like, however, to settle things quietly. We are not enemies of the Church. But we only want people to go to church when they feel like it. They should not be forced to go. The people of Berzence are extremely religious and listen to the advice of their parish priest. I have never met such stupid people. That's why

we came to see you. You must be aware of this, and since we trust that you are not an enemy of the people's democracy, you are naturally for your people; therefore, it is your duty to enlighten your flock and tell them to vote for the government."

I made my formal position crystal clear to him: "You came here," I pointed out to him, "on orders of the government, and you comply with the orders of the Minister of the Interior. Otherwise, you would lose your job. My authorized superior is the Bench of Bishops and canonical law. If I do not follow their orders, I will be suspended from my Order and clerical activities. I assume you would not like to deal with a suspended priest. As you know, the Hungarian Bench of Bishops has told priests to refrain from any activities connected with the elections. Your authorities have always asked priests to stay out of politics. Am I not complying with your wishes? Therefore, I regret to say that I'll be unable to comply with your request."

This answer, however, did not satisfy them. They tried to convince me that politically a priest must be independent from his Bishop and the Holy See, and told me I was merely hedging. Finally I decided to speak up: "Listen, let's lay our cards on the table. If you want the people of Berzence to vote for the government, then first the government must show its good-will toward the people here. Release the parish priest and the others jailed; then the people will show their gratitude."

They looked at me without replying; I continued, "I know what you're thinking: Let's have the vote first, and then the government will be generous." At this, the State representative agreed. "But there's one hitch to this," I said, "because such stupid people—as you said yourself—will not be influenced by such promises. They won't believe a word you say unless you first release the prisoners." At this point the State representative offered an intermediate solution: the release of all prisoners except the priest. I told them that the decision was up to them.

Now the AVH men interrupted us with the following objection: "We can't release the other prisoners. If we do so, soon people from other villages will want the same. They will begin saying that the government has cold feet."

"How interesting," I smiled. "I was unaware of the fact that this is a general phenomenon. It seems to me that this generosity would only improve the general atmosphere before the elections. After all, a few villages can't endanger the government." When they left, they told me they would think my suggestions over.

A couple of days later they returned, but preceded by a delegation of the Hungarian Women's Democratic Association, who requested that I put in an appearance at the Mothers' Day celebrations. The State representative also asked me to make the mothers the subject of my sermon in church, since the first Sunday in May was Mothers' Day. I agreed, and at both Masses I spoke of the vocation of motherhood. After Mass the whole group came to see me again, informing me that the local Women's Association in conjunction with the Party leaders were having a celebration that afternoon; I was asked to attend and make a speech. I tried to excuse myself from speaking, since I had

already given two sermons that day, but agreed to make an appearance at the celebration.

They re-appeared in the parish house to escort me to the ceremonies. I knew that these regime officials wished me to take part in the celebration to demonstrate to the people that the parish priest was on their side and that they were not enemies of the Church. In order to avoid this situation I purposely tripped on my cassock and tore the hem. With this excuse I went to the convent and asked the nuns to stitch it up for me, but to take their time about it. The officials urged me to hurry; I told them to go on without me, since it would look quite bad in a "democracy" if things were held up on account of one person.

The celebration was in full swing when I finally arrived. The State representative wanted me to take a seat in front, between two members of the Women's Democratic Association. I realize at a glance that if I consented to do this, I should be photographed sitting between two Communists. Instead, I left without a word.

I spent the next week talking to all the leading citizens of the town, begging them to assist me in arranging for the release of the parish priest. I even saw the Police Chief, explaining to him that, once released, the parish priest would surely be transferred to another town. In the midst of these arrangements, however, the parish priest was forced to sign a confession. A few days later I left Berzence, after being told that the AVH had planned to arrest me if I stayed any longer.

"Peace Priest" Movement

WHILE THE AVH and the State Office for Church Affairs had been active among all levels of the clergy in Hungary after the Communists came to power in 1948, the regime decided by 1951 that the clergy should lend more open support to the government. To this end the clerical "peace movement" was organized. Within each county one priest was singled out to lead the movement. He was visited by the President of the County Council, the District Secretary of the Communist Party, a member of the AVH and the local council President. At first they requested, then they threatened: either he join the "peace movement" or he be imprisoned. One Dean was told that they had found out he had been sentenced to death by the Bela Kun Communist regime in 1919, and that this sentence would be carried out if he did not comply. Another Dean was to be deprived of his parish and accused of immoral activities if he did not join the movement. Priests such as these, intimidated by the regime, were the organizers of the "peace movement."

Early in 1952 a Dean informed me that the President of the County Council wanted to see me at the Town Hall the next morning. Apparently if I agreed to go along with the regime and become a "peace priest," I could look forward to a happy future. I answered that the President of the County Council was not my superior. As I was a parish priest, I could explain that I was too busy to attend, and would accept his "invitation" only if it were approved by the Bishop.



Richard Horvath, center, excommunicated priest and Secretary-General of the regime-directed Catholic Peace Movement. He here stands between two Russian Orthodox clergymen.

Photo from *Beke es Szabadsag* (Budapest), June 24, 1953

A few days later I heard that the "peace movement" had been started throughout the county at that time. Twelve priests attended the first meeting; a staff of officers had been elected, and the agenda had been discussed. All had been guests of the County Council, who asked the priests about their complaints and their desires. All attending the conference were taken home by car, or had their travel expenses paid, and they all received a high *per diem* allowance. Soon after this, the first public meeting was announced. All priests were again visited and told to attend.

At this time I was visited by the County Council President, the District Party Secretary and the President of the local council. I was told that the next "peace meeting" would be held Monday in Veszprem and I was "invited" to attend. A car would be sent for me. I explained that I was recovering from a recent illness and could hardly walk, and therefore would be unable to go. After a good deal of argument back and forth concerning my physical condition, I concluded by explaining that no one who was as ill as I had been could possibly be expected to attend a political meeting. The Party Secretary replied that this was not a political but a clerical meeting.

To this I retorted that it could not possibly be a clerical meeting, as I had heard no word of it from my Bishop. Then the Party Secretary asked if I were of German origin. Realizing that they were going to accuse me of pro-Nazi activity during the war, I explained that I had been interned by the Hungarian fascist government during the war.

They tried a different approach, "You're a kulak, aren't you?" the Party Secretary asked.

"Yes," I said, "I was considered a kulak, but this was a mistake and I have appealed."

"Don't worry," the Council President replied, "we could dismiss the kulak charge if you attended the meeting."

When I refused again, they said they would appear on Sunday to pick me up, and indeed they arrived as scheduled; nevertheless, I still refused to go.

According to all reports, the attending clergy, about 35-40 priests, were sumptuously received. They were told that the clerical "peace movement" had been formed in order to improve the material condition of the poorer clergy. Until then, they said, the Canons and Bishops had been rolling in wealth, but now the State would liberate the lower clergy from their position of "servitude"; there was only one condition attached—that they join the "peace movement." This was the basic approach made by the regime: intimidation on the one hand, promises of wealth and prestige on the other.

When the movement was well under way, they approached me again. Our conversation was as follows:

"Are you a 'peace priest'?"

"No."

"What about the future?"

"I have no intention of joining the movement."

"Why?"

"Because I do not wish to be mixed up in politics."

"You say this? After your political activities during the War!"

"True, I was an anti-Nazi during the War. But now I do not wish to indulge in propaganda activities."

They continued relentlessly: "You know Mindszenty, don't you? Wasn't he anti-German?"

"Yes."

"But at the same time he intended to overthrow the present regime."

"I can only speak of Cardinal Mindszenty as the Bishop of my diocese. Never have I seen such a socially-minded Bishop as he. He kept hardly any funds for himself."

"We're not interested in all this. You must be aware of the fact that he intended to overthrow the present regime. You listen to the radio, read newspapers. What's your opinion about this?"

"I can only speak of him as my superior," I said. "In this respect I can only be grateful to him."

This line of questioning continued, and I tried at every possible move to avoid telling them what they wished to hear. At the end of an hour and a half they left after expressing their extreme displeasure with the attitude I had adopted.

Approximately all the interviews at the other parishes were conducted in this manner. Many of the priests were threatened with transfer to small, isolated villages if they did not become "peace priests"; others were told they would be degraded in rank. The Bishop, in the meantime, could do nothing. He often begged the priests to accept their demotions. The most extreme form of intimidation short of torture was the accusation that the priest had had immoral relations with women. These "crimes" were invented by agents of the AVH, who often hired women to appear at the very moment the security police were ready to call on the priest; it would be enough evidence if they found the priest alone with her.

One of the main jobs of the "peace priests" was to publicize the idea that there was no sense in any resistance to the regime since the Bench of Bishops had concluded an agreement with the State.* After all, if the Bishop had capitulated, why should the parish priest resist? If you get into trouble, they argued, the Bishop will not help you; in fact, according to the agreement, he would have to take steps to discipline "disobedient priests." These arguments convinced many priests that it would be better to go along with the regime.

By a three-pronged attack, therefore, the Hungarian clergy was slowly but systematically demoralized. The AVH, the State Office for Church Affairs and finally the "peace movement" took their toll. By the end of 1952, 70-75 percent of the priests were enrolled in the "peace movement." The rest remained passive. They might put in an occasional appearance at a "peace meeting," or even meetings of the local Councils; they dared show no open opposition to the regime, but by their very silence they remained a force against evil and a symbol of human dignity.

*On August 30, 1952, an agreement between the Church and the State was signed; the main provisions stated that the Bench of Bishops would recognize and support the Hungarian People's Republic and would discipline clerics who "fostered dissent"; that the Bench of Bishops would condemn "subversive activities" against the State; and that the Bench of Bishops would urge Catholics to support the 5-year plan. The Bench of Bishops, however, emphasized that this agreement would have to be accepted or rejected by the Vatican. At this writing the Vatican had done neither.





Scenes from three American plays which have had popular recent productions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia (left to right): Frances Goodrich and Albert Hackett's "The Diary of Anne Frank," perhaps the most widely-staged current American play in the area (photo from *Szinhaz* [Budapest], October 18, 1957); John Patrick's "The Teahouse of the August Moon," (photo from *Szinhaz* [Budapest], November 1, 1957); and right, John Steinbeck's "Of Mice and Men" (*Svet v Obrazech* [Prague], February 14, 1959).

Theater in the Soviet Bloc

The theater in Eastern Europe, as elsewhere, both reflects and influences its own milieu. In the ferment after the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress (February 1956), when the grip of Communism weakened, popular feelings and views in the theater increasingly prevailed over the official ones. This article charts the failure of the Stalinist "Socialist-realist" theater, the impact of the mood of dissidence and its expression on the stage, the proliferation and popularity of contemporary Western drama and Western theatrical ideas, and the Party's current attempts to reassert its ideology and control. The first part reviews the theater in Czechoslovakia and Hungary; a subsequent section will cover Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.

IN THE COMMUNIST scale of useful arts, the theater ranks high. As compared to those arts, such as poetry and painting, in which statement is largely personal, the theater is a "collective" experience and its impact is simple and manifest.

Rejecting the contemporary "bourgeois" theater as trivial and venal, the Communist theater proclaims a revolution in the role of plays, players and audience. It is first of all to be a theater for the masses who, in their naïveté, cannot choose their own fare but must have it prescribed by the Party. It is thus necessary to eliminate the "box office" system of stage economics, with its basis in the law of demand. All professional theater in the Soviet bloc consists of permanent repertory companies, run and financed by the State. Professional touring companies and

local troupes are supplemented by amateur theatrical groups, organized in factories, kolkhozes and cultural clubs.

Early in their administration the Communist regimes began to build up the theater materially, especially in the rural districts, where there was the greatest lack of regime organs of influence. These many new theaters were conceived in essence as platforms of ideological indoctrination, virtually "talking newspapers," whose functions in many ways paralleled those of the controlled press. Party-State control of the theater is exercised at a number of points: through control of the content of scripts, screening of performances, and prescribed repertoires.

Theater repertoires lean heavily on the classics. The Communist authorities have always saluted the classical drama—Greek, French, English—with one hand, while

busily revising its texts with the other.* In addition to these, modern Western playwrights whose criticism of "bourgeois society" suited Communist aims and who were at the same time popular with playgoers—notably, Bernard Shaw and Sean O'Casey—had a place in the repertory.

The core of the Communist theater, meant to occupy the leading place in the repertory, is the Socialist realist drama. These are the plays with so-called current themes, set in kolkhozes, coal mines, the new Communist-built steel cities, and "dramatizing" the need to raise production, discredit religious practices, unmask Western spies and speed agricultural collectivization.

Social realism as an authentic theatrical method stems from the 19th century naturalistic theater, particularly as developed in Scandinavia and Russia. Of all Russian "models" exported to Europe, that of Stanislavsky and the Moscow Art Theater was assuredly one of the most viable. But the Communist "Socialist realist" theater is a peculiar distortion: it is the creature not of Stanislavsky and Chekhov but of Stalin and Zhdanov. With its drearily literal style, its explicit "messages," its stock figures of good and evil (the "positive hero," the "class enemy"), it is far from realistic; its image of life is, rather, abstract and factitious.

This new theater never took root or put forth a flower in Eastern Europe, and the hardening grip of State and Party bureaucracy toward the end of the Stalin era led to its almost total strangulation. So great was the resistance to it that the original idea of facilitating theater attendance by mass ticket distribution degenerated into a system for conscripting audiences. Workers had to be dragooned by the trade unions into taking tickets, and they often failed to use them. A joke in Warsaw about a Polish propaganda play on the Indochinese war said that "it is impossible to get seats for it, only sleeping accommodations are available."

Miroslav Stehlik, of the National Theater of Prague, said of this period in *Kultura* (Prague), October 17, 1957:

"With uniformity of repertory and style, our theater entered the period of red-tape in art. The last young [avant-garde group] was closed down, new progressive groups could not—and still cannot—legally form; the theater became lazy and narrow-minded, existing comfortably on subsidies. Typical of this period were the words of the director of the Teplice Theater: 'I would rather play for one worker than for a full auditorium of the bourgeoisie.' And in truth they often did play for an audience of one, although I doubt if his class origin had much to do with it."

"The Defense of Granada"

In January 1956 a leading Polish Communist writer, Kazimierz Brandys, published a long story called "The

* This practice was one of the first "abuses" in the theater to be denounced during the "thaw": *Teatr*, (Warsaw), January 15, 1956, called it "vulgar sociology to adapt the classic plays to our contemporary conception [Marxism-Leninism]. We cannot cram into a play things that the author did not write and did not mean to write. . . . Such action results in monstrosities. . . ."

Defense of Granada,"* which charted the degradation of the theater under Stalinism from behind the scenes. Brandys described the fate of a "revolutionary" theater put together in the rubble of postwar Warsaw by young left-wing idealists. The story contained a striking portrait of the new cultural commissar, who at first "guided," then effectively took over the theater. His first move was to block the presentation of a play by Vladimir Mayakovsky, the fiery poet of the Russian Revolution, on the grounds that it is more to the interest of Poland's "revolution" to present the masses with "images of production." With chilling irony the author described the "success" of the group's first play, which received enthusiastic official endorsement, and played night after night to empty houses.

With the erosion of Party authority, particularly after 1956, the theater in Eastern Europe showed an accelerating tendency to revert to its prewar character. Audiences, critics, managers and directors began increasingly to regard entertainment—rather than "social enlightenment"—as one of the legitimate goals of the theater, and to turn to the popular classics, the plays of the 1920's and '30's, and to contemporary plays outside of the Socialist realist frame.

Under Stalin, virtually no new Western plays were published or staged in Eastern Europe. With the lifting of the taboo, the tide of Western plays in effect set East European stages awash. The most spectacular success seems to be that of the contemporary French theater, from Jean

* Available in English in "The Broken Mirror," Random House; 1958.



A scene from "The Tempest," by Imre Dobozy. This play, which opened in April 1958, was Hungary's leading contender in the revival of "Socialist realism" in the theater after the Revolt. It deals with events during the Revolt, and contains all the stock and simple-minded ingredients of Communist drama, including the heroic security policeman, the wicked former estate-owner, etc. The play has been produced all over Hungary.

Photo from *Szinhaz* (Budapest), April 11, 1958

Anouilh to the existentialist avant-garde, Beckett and Ionesco. The English stage is represented mainly by the plays of John Osborne, which have also created a sensation. The most popular American play has been *The Diary of Anne Frank*, which has been presented in every country of the Soviet bloc. American dramatists previously banned and now in demand are John Steinbeck, Arthur Miller, Tennessee Williams, among others. Another newly accepted dramatist is Bertold Brecht, toward whom Soviet bloc officialdom has long held an ambivalent attitude: his position was analogous to that of Picasso in the art world. Long a zealous Communist (he died recently in East Germany), he is an unreconstructed revolutionary in his art; his highly stylized "epic" method, which he opposed specifically to theatrical realism, was disdained by orthodox Communists as formalistic and degenerate.

Most of the new plays from the West are tolerated ideologically, since they can be construed as "exposés" of contemporary life under capitalism, but this does not seem to be the prime ingredient in their success; they are judged and admired by the audiences, for their art and vitality.

Reform and Reversion

The rather abrupt exposure to the Western theater undoubtedly had a tonic effect in Eastern Europe, but it also heightened the dissatisfaction with the domestic theater. Not only the drama itself, but all theater life is still clogged with the residue of Stalinist practices. One universal problem in the bloc is overpopulation in the theater. This is partly the result of the early program of expansion. But another, less lofty cause might be found in the fact that a theatrical career is one of the main routes to membership in the "privileged classes" in Communist society, with all that this means in wealth, prestige, exemption from the hardships and duties of ordinary working life. Thus the theater has attracted not only too many people, but for the wrong reasons, and with inevitable consequences. This problem is connected with the whole issue of the economics of the theater, which have become a maze of contradictions, abuses and waste. Currently the regimes are taking measures to streamline the administrative and economic operation of the theater, including—as in the Soviet Union—a decisive reduction in the State subsidy.

At the same time, in conjunction with the ideological "offensive" underway throughout the Communist empire, all the regimes are now attempting to drive the theater back onto the Socialist realist track, insisting on a more Party-oriented repertory for coming seasons, curtailing the flow of plays from the West, and prodding playwrights to write more and better Socialist realist plays. The "educational" role of the theater is again being underlined, and "bourgeois" critical theories and practices denounced. Thus, the reduction of State financial aid will make the theaters far more dependent on public demand, while tightening Party requirements will reduce their freedom to satisfy that demand. The theater in Communist Eastern Europe seems caught again in a suffocating squeeze play between Party and public, whose needs here as elsewhere are irreconcilable.

Czechoslovakia

CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD a lively and cosmopolitan stage before the war, and today its theater shows considerable life in at least one direction. Since 1955 the Czechoslovak Communist regime has led the Soviet bloc both in promoting official cultural exchanges with the West, and simultaneously in attacking Western political and economic institutions. Thus it is that more contemporary Western plays have been successfully staged in Czechoslovakia than anywhere else in Eastern Europe, except Poland, while the indigenous Czechoslovak theater has been rigidly circumscribed, and vitiated, by orthodox Zhdanovist dogmas.

The Western Drama

In February 1956, the New York company of *Porgy and Bess* scored a resounding success in Prague. It was the first major Western company to appear in Czechoslovakia since the Communist coup in 1948. All performances were sold out even though official ticket prices (30-50 *koruny*) were much higher than normal (average weekly wage: 300 *koruny*).

Since then a large number and variety of plays from the West have been given Czechoslovak production. According to *Literární Noviny* (Prague), March 8, 1958, about 40 successful plays were staged in 1956-57. Richard Nash's *The Rainmaker* and Lillian Hellman's *Autumn Garden* were outstanding hits. ("In our theater repertory the good comedy is indeed a novelty," the Prague paper *Lidova Demokracie* observed in reference to *The Rainmaker*.) The Prague National Theater production of John Osborne's *The Entertainer* was perhaps the major theatrical event of the 1957-58 season. Opinions on the merits of the play and on the wisdom of presenting it to Prague audiences were widely—and apparently quite freely—discussed in the press. *Divadelní Noviny* (Prague), which supported the presentation, published a letter from a reader on January 22, 1958, which complained that the play was decadent and sent audiences away with a "feeling of emptiness." A letter in the February 5 issue pronounced it the duty of the "healthy"—i.e. Communist—camp to "extricate those unhappy people from their terrible situation. . . . Let us not condemn but thank the National Theater for knowing how to warn us by such a strong and clear example." Another letter on February 19 held that although the play had no "positive hero," the author, and the Prague director, Alfred Radok, had "done everything possible to supply this missing element in the persons of the audience." One reader who had been to England said that the play was a faithful reflection of the capitalist world: ". . . Does it not make the spectator feel that things cannot go on like that forever, not even in England?"

A dissenting view on the Prague production, based on somewhat different criteria, was registered by critic Jiri Mucha in *Host Do Domu* (Prague), September 1958. Mucha said that what was valuable in Osborne—and was, he charged, completely lacking in the Prague production—was the photographic precision of his characterization of average people in England. Mucha praised the artistic

achievements of the theater in the West: the postwar development of the American musical comedy, he said, was comparable to "the development of the Sputnik by the technically backward Soviet Union." Citing *Guys and Dolls*, *Carousel*, *Kiss Me Kate* and *My Fair Lady*, Mucha concluded suggestively that "after all the public is the



The Disk Theater, in Prague, is the playhouse of the drama faculty of Prague's Art Academy. Above, a performance of the Soviet play "The House in the Suburbs," by Alexei Arbuzov, dealing with the war; it was staged for the fortieth anniversary of the Russian October Revolution. Below, a scene from Carlo Goldoni's comedy "The Little Cafe."

Photos from *Czechoslovak Trade Unions* (Prague), No. 5-6, 1958



same everywhere and its need for higher values in entertainment will probably not be restricted to only a few countries."

Look Homeward, Angel was staged in September 1958 at the Czechoslovak Army Theater in Prague. This was the European premiere of the play, according to the Czechoslovak press. The performance was highly praised, and the Czechoslovak reviewers had no difficulty in reading the "ideological message" of the play ("Eugene Gant's successful attempt to extricate himself from a relationship [with his family] that reduces everything to 'business' is the meaning of this play," said *Rude Pravo*, October 4).

Svobodne Slovo (Prague) reported on August 21, 1958, that permission had been obtained to produce Arthur Miller's *Death of a Salesman* and Erich-Maria Remarque's *The Last Act*. The authors were said to have "hesitated for a long time, probably because they were afraid to discredit themselves by cooperation with a progressive State."

Arthur Miller's *A View from the Bridge* opened in both Prague and Bratislava in February. The play was hailed for its honesty and artistry in depicting the "indifference of 20th century civilization to the fate of the unemployed," but was, of course, found by Communist critics to be incomplete in its social and political message (*Literarni Noviny*, February 7, 1959.)

Abroad and at Home

THE FIRST FORAY of the Communist Czechoslovak theater into the Western world was the participation of the Prague National Theater in the Paris International Theater Festival in 1956. This proved something of a fiasco. Not only were the performances plagued by anti-Communist demonstrators armed with leaflets and tear gas bombs, but the staging itself, of Karel Capek's comedy *The Robbers* and a contemporary play by Nezval, was harshly criticized even by the Czechoslovak press. *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), June 6, 1956, said that the performances were insufficiently prepared, the French audience did not understand the plays, and "a contemporary shop window on a Paris boulevard is arranged with more art and sense of style than were the sets of Capek's lyric comedy. . . . In short: the visit of the National Theater to Paris unquestionably had more importance for us than for the international theater festival. . . . It showed us that we are lagging behind the development of the theater in the rest of the world."

It is undoubtedly this recognition of the high cost paid for the Stalinist policy of isolation, this blow to national pride, that is the root of the current interest in and import of Western plays. The Czechoslovak productions *Laterna Magica* and *The Bartered Bride* sent to the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 enjoyed considerably greater success.

Czechoslovakia has some specialized theaters uniquely of its own (pre-Communist) culture. Probably the best known of these is the professional puppet theater, Spejbl and Hurvinek. It is one of Prague's chief attractions, and was one of the first—and most successful—Czechoslovak cultural "exports" after Stalin's death. In 1955 the com-

pany toured France and England, in 1956 Sweden, in 1957 West Germany, and in 1958 it went to the Brussels World's Fair.

Another theatrical institution is the ABC Satirical Theater*, directed by a well-known writer-actor, Jan Werich. It is probably the only theater in Czechoslovakia which is presently self-supporting. It receives no State aid, and the regime regards it with misgivings, but because of its popularity, especially with foreign visitors in Prague, it is tolerated. *Svobodne Slovo*, July 29, 1958, said that the ABC Theater had become "the rendezvous of foreigners in Prague" and was often praised in the foreign press: the West Germans had compared Werich to Charlie Chaplin.

The D-34 Theater

The D-34 Theater occupies a somewhat anomalous position: founded in 1933 as an avant-garde theater, it is still so considered, although its director E. F. Burian, who is also a writer, actor and composer, is a dogmatic Stalinist**. Burian recently caused a stir by announcing that he was abolishing formal "opening nights" as inconsistent with the Socialist spirit. In a letter to *Rude Pravo*, December 11, 1958, Burian denounced the "premiere clique, bored and overfed with culture." He invited critics instead to attend rehearsals and make suggestions about improving the plays before they were shown. At the same time that he formulated this extreme "class-conscious" position (which had a rather cool and puzzled reception in the Party press), Burian staged a production of Brecht's *Threepenny Opera* in which he apparently returned to the theater's prewar style, marked by "sharp strokes of the gong at tense moments, unconventional sets, accentuated satire." (*Czechoslovak Life* [Prague], January 1959). The D-34 theater generally presents contemporary Socialist realist plays, often Burian's own handiwork. These have apparently been very badly received; according to *Mlada Fronta*, March 17, the theater has recently attempted to conceal the emptiness of its houses by curtaining off a portion of the auditorium. The paper harshly criticized Burian for "tossing off one original contemporary play after the other this season, in the hope that quantity will necessarily turn into quality." *Mlada Fronta* held that the failure of these plays could not be blamed on "audience snobbishness or critics' grudges." Implicitly, it was due to the weakness of the plays themselves.

*The ABC Theater, originally called the Liberated Theater, began as an avant-garde group before the war, headed by Jan Werich, who wrote most of the sketches, and Jiri Voskovec, who is now in the United States and active in stage, television and movies. After the war and the Communist coup the theater was revived to a certain extent by Werich, with Voskovec's parts taken over by Miloslav Hornicek. Its repertory, until recently, consisted of the old prewar satirical sketches brought up-to-date. In 1957 the regime press announced that the theater's range would be "broadened." It recently staged a production of *Arsenic and Old Lace* which was one of the most successful plays of 1958.

** In an article in *Kultura*, July 10, 1958, Burian praised Soviet Socialist realism and said: "It is a great good fortune for [Czechoslovakia] that our order is based on the first country of Socialism. Consequently the art of our nation can only be an expression of that good fortune. There is no avant-garde other than that."



From the D-34 Theater's production of Brecht's "The Threepenny Opera," touring in Warsaw. The D-34 group, founded as an experimental theater in the Thirties, still has a reputation for being avant-garde, although its director, E. F. Burian, is a strong Stalinist. This successful production of "The Threepenny Opera," however, returned to the group's effective prewar style.

Photo from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 9, 1958

Growth and Decline

Since its accession the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia has increased the number of theaters in the country from about 40 in 1949 to 71 in 1958. (*Prace*, March 30, 1958.) The theater in Slovakia, which was much less developed than the Czech (it had only five professional theaters in 1949) was built up, and special theaters were established for the Hungarian, German, Polish and Ukrainian minorities.

All these were subject to detailed centralized State administration, as well as political control by Party members within each theater company. But both artistically and politically the "new" stage failed to develop according to Communist design. In October 1957 a new Theater Bill was introduced which decentralized the administration of theaters, putting them under the jurisdiction of the local national committees. The theaters continue to be subject to "quotas" and "plans," consisting of a number of plays and performances prescribed in advance (The Spejbl and Hurvinek puppet theater was recently leading with 146 percent plan fulfillment).

Prace (Prague), March 30, 1958, revealed that the theaters in Czechoslovakia earn less than one-third of their own expenses, in some cases less than 20 percent. The State subsidy to the theaters averages seven *koruny* per ticket sold. Average annual State expenditure on operations amounts to 2,360 *koruny* for each person employed in the theater. (*Rude Pravo*, December 28, 1957.) Under the Second Five Year Plan the theaters are charged with increasing their financial independence by seven percent.

Miloslav Stehlik, a prominent playwright, declared in *Kultura* 57, October 17, 1957, that the problem of unqualified performers was a main obstacle to raising the artistic level of the Czechoslovak stage, and he showed how this was directly connected with fiscal practices in the theater. In every cast, he said, there are a few qualified actors, surrounded by what he termed "rubbish"—actors

playing supporting parts or not performing at all but engaged only to raise the numbers for the purposes of salary computations. Every theater has a fixed average of salaries, for example, 1,000 *koruny* monthly per performer. In order to retain an actor of the first rank in his cast, the theater manager must pay him 1,400 *koruny*, and in order to do this he must engage two actors of less than average qualifications to whom he pays 800 *koruny* each. "This is of course immoral and uneconomic, but it is necessary," Stehlik wrote. "The tragic part is that the young actors making up the 'rubbish' are given no professional opportunity and are kept among the 'rubbish' as long as possible. How low we have sunk in the administration of our theatrical art!"

Theater Artists' Union

IN 1957 a Theater Artists' Union, the theatrical equivalent of the established Writers', Composers' and Graphic Artists' Unions, was set up by the regime. Previously theater workers in Czechoslovakia had no official organization and no press organ. The new Union started out with a ("voluntary") membership of 600, and includes actors, stage managers, translators, set designers, composers, critics, theater scholars, teachers, etc. It has three sections: drama, musical drama and puppetry; and a special Slovak branch. A 36-member Central Committee was elected at its first Congress in March 1957, at which a letter pledging "unshakable loyalty to the idea of Communism and to Socialist realist art" was dispatched to the Central Committee of the Party. On November 12, 1957, the first issue of a new bimonthly, *Divadelni Noviny* (Theatrical Gazette), was published in Prague as the organ of the new Union. The Union undoubtedly serves as an instrument for tighter control over the theater.

Ideological "Slippage"

IT IS THE TREND of ideas in the theater that the regime sees as the greatest threat to its theatrical (and indeed more general) intentions. The rise of non-Marxist critical standards and interest in non-Party themes, the boycott by playwrights and theater managers of the Socialist realist drama, indicates that those working in the theater are at one with the Party-State officials at least in their dissatisfaction with the contemporary Czechoslovak theater.

In a speech to the National Assembly on October 31, 1957, Minister of Education and Culture Frantisek Kahuda, while conceding the failings of the "immature, schematic plays" of the Stalin era, complained that some theaters had not staged a new contemporary play for years.* Accord-

* Miloslav Stehlik has been writing a series of plays intended as a dramatic panorama of Czech village life from the beginning of the century to the present. The second play, produced in June 1955, was said by *Rude Pravo*, June 28, 1955, to be the first contemporary Czech play staged by the Prague National Theater in "six whole years."

ing to Kahuda, the proportion of these plays had risen recently from one-third to one-half in the overall repertory, but he charged that too many theaters still prefer to stage classical and historical drama and Western plays. He warned against the development of a "one-sided reaction to the one-sidedness" of the Stalin era, above all against "over-estimation of the mere artistic component of works . . . while their social meaning and political impact are ignored." He condemned examples in the press of the revival of the "liberalistic, individualistic superstition" that an artistic achievement should be judged only by artistic criteria.

The resistance of playwrights to prescribed Party themes was illuminated by the results of a playwrighting contest reported in *Kultura* 58, July 24, 1958.** The majority of the plays submitted dealt with family and personal problems. The artistic and technical level of the plays was criticized by the judges and neither the first or second prizes were awarded, although several of the most prominent Czech playwrights took part.

Rude Pravo, March 20, 1959, complained that figures of workers and peasants have disappeared from the stage "as if they were responsible for the schematic dramas written about them some time ago." According to the paper, they have been replaced by doctors, scientists, professors, literary men, actors and clerks as the central characters in contemporary drama. The paper warned that "we cannot permanently omit [from the drama] those upon whom our society is built and who are the pillars of our time. . . . Without them we shall be unable to catch our Socialist epoch on our stages."

The demand for strict ideological conformity—with its portent of increased intimidation and coercion—called for by the Eleventh Congress of the Czechoslovak CP in June 1958, evidently caused considerable unrest in the theater world. *Divadelni Noviny*, June 11, 1958, wrote sharply:

"Some people have been making a great effort to keep alive among the artists the 'fear' that the Eleventh Congress would bring a 'tighter course,' that the ideological screw would be turned a bit harder on them. At a time when our Party is [working] for the completion of the Socialist construction of our economic life . . . some little Columboes of theatrical theory and criticism are attempting to 'solve' the problems of our theater without any 'restricting' considerations of the audience or of life itself. . . . It has never occurred to them that there is no new

** According to *Kultura*, 182 plays were submitted in the contest, which was held by the Prague Central National Committee in cooperation with the Municipal Theaters. About 70 percent of the entries took family and domestic conflicts as their theme. Some 20 percent were on the subject of "the problems of young people, most of which were attributed to drinking. . . . More attention was directed to the errors of disturbed youth than to youth who takes an active part in . . . the successes of our economic struggle. . . . Generally interesting problems were described by female pens which on paper threatened selfish husbands, described their own exhaustion from overwork, and tried to prove that men should be re-educated." The paper said that a large number of plays dealt with international politics, but that many of these showed conspicuous ignorance of the situation in capitalist countries. Implausible milieus, poor use of language and insufficient grasp of psychology and of the laws of dramatic construction, together with an excess of "exterior ideology," rendered these works something less than gratifying to the judges.

Communist Critics Moonstruck

THE COMPLEXITIES and hidden traps in the path of the unwary Marxist critic evaluating American plays were well illustrated by the case of John Patrick's comedy *Teahouse of the August Moon*. The play was at first enthusiastically received in both Bulgaria and Hungary, but closer analysis exposed it as an unusually subtle whitewash of American imperialism, as shown by the following two excerpts from the Communist press.

Otechestven Front (Sofia), October 18, 1958, wrote:

"Our Socialist theater shows great interest in the works of progressive playwrights of non-Socialist countries. The picture of decaying class society disclosed with the force of art educates our audience and stimulates its hatred towards the supporters of this inhuman order. But we cannot maintain that all the plays selected by the theater groups in our country adequately [serve this aim].

"We must try to clear up one question—the question of what opportunity authors in capitalist countries have to express openly and directly their negative attitude towards the existing order. No doubt they do not have such an opportunity and we cannot require this from them. They are often compelled to use Aesopian language, aphorisms, metaphors, in order to get their point past the censorship. But in the end it is just this point which is most important for us. And it is just this point that is not always properly evaluated by some theaters. . . .

"A most vivid example of this is furnished by John Patrick's play *Teahouse of the August Moon*, which was translated at the wish of our theaters but not performed because of the objections of our theatrical world. It is strange to see how the progressive value [ideological merits] of this play was determined. Certainly at the start the reader gets the impression that the author is criticizing the stultifying influences in the American Army that exert a colonial pressure on an eastern State. But soon we see the American colonialists and the natives come to a full understanding, the condition of which is that they will divide between them the local alcoholic beverages and the teahouse with the pretty geishas. . . . Captain Fisbey [the hero] is well disposed toward the subjugated population; one might even get the idea that there are some American officers who are not animated by the oppressive spirit of their commanders. But the way Patrick describes the oppressed Okinawa people can only be termed a calumny. They are depicted as without culture, as lazy, accepting slavery voluntarily so long as it supplies them with alcohol and women for pleasure. The proponents of colonialism could hardly wish to add anything to this picture, which reveals real racial arrogance."

In Hungary, according to Istvan Kende in *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), December 12, 1957, the play was produced at a Budapest theater and received favorable reviews. The critics "seemed to give credit to and accept the message of the play; which is, that the Army of American imperialism is innocent, although its officers are sometimes whimsical and narrow-minded. . . . In fact, the play does not condemn or expose the clumsy but innocent colonialists; on the contrary it absolves them. . . ."

aesthetic concept without a new concept of our society . . . that a new theatrical form is not the result of a caprice of Messrs. Vostry or Kopecky or Hajek, but the result of a comprehension of [the social developments] around us. . . ."

Party activity is to be spurred backstage, where too many theater "collectives" have abandoned the practice of "criticism and self-criticism", according to *Rude Pravo*, September 18, 1958. The paper scored the lack of political concern in the theaters and the weak influence exercised by the Communist members of the casts.

A stalwart Stalinist, Bedrich Prokos, was installed as director of the Prague National Theater in October 1958, and at ceremonies celebrating its 75th anniversary in November, Party chief Antonin Novotny again warned the theater world against "closing its doors to the struggle for Communism." But the extent of the inroads of "revisionism" in theater circles was most sharply exposed at a conference on theater criticism held in Prague in December 1958. According to *Praca* (Bratislava), December 5, the conference dealt chiefly with the need to "check the currents set into motion by the Twentieth Congress, particularly the nihilistic tendency to liquidate everything achieved by our theater since 1945 . . . and to surrender the social-educational role of the theater." The paper cited "confusion about the very principles of Socialist art." It admitted that "a part of our theatrical people still stick to their errors and want to see the Socialist world go in the direction in which they tried to push it immediately after the 20th [Soviet] Congress [in February 1956]. . . . It is no secret that many Communist artists have committed grave errors."

That audiences have regained a franchise in the theater which was denied them under Stalinism, and that they have exercised it in a forthright manner, is revealed by a report in *Rude Pravo*, March 20, 1959, which said that less than 12 percent of the theater-goers in 1958 went to new "contemporary" plays. The overwhelming majority patronized prewar plays and classics: while the most popular play, which 90,000 playgoers saw at the ABC theater in Prague, was *Arsenic and Old Lace*.

Hungary

HUNGARIAN THEATERS reopened in the ashes of the October 1956 Revolt with a repertory of romantic comedies and revivals of the sentimental musicals of the Hapsburg epoch. There was a virtual epidemic of the works of Ferenc Molnar: at the beginning of 1957, *Olympia* was playing at the Petofi Theater in Budapest, *The Swan* at the People's Theater and *Liliom* at the Miskolc Theater, the largest provincial playhouse.*

The seeming incongruity of this repertory was in fact consistent with the Soviet-imposed regime's Janus-like policy of accompanying its ruthless political reprisals with a certain indulgence in cultural and (for a time) economic

* There are about 20 permanent theater companies in Budapest and two opera companies. Almost every town with a population of more than 30,000 has its own permanent theater. In addition, in Budapest there is a Literary Theater and a puppet theater; there were cabaret theaters giving satirical revues. These last have now been completely suppressed.



One of the most successful and widely-staged of recent Western plays was John Osborne's "The Entertainer." Above, the Czechoslovak production in Prague.

Photo from *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), March 1958

matters. This permissiveness went to extreme lengths in the theater. The Budapest National Theater reopened with Laszlo Nemeth's play about the Inquisition, *Galilei*, which had been suppressed as "inflammatory" just prior to the Revolt. The People's Army Theater, the chief Party theater under Rakosi, reopened at the beginning of 1957 with a program of plays by Rostand, Shaw and Anouilh.

Until 1957, no contemporary American plays had been presented in Hungary for more than eight years. In 1957, *The Diary of Anne Frank*, *Of Mice and Men*, *Teahouse of the August Moon* were produced in Budapest. The Kadar regime tried to obtain production rights to a number of other plays, among them Arthur Miller's *The Crucible*, but was refused permission by the authors.

John Osborne's *The Entertainer* was presented by the Katona Jozsef Theater in July 1958. It was well received by the regime critics but was not a popular success. *Look Back in Anger* was recently published in Hungary, and the Party daily *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), October 17, 1958, urged that it be given a stage production.

1957 also saw the presentation of *The Egg* by Marceau, an existentialist play of the Beckett-Ionescu school.

There was virtually no "Party-minded" drama in the 1957 repertory, and no new works from the major contemporary Hungarian playwrights (as from most Hungarian writers), many of whom had played a key role in the Revolt.

This concessionary theater policy continued into 1958, at a time when all other regimes in the Soviet bloc were attempting to curb the "evansionist" tendencies of their theaters and to restore the principles of Socialist realist dramaturgy. *Szinhaz* (Budapest), July 5, 1957, noted jocularly that the Hungarian stage in the 1957 theater season was populated with kings, counts and aristocrats. The Kadar regime apparently sought at this point deliberately to strip the theater of all political and "social" significance and confine its function to diversion. The recollection of the consequences when the theater assumed a political role in earnest by attacking the pre-Revolt regime still hung in the air.

Even under the stringent controls of the Rakosi regime, the popular appeal of some plays had been derived at least in part from their symbolic criticism—mainly in terms of historical analogies—directed at the existing oppression. Such was the case with the works of two of Hungary's most popular and influential playwrights, Laszlo Nemeth and Gyula Illyes (both non-Communist and members of the Populist movement. See *East Europe*, February 1959, pp. 38-39). Illyes' *The Flame of the Torch* and *The Example of Ozora*, both presented during the Rakosi era, dealt with the 1848 Hungarian Uprising against the Austrians. *Galilei* by Nemeth was produced early in 1956 and banned after a few performances. Its suppression was one of the points of grievance against the regime raised by the writers as their disaffection mounted during 1956.

Perhaps the most overtly anti-Communist play of this period was Jozsef Gati's *Mountain of Freedom*. Produced just before the outbreak of the Revolt, it was completely sold out for every performance. The central character is an ambitious and ruthless Communist who turns his brother over to the authorities for having pointed out and criticized the crimes of the regime; ostracized by his family and friends, he is left at the end with only one companion, the AVH (security police) guard who has been assigned to protect him. After the Revolt, Gati was sentenced to serve ten years in prison.

The Return of Socialist Realism

THE 1958-59 REPERTORY was still composed mainly of light, non-political fare. However, there began to be agitation in Party circles for a restoration of Socialist realist principles and for new plays with "contemporary themes." In April 1958 Politburo member Gyula Kallai said to the Hungarian National Assembly that "in contrast to the previous period [that of Rakosi] we do not bar the public or the creative artists from [Western drama] . . . but we do not approve of our leading theaters filling their repertories with low-grade Western works such as *The Fourposter*, *Teahouse of the August Moon*, *The Egg*, etc." (*Magyar Nemzet*, April 19, 1958). *Elet és Irodalom* (Budapest), July 4, 1958, took a strong stand on behalf of the "suppressed" Socialist realist drama, told its proponents to take the offensive and prevent a repetition of the previous year's theater season.

On August 29, 1958, *Nepszava* asserted that the new season would be "politically" sounder than the last, that



Adam, Eve and Lucifer in Imre Madach's famous play "The Tragedy of Man." Written in 1862, the play is a poetic and allegoric history of mankind. It was banned from the Hungarian stage in the Rakosi era, but was produced during the pre-Revolt thaw and attracted large audiences, who viewed it as symbolic criticism of the Communist regime.

Photo from Hungary (Budapest), March 1955

Western plays would be more carefully selected. But, a hidden pitfall in this policy was pointed out: "If we show only the best of bourgeois art, we could be inadvertently spreading the impression that . . . anything which comes from the West must be exceptionally good."

Magyar Nemzet, October 11, 1958, said that no capitalist regime furthers the cause of world classical literature as does Communism—"Does the British man in the street love Shakespeare as much as the workers of Csepel do? We do not think so,"—but the paper warned against restricting the theater to the classics and called for new contemporary drama. The paper cited a new one-act play on the subject of the 1944 anti-Fascist struggle, declaring that although this subject had been dealt with before, it might be considered "relatively new." "Indeed," said the paper, "the counterrevolution [1956 Revolt] revived the specter of Fascism, and therefore plays which deal with the 1944 events in a sense take a stand for our present regime." It was to be hoped, however, that this would not be the only form in which the new drama would express its support, the paper added.

A number of new plays were included in the 1958 repertory, all of them by little-known Hungarian playwrights. The leading dramatists still kept their silence. As in Czechoslovakia, many of the new plays deal with matrimonial conflicts, domestic crises, etc. The 1958 repertory also scheduled a larger proportion of plays from the Soviet Union and the rest of the bloc. But most significant was the return of the play with an explicit propaganda message.

Anti-Revolt Propaganda

The propaganda plays of 1958 have only one main theme and purpose: the discrediting of the 1956 Revolt. Tied in with this is propaganda for farm collectivization. Most of these plays are set in the farm districts rather than in Budapest, which was the center of the Revolt. (Thus the Revolt can be "explained"—discussed by the characters using the regime arguments—rather than directly represented.)

The exemplary model of these plays, which the regime has enthusiastically endorsed, is *The Tempest* by Imre Dobozy, which opened in Budapest in April 1958 and has been included in the repertory of all the major theaters throughout the country. The Party has promoted it even to the extent of "mobilizing" audiences for it, a tactic which was dropped before the Revolt and only used since in this one instance. The play contains all the stock characters from the old Socialist realist storehouse: the heroic AVH men, the former big landowner, the ignorant and wavering kolkhoz manager who is "enlightened" at the end. The message of the play was spelled out in *Szinhaz* in April 11, 1958, in the following terms:

"The memory of 'the tempest' is still very much alive in our minds. There is no one in the country who was not touched in some way by the wind of October 1956. And the manner in which various individuals withstood the tempest, proved their loyalty, courage and love of humanity, will be the theme of playwrights for some time to come. This is the subject of Imre Dobozy's play . . . he deals with it courageously and effectively.

"Where does the loyalty of the Hungarian peasantry lie? With the people's power, the Communist regime, or with the counterrevolutionists? [Their answer] not only tipped the scale in 1956, but gave an effective reply to the charge that Socialism is alien to the peasants, that the

(Continued on page 51)



At a meeting of a theatrical workers' Communist Party organization.

Photo from *Szinhaz* (Budapest), September 5, 1958

February Sunshine

by Akos Kertész

- How do East European workers change jobs?
- What do workers want in a job?
- How do factories differ?
- What are working conditions really like?

These and other questions are answered in this Hungarian short story reportage, which appeared in the Budapest literary magazine *Kortárs*, December 1958. The story, telling of two men in search of a decent place to work, shows what the much-boasted full-employment under Communist regimes really means in terms of overwork, inefficiency, low living standards, deleterious effects on the morale of workers and severely throttled economic mobility.

IT WAS SIX-THIRTY and Gyula Homok blinked into the gray February morning. The world seemed quite different to him as he looked at the cheerfully glittering houses along Pacsirta Street. He was not used to the transparent, almost milky air of the early morning, which he had not seen since last September. The Hermes automobile factory was in Lorinc, and he had to leave his home at 5 in the morning to get there on time, and during the winter it was usually very dark at that hour. Leaving the house in the growing daylight reminded him of spring, and a sense of hopefulness rose in his heart alongside the lurking anxiety. For the fact that he left home at 6:30 instead of the usual 5 A.M. was because he was looking for a job.

Not that he did not have a job—he had one, but it was a very poorly paying one. Recently he had become friendly with Balint Baracs who had talked Homok into the important move. The brother-in-law of Baracs worked in some auto repair shop, and he fairly turned Baracs' head with the stories about what a good job he had. Baracs was a restless type of fellow, and he had worked at many places. When he was younger, he had been a regular ladies' man; he had even left his first wife without observing the formalities. To make a long story short, one day, when Homok was discouraged and disgusted, Baracs suggested that they leave their place of work—after all, a good mechanic is welcome anywhere. It was not difficult to convince Homok because he was completely fed up with conditions at the Hermes plant.

Every month it was the same story; during the early part the workers wandered idly around the plant, standing around one machine, then another, and to pass the slow-moving time they cracked bitter jokes about loafing. For instance: "Is it true that he also serves Socialism who, in Socialist competition, only stands and waits?" (For everybody knows that in such competition one should work and not stand.) The proper answer to this question was:

"We're storing up energy, comrade, for the rush at the end of the month." This is how they passed time, and the work done by the tenth of the month didn't amount to 200 forint. During the middle part of the month work went on at a normal pace, but the last part of the month brought such a frantic scramble that practically no one went home at night.

And that was only part of their troubles. During the rush at the end of the month the men were pushed around from one job to another. The chief engineer would have a nervous breakdown and give the department heads a dressing down, pointing out that if the schedule was not met, there would be no bonus. The department heads took it out on the foremen, and the plant resounded with their shouts. For the bonus was an important matter. Then the foremen took off into the various parts of the plant and issued orders: "You stop what you're doing and make five pieces of this." You hardly managed to complete one order when the foreman was at it again: "Botka is sick, five doors must be completed; you can't go home until they're finished." You could yell in protest, but the foreman could yell, too, and you could throw down the hammer (fighting a strong temptation to use it on the foreman's head), but what was the result of the big fuss? At the end you stayed in the plant and finished the doors. And, gritting your teeth, you continued to work twelve hours a day, several nights, and one or two week-ends. Finally the plan was fulfilled, the bonus granted, and at the next production meeting it was revealed that lax labor discipline was the greatest source of trouble.

And that wasn't all. The worker was such a fool that for a few nice words of praise he would work his fingers to the bone. If the job was handed over to you with a remark like, "Look, Homok, I know what you can do, no one else in the shop can do it as well," then you gladly worked even if the reward was meager. But at the Hermes Fac-

tory? Praise or nice words were unknown there. There was a small clique, friends of shop-chiefs and foremen, and they always took home the honors. And not only the honors—also the bonus, whenever there was one.

As you can see, both Homok and Baracs had had enough of Hermes. They felt it was time to find a nice little shop, without an assembly-line, where the norm-steward did not watch every man's output with an eye to cutting production time. And most of all, a place where the pace was normal. For a worker should take care of himself; his physical strength, his good health are his only assets. And yet it is the worker who pays least attention to this. But now Homok and his friend decided to stop killing themselves for bonuses received by the privileged few—they decided to take a day off and look for a new job.

THAT'S WHY HOMOK left his home at 6:30 instead of at 5. He was to meet Baracs at 7, but Homok was early. So he leaned against a shopwindow and lazily thought about how different the world looked at that time of day. The end of Vaci Street looked so strange in the dimness of this early winter morning that he felt as if he were wandering in a foreign city. Unfamiliar faces were hurrying towards their own destinations, and Homok killed time by trying to figure out where some of them worked and what their profession was. Fat coachmen sat with great dignity in the driver's seat, wrapped in heavy coats and blankets behind the wide rumps of their well-groomed horses. Homok had to admit that of all the people these coachmen looked the best fed and most prosperous: their bottoms were almost as wide as the rump of their horses, and their heads rested solidly on thick, red necks. All of them were amazingly alike.

The fog rose lightly, and a gentle breeze, carrying the promise of spring, teased the soot-covered world and tore playfully into a strand of hair peeking out from below Homok's hat. He pushed back the stray bit of hair under his hat with a careless gesture. He was smiling, for the light breeze made him feel the pungent, overpowering fragrance of spring. He enjoyed waiting for Balint, the feeling that no one was hurrying him, that he was the only one in this rushing crowd of men who had time on his hands; he could enter a bar and have a drink of rum, and his body shivered with the imagined pleasure. But even better than that was to stand there lazily, because even the rum was not really necessary, while the deep calm soothed him.

Suddenly the figure of Balint Baracs emerged from the shapeless mass of people milling around the streetcar station. He moved towards Homok with a strange teetering walk, his long nose sniffing the air. When he noticed Homok, the look of worry on his narrow, fox-like face dissolved into thousands of tiny laughing wrinkles, and with a broad gesture he stretched out his big bony hand towards Homok.

"Forgive me for being late, but it's part of this new life. Come on, don't make such a face, let's have a drink somewhere, and then we can go." Balint's cat-like eyes laughed separately, almost independently of his face, and their



Here and below: automobile repairmen at work in a Hungarian shop.

Photos from *Beke es Szabadsag* (Budapest), November 4, 1953

cheerful glint affected Homok; for no reason at all he burst out laughing, and they stood there for several minutes, laughing and shaking hands.

"What did your wife say about our project?" Balint finally asked.

"Oh, Lidi," said Homok, still laughing. "She took it beautifully. She said I knew what was right, the only thing she warned me against was a bad change, getting a job at a place even worse than Hermes."

"Not a chance." Baracs wrinkled his nose. "There isn't another place quite so lousy in this country. But I sure respect your Lidi. My wife put up a such a show. She whined so much I nearly beat her up last night. I said to her: 'you are a reactionary, you're scared of anything new.' But such talk has no effect on her. She said that so far anything new has always brought her nothing but trouble. 'Even when you married me? That was a novelty, was that bad, too?' She said that was the worst mistake in her whole life. I tell you, Gyula, women aren't made for politics." Homok laughed at the story, until his eyes were watering; he envied Baracs for his light sense of humor. Balint's face was made to cheer people up. His long nose, the slanting eyes and the twinkling wrinkles in his face radiated merriment, and Homok had to smile just to look at him. Baracs was popular everywhere, for people like men with a good sense of humor, men who can dispel everyday worries. To a poor man, a sense of humor is just as valuable as his hands; with his hands he earns his living, and his sense of humor helps him to forget how little that is. That's why a cheerful person is appreciated so highly; that's why everybody likes him.

"Well," said Baracs, looking at Homok, "I hope your courage is back."

"Oh, I've had it all the time," smiled Homok, "let's go."

Baracs suggested that they try the No. 8 automobile repair shop because that one had had an ad in the paper, looking for help. For the last few days they had studied the papers thoroughly, and Homok had made a list of all the places they wanted to call on, so as not to forget any.

The No. 8 shop was in one of the side streets, in the

heart of Angyalfold. They took a streetcar and watched with interest the factories they passed. They were both strangely animated, like people facing some important event but trying not to think about it. They were talking loudly, cracking jokes and kidding, and their good mood made them stand out from the other passengers, who travelled to their jobs with the sleepy dullness of routine. Homok and Baracs were conscious of the difference, and they interpreted it as an encouraging symptom.

As they got off the streetcar Homok turned to Baracs: "Which way?"

Baracs raised his forefinger, indicating that he couldn't talk for a moment, and with great pleasure sneezed loudly. He pulled an amazingly large handkerchief out of his pocket, buried his nose into it and gave off a sound like the trumpeting of an elephant.

"You see, I was right, when I told you that we're bound to find a place better than that lousy Hermes plant," he said triumphantly.

"What do you mean?" Homok asked in amazement.

"You know that sneezing after a statement means that you spoke the truth."

"But you made that statement more than half an hour ago."

"What does it matter? The important thing is that I sneezed. You don't know anything about superstition. But my grandmother was a medicine-woman, a real witch. You just leave it to me."

"Well, if you say so . . ."

"Then, it's so." Baracs completed the sentence with Homok. The fact that they uttered the last few words together gave them a strong sense of belonging, and they felt light-hearted and optimistic.

"Well, which way do we go?" Homok returned to the original question.

"You don't know?" asked Baracs with mock surprise. "Just follow me."

Of course he didn't know the way either, but started out with energetic and determined steps. Homok followed him without thinking. They walked on for a while, talking amicably, but then Baracs suddenly stopped and said in an uncertain, thin voice:

"Perhaps we should ask . . ."

"What?"

"Where Csonak Street is."

"But you said you knew where it was. . . ."

"I didn't say that," replied Baracs, and his voice came out thinly, like the tone of a violin in unskilled hands. "I only said that I would show it to you. But if I don't find out from someone where it is, I can't do so."

Homok was shaking his head laughing: what a guy this Baracs was. It was lucky they were together, much better than if he were all alone. For if someone sets out to do something important all by himself, to face the world alone, the whole day is filled with nervous anxiety and fear. But with Baracs you don't even think of those things. You couldn't, for one look at Baracs' long nose, which was now so dejectedly hanging downwards, made you laugh and forget all your worries.

AFTER A LONG SEARCH they finally found No. 8 shop. They were a little discouraged at the sight of the dingy entrance, the narrow courtyard, full of wrecks of trucks thrown into a disorderly jumble. Compared to the Hermes plant, the whole place looked shoddy, small and very dirty. But while they were waiting they noted that there was a kind of intimate friendliness among the workers, who all seemed to know each other. No one paid any attention to Homok and Baracs, and no one knew anything about the ad in the paper. They called Personnel, inquiring if the company was hiring, but the man in charge was not in. So they just waited. The room was warm and the radio was on, yet after about an hour they began to get very restless: somehow they did not like the waiting and wanted to be out of this place, not being able to explain even to themselves why. Finally a very thin, quick-talking, excitable man came into the room, wearing a fur cap twice the size of his head. He was the Chief of Personnel.

"You from Hermes? Come with me. This way, please, to the office. We can talk better there."

They walked across the courtyard, jumping over pools of mud and water. "Well, this is our dump." (Somehow it did not fit him to use such expressions; it came out awkwardly.) "It's not as modern as Hermes, but not bad. Damn this mud, we plan to put in a cement floor, perhaps next year." They turned into the office building, and there everything was clean and orderly. "Follow me. This way," said the little man breathlessly, quickly running ahead. He opened the door for the visitors and, standing aside, let them go in before him. "Sit down, make yourself comfortable." He himself tossed his fur coat and his magnificently huge fur cap on top of the desk, and then with great informality sat on the desk.

"So you are automobile bodyworkers," he said encouragingly. "How long have you been with Hermes?"

"Four years," Homok answered obligingly, and waited with anticipation for the next question.

"And why did they let you go? With your experience?" the man continued with a smile.

"They didn't let us go, we came on our own," said Homok with surprise.

"But why?" the little fellow continued pleasantly. Not



for a minute did the smile wilt from his face. Homok was much impressed by his cordial manner and could not understand why the expression on Baracs' face was growing darker by the minute. He thought that perhaps it would be better to let Baracs do the talking, in case he, Homok, said something stupid. It's difficult to be smart in such cases. If someone has been sacked, it doesn't put him in a good light, for he may not be a good worker. On the other hand no one cares for a person who just leaves his job without good reason; perhaps he's hard to get along with, or there was disciplinary trouble. If that were true, they wouldn't be hired at all. Therefore it must be made clear beyond any doubt that it was solely the fault of Hermes that they had left. But that's dangerous, too; too much complaining might create the impression that they were hard to please, and no plant likes a worker who is always dissatisfied.

All this flashed through Homok's head. After all, he had discussed the problem before with Baracs, but now suddenly he was scared. He didn't want to bear the responsibility, and he fell silent. Baracs cleared his throat. His eyebrows leapt up into the middle of his forehead, making his long nose appear even sharper and giving his face a funny but also cunning expression. Homok averted his eyes to keep from laughing, while Baracs started to talk with deliberation: "Well, at Hermes there is assembly-line production, and we don't have an opportunity to make use of all our knowledge."

"Don't you make good money on an assembly-line?"

"It wasn't a matter of money," continued Baracs, looking out of the window. "We just didn't like that type of work. It's too monotonous—at least for people who could do so much more. That's why we want to work in a repair shop, that's all." Baracs looked at the little official with brazen insolence, so much so that almost as a reflex a smile of obliging willingness appeared on Homok's face; he was embarrassed. Basically he was not a very helpful man, but he had an engagingly polite smile. He always kissed women's hands, and this rather superficial mannerism made him quite popular. He was generally considered to be a well-mannered person, and that was quite a lot, because it meant that he was almost a gentleman. That is if he did not have to do manual labor for a living. Of course, this opinion was never expressed in so many words, because in the Socialist order the concept of a "gentleman" exists only in the deepest recesses of the human mind. But there it is very much in evidence. Homok was aware of all this, and was quite proud of his pleasant ways, making use of them whenever it seemed expedient. Now he was beaming with humble respect to counteract Baracs' insolence.

"Well, then," the official suddenly stood up, "we'll try to talk to the Comrade Director. I'll call him." Briskly he dialed and then said: "This is Radvanyi. I have two bodyworkers here from Hermes, are you interested? . . . All right, we'll be right up . . . yes, yes. . . . Freedom." He finished with this salutation, put down the receiver and turned to the visitors: "Let's go, Comrade Szenes is expecting us." He slapped Homok's back and said in a stentorian voice: "Let's go, men."

THE DIRECTOR'S OFFICE was on the upper floor. Baracs walked, obviously deep in thought, and Homok did not say anything either. He walked briskly, his muscles deliberately relaxed, his hat pushed back on his head, fighting to overcome the feeling of embarrassment which always possessed him whenever he was to see a real big-wig. Walking up the stairs he tried to imagine what sort of a person the director was. He imagined that a man in such a position would be a tall, wiry person, the face showing the signs of an ulcer, rimless glasses, spare hair carefully arranged. He was weighing which would be a more appropriate greeting, "freedom" or "good afternoon." He decided for the latter, because it seemed safer in view of the fact that most factory directors were not Communists at all, but just pretended to be, to further their careers. On the other hand there were some who became so used to the role they played (or were particularly afraid for their position) that they insisted on the address of Comrade and the word "freedom" for a greeting.

They came to the office. Radvanyi knocked lightly on the door and without waiting for an answer entered the room. He nodded to the men to stay behind, and winked at them as if to say that he was on their side all the way and was going to do everything he could to influence the boss in their favor. Left alone, Baracs and Homok felt that they should quickly decide on the strategy to follow, but were afraid to start, since Radvanyi might return any minute for them. Finally Baracs said in a whisper: "If the pay is good we'll stay. We must find out what the Stakhanovite level is." Homok knew very well why that was so important. In places where the Stakhanovite standard was low, the average pay was low; and if there were very steep norms, wages were also low. A place where a 120-130 percent production standard was considered the Stakhanovite level was not much good, because then the average worker would not reach more than a 100-110 percent—just enough to keep the wolf from the door but not enough to support a family.

Suddenly the door opened and Radvanyi stuck his head out: "Come on in, men," and he again winked at them, indicating that he had smoothed the way for them, and everything would be all right.

They entered. On their left a huge window made the small, comfortably furnished office look very bright. Emerging from the dark corridor Homok and Baracs blinked, almost blinded by the light, but they were glad to know that the sun still shone brightly outside. Under the window was the desk with some papers and a telephone on top; opposite the door a huge safe took up almost the entire length of the wall, while the wall opposite the window was covered with shelves. A small table stood in the middle of the room, covered by a lace cloth, with a fancy ashtray on top. Around the table were three comfortable, upholstered easy chairs. The director was standing at the desk, reading something, but when the callers entered, he turned to them and in a melodious, deep voice greeted them with a friendly "good afternoon," thus solving Homok's problem. The two men replied and hurriedly took off their hats, which in their embarrassment they had forgotten to do before entering the room.

"Illustration of Empty Slogans"



"Help, help, I'm falling!"

"Take it easy, those are only individual complaints. Let's stick to general principles."

Szenes was a rather stocky worker of medium height with wide shoulders, about 55 years old, his healthy, red-cheeked face covered with thick, graying stubble. His open, blue eyes twinkled cheerfully.

"Sit down." With engaging simplicity he pointed to the easy chairs. A wave of friendly trust rose in Homok's heart; he could hardly suppress it and warned himself with sober caution that this type of man often turns out to be the most calculating exploiter.

Baracs made an uncertain gesture towards the chairs, then stopped awkwardly at the table. Homok looked at him without moving; he did not want to sit down first. Finally, at the repeated urging of the director, Baracs settled himself on the edge of the chair, and Homok followed suit. Szenes joined them and began a long talk about the advantages of a small concern. "I know my men," he said. "I am always available to everyone, and if there is trouble I go down and try to put things right. In large plants, like Hermes, the director is high above the workers, unapproachable for them." Then he pulled out some sheets of paper marked with figures. In December two men earned 1700 forint, the rest made somewhere under 1500. Homok looked stealthily at Baracs to see what his reaction was, but Baracs sat there, looking blankly at the director.

"Well, men," smiled the director, "I won't beat about the bush, I do need you. Now, let's go down to the shop, and I'll show you our way of working". He spoke pleasantly; Homok's embarrassment completely disappeared in

the face of such simplicity. A decent guy, he thought, and could not explain to himself why he was so anxious to get out of this place. He asked whether there was a bath for the workers.

"Of course," Szenes answered quickly, "We have a bath, locker rooms, and we also have a mess hall." Homok would have liked to see all these but he did not dare to ask. He felt the same way he had the time when he went shopping and was served by an overly-helpful clerk: he had been too shy to look over all the goods the clerk had dragged out, nor did he dare ask to see something else, particularly when he had the feeling that he would probably walk out of the store without buying anything. He felt the same way now and was almost ashamed of himself as he trotted after the rest of the group towards the shop. He didn't know why, but somehow he was quite certain that, no matter what, they would not stay at that place.

The shop was a narrow, badly constructed, barn-like place.

"Until now we had no heating installation in the place, but next year, it'll be as warm as a bakery," Radvanyi explained. "The blueprints are all ready, we have the budget, you'll see it all."

Homok did not want to see anything. The disorder in the shop was simply shocking. He did not see a decent workbench, an upright drill, or even a grinding machine. He again tried to catch Balint's eyes, but Baracs wore a completely inscrutable expression, and Homok did not know what he was thinking or how he felt. He just went on talking about deadlines for the various jobs with the man in charge of norms. Gyula was looking at the workers and wherever he turned he met with hostile glances. The workers were just as cold to the newcomers as the place itself. Finally Baracs ended his talk, they said their good-byes, the director shook their hands warmly, and accompanied by Radvanyi they started to leave.

"We're counting on you," Radvanyi grinned ingratiatingly. "We don't ask where you come from or why. We need and have the budget for three bodyworkers, and naturally we want to hire men who are experts in their field. We know what really counts—" he laughed—"the main thing is the dough, the rest doesn't matter. Well, you can make money here. After all, you could tell that yourself. When will you start?"

Baracs stopped, pulled out his enormous handkerchief and buried his face in it. Then, he lit a cigarette, offering one to Homok and Radvanyi, too.

"When we can start?" he repeated the question. "That we couldn't say for sure."

"I'll tell you one thing," said Radvanyi, "we have to fill the vacancies, it doesn't matter how, although we would rather have good workers. This is understandable, isn't it? But if you don't come in time, we can't keep the jobs for you. I suggest that you call me up later this week, extension 36, Personnel Department. Ask for Radvanyi, that's me. O.K.?"

"That'd be fine," Balint agreed. "If they let us go from Hermes, we'll tell you when we can start working here."

"Good, excellent," Radvanyi gushed, "and be sure you do your best." He winked encouragingly. "I'm sure you'll

be happy here. Well, you can find your way out. So long and good luck."

Out in the street they just walked along without saying a word. At the corner Baracs turned toward No. 8 shop and gave a profound sigh of relief.

"Brother, this is one place we'll certainly not come back to. Lucky we got away with a whole skin."

Homok laughed happily and lightheartedly, feeling as if he had just been released from jail.

"You didn't like it either, Balint? I felt like a fish about to be hooked. A place where they need men that badly, where they're willing to hire someone without knowing where he comes from, who he is, whether he is a good worker, or a loafer, couldn't be any good. And what a lousy little rat that personnel man was. Yet, the director seemed to be a nice enough fellow."

"I don't care how nice he is. I don't want to marry him, all I want is to make money!"

"But it wouldn't be a bad match, and what a lovely little wife you'd make. . . ."

Homok fairly shook with laughter as he imagined Balint, his bony body wrapped in some loose-fitting morning gown waddling alongside the well-fed stocky Szenes, and he could almost see Balint's long nose and stubbled fox-face framed by a red polka-dot kerchief.

"That's enough of this nonsense" barked Baracs, feigning annoyance. "Better start thinking about our next step. It's nearly half past nine and we haven't accomplished anything yet."

ONCE AGAIN THEY CONSULTED their list of addresses, visited three other plants, which were all so repulsive that they didn't even go in. Finally they came to a place, numbered 28 Gabriel Street, which also had an ad in the paper, but at that address there was nothing that reminded them of a repair shop.

It was a dirty gray, one-story house, bars on the windows, the door locked. There was no sign anywhere, so they walked around, trying to find someone who could give them information. Homok pulled out the much-thumbed, greasy little notebook in which he had put down all the addresses to check if this one was right. The address was correct: 28 Gabriel Street.

"God damn it, they probably moved. When did you see this address?"

"Yesterday," Homok answered sadly.

"You mean the ad was in the paper yesterday and they've moved since then?" Balint exclaimed incredulously.

"Well, to tell you the truth, I saw the address not in the paper but in the telephone directory and that was issued two years ago."

"You took the addresses from the telephone directory? How do you know that they are hiring here?" demanded Balint.

"We're bound to come to a place where they need people even though they had no ad in the paper. Hermes seldom advertised, yet whenever a bodyworker came for a job, he was always hired."

Baracs spat out disgustedly. "Let's get out of here, there's nothing here for us."

Just as they turned away, the door opened and a man, wearing overalls, came out with a large tin of paint under his arm. Homok fairly jumped at him.

"Good morning, friend. Do you know what happened to the auto repair shop that used to be here?"

The man in the overalls looked at him with suspicion: "Why? What do you want with it?"

"We are auto bodyworkers and we're looking for a job," said Baracs, coming closer.

The expression on the face of the man changed, suspicion disappeared and like the sunshine in a deep valley, a smile of self-importance and good will lit up his face. He leaned very close to Homok, got hold of a button on his jacket and whispered: "The shop is right across the street. I work there, too. My name is Gal. I am a polisher." He stretched out his hand to Homok.

They shook hands, Homok and Baracs introduced themselves, and the polisher continued:

"This is a good place, a real good one. You should try to get in. We are paid fixed monthly wages, 1300 a month. It isn't too much, but every week we get clean working clothes, a free meal every day, and the portions are so generous that I usually take home some for dinner. It's a comfortable, clean shop, they don't rush us; all we are required to do is to put out nice accurate work. This is the garage of the Minister of Internal Affairs," he continued, lowering his voice even further. "We only have passenger cars, Hudsons and Zises; they all belong to the big-wigs, and that's why we have to work with precision and care. You should be able to get in, they need bodyworkers. We've only a single bodyworker, and he can't do everything. Look, he's just coming out, you could talk with him."

The only bodyworker of the place was a small, stout, elderly man, who was carrying a big saw and several files. He came over to the group and addressed Gal:

"What's the matter, Gal?"

"These are my friends." Gal introduced them. "They're both bodyworkers and want to get a job with us."

"Oh, that would be just fine." The little man sighed. "I am so busy, simply can't manage everything. The three of us could do it comfortably."

"You see," said the polisher triumphantly, "I told you what the situation is here. Come along, I'll take you to the boss. But don't tell anybody, if you're hired, that you work here, or the whole town would swarm to us. Are you employed now?"

"Yes, we work for Hermes."

"You must keep it a secret there for sure, or else it might become a case of enticing workers from another plant, and then we'd all be out. The old man would certainly not want to see that."

Homok and Baracs held their breaths; they were excited. If this worked out. . . . It sounded like a beautiful dream. They were almost frightened to think of the implications: fixed monthly wages—perhaps the first instance of that they had encountered since the national norm regulations. The secret and unattainable dream of every worker: to be rid of the strenuous piece work. At the time the norm-system was introduced, there was still a possibility of making a living, for the time limits were quite reason-

able. At Hermes, too, good workers took home 700-800 forint a week. But the holiday was soon over, and the men learned to be glad if they managed to take home 1500 forint a month. And to earn this, they had to work as much as for the weekly 800 in the old days. Thus the monthly 1300, plus the benefits, seemed like heaven to Homok and Baracs. They entered the building and found a well-equipped, clean garage and workshop. They went up a sloping runway, and at the far end of the hall Gal took them to a long corridor, opening to the left. At the end of it was the office of the manager. Gal knocked at the door timidly, and a high, nasal voice asked: "Who is it?" Gal pushed Homok and Baracs into the room and entered after them. Homok stood to the left of the door, Baracs to the right, politely holding their hats in their hands, and trying hard to create a good impression. The polisher stepped in front of the desk.

"Comrade Steiner, I've brought along two bodyworkers."

The director was a fat man, his bald, shining head sitting almost square on his shoulders. He wore a tan, long coat, and his aggressively arched, thick eyebrows reminded Homok of a beetle. He remained silent for a few minutes, as if deciding whether it was worthwhile answering at all.

"There is no budget for that," he finally said in a flat rejection.

"But Comrade Steiner," Gal continued humbly, "Mr. Pallagi can't manage alone and just now that smashed-up Buick came in. We would really need them. I know them, they're good bodyworkers."

"I'm sorry, there is no money," the director answered in a voice suddenly loud and rasping. "I have just placed an ad in the paper for a mechanic, and I've got the money only for that."

With his cold, beetle eyes he gave a fleeting glance to the applicants. Then he looked at Gal silently, as if expecting other stupid arguments or requests. The polisher was apparently a stubborn man; he did not give up the fight easily.

"Please, I have just talked to Mr. Pallagi, and he told me that two more men would make it just right. The three of them could do the work well. . . ."

"I don't have the money, don't you understand?" barked Steiner, by now impatient and reaching for a pile of papers on his desk. "I applied to the Ministry for it, but it was rejected," he added in a milder tone. "If I get it, I can hire them, not until then. Good-bye."

Thus the interview came to an end. Homok was despondent.

"I knew we wouldn't make it. We don't have the good fortune to find a job at a place like that," he sighed dejectedly.

"I was sure you would make it," said Baracs morosely. "Why me?"

"Because fools are favored by lady luck."

"Come on, men, don't quarrel," interrupted Gal. "You'll make it yet. Some day we shall get the money. You heard what the old man said. He is not a bad man really, he just likes to play the tough guy. He has a heart of gold, and helps wherever he can. He's a Jew, but a truly nice guy. I can't think of a better fellow to work for. Well, come

along in a few days, and look for me, Gal the polisher. I'll take care of you. We must help each other. After all, our work is along the same lines, whatever you mess up making repairs, I cover up with my polish, isn't that so? As soon as we started talking I could tell you were good workers and decent guys, and it's always better if you can pick the men you work with, instead of leaving it to the big-wigs. That's why I want to get you in here. And you'll have a good place, you'll see. And don't quarrel," he added in a low voice and with a friendly smile. "The poor are pushed around by so many, at least we shouldn't be at each other's throats. Well, so long, men."

SO THEY LEFT, and as they passed a tavern Baracs suggested that they go in for a glass of wine. He was ashamed of the spiteful remark he had made and felt that a glass of wine would wash it away. Over a drink they would forget about it, for the best thing is to forget such ugliness. But that's what happens when a man gets angry, he does stupid things. He lashes out at the person closest to him for he can't reach the one responsible for the trouble. Homok didn't say anything about the incident; he knew that Balint was sorry, for his long nose clearly showed that he was worried. In any case Gyula was not the type to bear a grudge, and when it came to his friends he did not take offense easily. So he started talking about the polisher:

"What a nice guy, that Gal. He is really something. It's a pity there aren't more of that type in the world. Life would be different if every proletarian were like that."

They drank their wine with club soda and started out again on their search. . . .

"Well, Gyula, where are we going now?"

Homok again consulted his notebook and pronounced the verdict:

"We'll try No. 15 auto repair shop."

"Did you get this address from the telephone directory, too?" Baracs asked.

"Yes. The only ad in this neighborhood was No. 8. It'd be silly not to visit every repair shop in Angyalfold, since we're here anyhow. They seem to be all around here."

"It's all right with me, I don't mind. But I warn you, if we waste the whole day and come up with nothing I'll be mad as hell."

"Now listen here, Balint," sighed Homok, "you're a difficult man to get along with. Even if we don't end up with anything definite we'll have learned a lot about wages, conditions, the shops and what-not. We'll be in a better position to make our choice. In fact, we shouldn't do anything definite, because if this Gal business came through, that'd be better than anything else."

"That will never come through."

"Now, what's the use of such talk? Are you trying to discourage yourself or me? How do you know it won't materialize? It may very well work out, if we keep after it. Listen to me, you blockhead. If you marry the first girl you meet there's a good chance you'll be thinking about divorce one year from the wedding. But if you take

your pick from 20 girls, you can hope to be truly happy with her. It's the same with a job. If we pick the best out of 20 places we'll be better off than if we got stuck on the first one like a fly on sticky paper. We must find a job where we can make good money and where they appreciate a man and his work. If he fixes up a badly smashed-up car or does a general overhaul job, he ought to be properly appreciated. Not the way they do it at Hermes, where you can work your fingers to the bone and get nothing but tongue-lashings."

Homok was quite proud of the lecture. For once he felt that he was the more mature of the two, and that he was giving new courage and faith to Balint. He was much impressed by his own wisdom and even more with the child-like confidence with which Balint listened to it. . . .

THE NO. 15 AUTO-REPAIR establishment had several shops which were all directed by a central office which also housed the Personnel Department. That's where the friends went first. They were received rather casually, told to go to No. 3 shop on Robert Karoly Avenue, look at conditions there, and if they liked it, to come back to the office.

No. 3 shop was a huge hangar, similar to those at the Hermes plant, just a little smaller perhaps. They found the works manager, whose name was Lorant, who did not waste much time on them but summoned the foreman, a man called Horvath, and told him to find out what they knew. The three of them went into the sheet-processing section. The first thing they noticed was that the plates were of very good quality; generally the equipment seemed to be good, rather similar to that used at the Hermes plant, so they thought the work wouldn't be too foreign to them. Before entering the room the foreman, Horvath, stopped and took a good look at them. They stood the scrutiny calmly and with some pride. "Well, what is your type of work, men?" he asked finally.

"We can press and chase. . ." Homok began; at this point Horvath interrupted:

"You can press? that's good. Let's see how well. Take off your jackets. Here is an unused plate, a chasing hammer, there are the sheets. This is for you," he said to Homok, "and this for you," to Baracs, "start working on it." And off he went.

They started vigorously, but after the first few blows Homok began to feel hot, his face was burning, and soon he was bathed in sweat. The hammer was a very old type, and more than that it felt terribly strange in his hand; the plate seemed to be at an awkward angle, even the light was different from the way he was used to at Hermes. He didn't seem to get anywhere with the metal sheet. At first he did not look around, for he knew that every man in the place who knew how to press a metal sheet was watching him secretly, judging his skill and knowledge. He also suspected that even if he worked like a demi-god, his achievement would be belittled. No one would say: look at that man, he really knows what he's doing. Homok felt as if little insects were crawling on his scalp and at the nape of his neck, and he did not dare to even look at Baracs. He kept his eyes steadily on the

sheet in his hand, following intently every change in its shape.

Slowly, very slowly, the material was becoming smoother, and when he suddenly realized that it was starting to form in the way he wanted it to, the world disappeared around him—there was only he, the bad hammer, over which he had gradually become complete master, and the sheet which was assuming the right form. All at once he had a strong urge to laugh; he was happy and felt victorious because he had conquered the problem. He didn't take so much as one glance at Baracs until the sheet became smooth, shiny, perfect.

When he finally looked up, he found that Balint wasn't doing very well. He was as red as a boiled lobster, and the sheet in front of him wiggled in all directions like an accordion. Homok went over to him and told him in a whisper where to hit it, how to hold it, so that no one should realize that Balint was not hitting the mark. For that would be disastrous: Baracs wouldn't be hired and then he, Homok, would have to go, too, because once they started out together they had to stick it out together. For that's how it should be. Then, in order to avoid discouraging or embarrassing Balint, Homok went back to his own sheet, smoothing and patting it a little more, pretending that he was not ready either.

But that just won't do, he suddenly thought. They should see that at least one of us is doing well. So he stopped pretending, and for the first time looked around, observing the other workers. No one was paying much attention to them, and he noted with pleasure that the general pace was rather easy; nobody drove himself too hard, the way they did at Hermes. This seems to be a pleasant place, he was thinking to himself, at the same time watching Balint with increasing anxiety. Baracs was drenched in perspiration and wasn't getting anywhere. Homok started to wander around, exchanged a few words with one man then another, inquired about norm-times, and the answers he received were very satisfactory. An elderly, gaunt man, separated from the others, was pressing sheets; he was the most talkative and most dissatisfied.

"What do you get for a sheet here?" Homok asked him.

The old fellow shrugged his shoulders and said curtly: "Dough." Then he turned abruptly towards Homok and said: "I have 60 minutes to do one square meter for category 6. Everywhere else this work is classified category 7, here it is 6." He spread his hands: "That's how things work here. In two hours you have to finish a full sheet, but if I want to make a living I have to finish it in one hour. I ask you, who the dickens could press this blasted, hard metal? Well, tell me, who the hell can finish such rotten, hard metal in that time? Huh?"

"So how long do you take to finish it?" Homok continued his inquiries.

"I don't finish it," snorted the old man. "I hammer along on it for an hour, then set it aside. The way it is then is the way it remains, and that's how it will go, even to America."

"And do they accept it?" Homok marvelled.

"Do they accept it? You bet they do. I also tell them what I think, that for this money they can't expect qual-

ity. For quality work they have to pay quality wages. For what they pay, this trash will do," and he ended by contemptuously pointing to a pile of metal sheets in the corner.

Homok rather liked the old boy's rebellious dignity, but he couldn't continue the conversation because Horvath, the foreman, came up to them: "Let's see how you're doing."

He stopped next to Balint, picked up the sheet, kept turning it around, inspected it from all angles, and apparently was satisfied.

"This'll do," he said. "You need a little more experience and everything will be fine. How about you?" he asked, turning to Homok. "Have you finished?"

"Yes," Homok replied with a deliberate show of calm indifference.

"Oh, really?" said Horvath questioningly, and the thick bushes of his eyebrows were dancing mischievously.

"Let me see." Examining the sheet, he grunted with approval: "This is perfect."

"More or less," Homok replied, and for some strange reason he was less sure of himself than a little while ago.

"More or less?" What's wrong with it?" Homok examined the sheet intensely; his eyes bulged, as he strained not to say something stupid. Then, as the sheet was gently swaying in Horvath's hand, he noticed that one side of it had a longer radius than the other, and the plate was tipping like a fish that doesn't swim, but just floats on the water. So he said: "The middle is a tiny bit tight . . . the weight holds it."



"You can take care of the assembly in transit, Comrade Kovacs, the main thing is to get the shipment out on time."

Lúdas Matyi (Budapest), February 23, 1956

"Well, if it does, let it be. We shall give it a few more blows with the hammer, and everything will be all right. Now, we'd better see about other things."

Then Horvath put them through a regular examination. He asked about everything that was in any way connected with their trade. But if Homok could not think of the proper answer Balint blurted it out, and if on the other hand he drew his brow into troubled wrinkles, Gyula suddenly saw the light and hurriedly gave the answer. In other words everything was just fine.

"I think we shall get along well." The interrogation was over.

"I think you'll be happy here. Many hammer blows mean many *forint*. And if you have difficulties in some field, experience will come with time."

By then Gyula felt quite at home. Although Balint again folded his face into the most non-committal wrinkles, the now-experienced eyes of Gyula could easily detect the signs of satisfaction in his eyes, too. In the wake of the dissolving anxiety he again felt like cracking some jokes.

"We don't even ask money for the hammer blows," he began, "those we shall give for free." And as Horvath looked at him with amazement, he continued with a smile: "We only want payment for our skill, for knowing where the blows have to go."

"Well, well," said the foreman with a twinkle in his eyes, knowing that if he searched that skill a little deeper, he could easily find flaws, but he would not do it. After all, why should one poor man push another too hard. Somehow a warm and friendly feeling came over all three of them and they laughed cordially.

Then they went to the shop manager who exchanged a few words with Horvath and took the two friends into his office, bade them to sit down, and asked:

"Do you know Bandi Pongrac?"

"Yes, of course," Homok hastened with the answer. "I used to work alongside him. A nice, quiet boy and an excellent worker."

"We were apprentices together," said Lorand, and continued to ask them about the people at Hermes. He was satisfied with the list and remarked that they were all truly skilled in their trade.

"Look," he said, "I can use you. If you think you can come I'll keep the jobs open until the end of the month. There's plenty of work; if you are through with the cars you can work in the storerooms. In my shop there's no loafing, no mad race at the end of the month, no overtime. And no one kills himself with work, that you could see for yourself. But I need skilled workers because I have to meet the plan. You, on the other hand, need the job and the money. We're dependent on each other. If you do your job well you can count on my full support in everything. One good turn deserves another. Is that clear? If you feel the same way we shall get along well."

(Continued on page 37)

How Shall the Last Be First?

SOVIET PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV, in his speech to the Twenty-First Congress of the Soviet Party in January, added a new canon to Marxist doctrine when he declared that all Communist-led countries would enter the highest phase of Communism together. He explained that "economically backward countries, supported by the experience of other Socialist countries, by cooperation and mutual aid, quickly make up the time lost and raise their economy and culture, and thus the general line of economic and cultural development of all Socialist countries is leveled off." On April 5 a writer in the Polish economic journal *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw) picked up Khrushchev's blank check and inquired whether Poland might not qualify for special assistance because its economy was developing more slowly than that of the Soviet Union.

* * *

THE MAIN CRITERION for the correct development of all countries of the Socialist camp ought to be the principle of advancing together. . . . If this principle were to be ignored, then—as a result of the tremendous differences in the conditions of development in individual countries—there would inevitably be a further differentiation in the level and conditions of their development, a fact which, as we shall show, is becoming evident at the present time. . . .

"The Soviet Union has the greatest overall industrial potential and a relatively high production per capita, along with unlimited reserves of raw materials. Czechoslovakia has relatively the highest production per capita but very limited reserves of raw materials. Compared to the USSR and the CSR, Poland has the lowest industrial development while its production is based on its own raw materials to a somewhat greater extent than that of the CSR. . . .

"In 1950 the USSR produced only half as much fuel per inhabitant as Poland and 60 percent as much as Czechoslovakia. In 1957 Czechoslovakia outdistanced Poland in the production of fuels and the Soviet Union attained 75 percent of Polish production per capita. If the tempo of development continues according to plan, then in 1965 the Soviet production of fuels will exceed Polish production by



A Polish propaganda chart illustrating Khrushchev's targets for Soviet industry during the Seven Year Plan. Top arrow: means of production; middle arrow: total output; bottom arrow: consumer goods. This trumpeting of Soviet economic expansion has given rise to criticism by some Polish Communists of their own country's economic plan, on the ground that Poland may be left behind.

Chart from *Zagadnienia i Materiały dla Aktywu Propagandowego* (Warsaw), No. 23, 1958

20 percent and Czechoslovak production will exceed Polish by 40 percent. . . .

Production of Fuel per Capita (in kilogram equivalents)

	Poland	USSR	CSR
1950	2,860	1,430	2,410
1957	3,160	2,450	3,480
1965	3,500	4,210	4,885

"In electric power production, we can see in the years 1957-1965 not only an increase in the absolute differences between Poland and the other two countries, but also great differences in the rate of development.

Electric Power Production per Capita (kilowatt-hours)

	Poland	USSR	CSR
1950	376	502	756
1957	744	1,045	1,333
1965	1,280	2,260	2,640

"In the years 1950-1957, the production of steel in Poland rose at a slightly faster rate than in the USSR and at a much greater rate than in the CSR; however, in 1957-1965 the situation will begin to change: the rate of increase in Poland will become smaller than in the USSR and much smaller than in Czechoslovakia.

Steel Production per Capita (kilograms)

	Poland	USSR	CSR
1950	100	152	252
1957	186	254	386
1965	270	392	670

"As far as cement is concerned, Poland has a relatively high level of production but a slow rate of development. Around 1960 the Soviet Union will attain and surpass Poland's level of cement production per inhabitant. . . .

**Cement Production per Capita
(kilograms)**

	Poland	USSR	CSR
1950	100	56	162
1957	158	145	266
1965	310	348	486

"Productivity of labor in industry is about 50 percent greater in the USSR and at least 30 percent greater in the CSR than in Poland. . . . It is expected that labor productivity in Poland will increase by 60 percent in the years 1959-1965. . . . In the same period of time Czechoslovakia is planning a 64 percent increase in labor productivity. The USSR expects a 45 to 50 percent increase during the years 1959-1965. Thus we can see that the differences between Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia with respect to industrial development and labor productivity will remain unchanged.

"The same may be said, more or less, of the other countries that are on a lower level than Poland, namely, Hungary and Romania. . . .

"Agricultural production is to rise in Poland by 30 percent during the years 1959-1965, in the USSR by 70 percent (from a lower per capita level than in Poland) and in the CSR by about 33 percent. The supply of housing per citizen will be twice as great in the USSR as in Poland. . . .

"The facts given above indicate that . . . for a long time there will be no significant tendency to eliminate the economic differences between Socialist countries at different stages of development. It is even probable that the differences will increase. . . .

"Generally speaking, it seems that the USSR and the CSR are making bigger capital investments in relation to

their industrial potential than is Poland, and this results chiefly from the fact that more developed countries are objectively capable of setting aside a much greater part of their national income for purposes of further development. . . .

"No doubt the first task of the less developed countries is to equalize their economic development through their own efforts, if at all possible. . . . Considering the problem objectively, however, it is difficult to expect Poland—if it follows the same road it is on now—to lessen the distance between itself and the more developed Socialist countries, especially since these countries will be making the same effort in the same direction and we have no advantage over them.

"The possibility of speeding up economic development involves more intensive international economic cooperation [i.e., within the bloc—Ed.], particularly that of making raw materials more accessible to countries which lack them. . . . There should also be price adjustments for these materials so as to bring costs to the same level, regardless of whether a country imports them or produces them itself. . . . International cooperation in the field of manufacturing is also essential to smaller and less developed countries. . . . This requires a correct arrangement of prices so as not to harm weaker countries nor incline them to autarchy. . . . But all this is not enough to remove the existing differences in the level of development in Socialist countries; it can at most help to alleviate the problem. . . .

"The question arises whether the solution of the problem may not require other measures whereby the more developed countries could give assistance to the less developed: the sale of capital goods below cost, special low rates of interest on investment loans, etc. Perhaps we cannot expect too much at the present time, when even the more developed countries are experiencing many fundamental difficulties, but the problem described above will become increasingly important in the near future as the might of the Socialist camp undergoes a tremendous growth. . . ."

(Continued from page 35)

So long, men."

Lorand stood up, shook hands with Gyula and Balint; they said good-bye to Horvath and left.

Out in the street, Homok looked questionably at Baracs: "Well, what do you say?"

Instead of answering, Baracs returned the question: "What do you say? Frankly I like it."

"Well, well," Baracs mimicked the foreman, Horvath, but his face was so full of good humor that Homok could no longer suppress his joy: "These people were really looking for expert workers."

"They certainly looked us over thoroughly. They didn't even talk to us until they knew just how good we were."

"They didn't try to hook us like the No. 7 shop. Remember?"

"Did you notice how noncommittal they were before we started to work?"

"Oh yes. But soon they sang a different tune."

"Nobody can deny it, we certainly are good at our trade."

"Do you recall when Horvath asked me . . ." and with great merriment, cutting into each other's words, they didn't realize that they were talking very loudly, fairly shouting in the pleasant recollection of their experience. "Remember, when you didn't know, I gave the answer, and when I was in a fix or couldn't remember something, you stepped right in."

"There now, you and me, we certainly are simply terrific. There isn't another pair like us," Balint roared, giving Homok a resounding slap on his back. . . .

Current Developments

AREA

Warsaw Pact Meeting Held

The Foreign Ministers of the eight Warsaw Pact nations as well as a Deputy Foreign Minister of Communist China met in Warsaw, April 27-28, ostensibly to formulate plans for the "Big Four" Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in May. The communique, released at the end of the conference, restated the Soviet bloc's position on a German peace treaty and European security: that Berlin should be made a free city; that the peace treaty should be separated from the question of European security; that an atom-free zone in Central Europe be established (the Rapacki Plan); that the Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia and Poland should participate fully in the Geneva Conference. As a whole, the communique was restrained in its language, although West Germany was castigated "for reviving German militarism and for openly putting forward revanchist claims." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], April 29.)

40th Anniversary of Yugoslav Party

Marshal Tito read a lesson in history at a special meeting of the Communist League's Central Committee devoted to celebrating the 40th anniversary of Yugoslav Communism. The Yugoslav President bared Stalin's role in Yugoslav-Soviet relations, accusing the former Soviet leader of liquidating more than 100 Yugoslav Communists who fled to the USSR before World War II. By such methods, Stalin "was destroying the revolutionary character of the Communists and creating a spineless Communist type." (See box.)

At the same time, Tito underlined the assistance the Yugoslav Communists had given other East European comrades between the two World Wars:

"Our support for the October Revolution and help to the Hungarian Soviets [in 1919] were followed by many other actions in giving support to revolutionary struggles in other countries. When the Bulgarian uprising in 1923 failed, we sheltered over 2,000 Bulgarian fighters in our country, with Comrade Dimitrov [late Bulgarian Party leader] at their head. . . . In Czechoslovakia's crucial days in 1938 and 1939, our Party organized a volunteer movement for the defense of the Czechoslovak Republic. . . . However, since the Czechoslovak government did not decide to offer resistance and the Czechoslovak Communist leadership, which today denounces us so loudly, did not find it necessary or did not have the courage to step forward in defense of the independence of its country, our action remained only an expression of sympathy for the brotherly Czech and Slovak people. . . . We extended valuable help in the creation of the Albanian



In the weeks before the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference, the press of the area stepped up its propaganda pitch on the two Germans. The accusations of renewed militarism, Nazism, revanchism were unceasingly flung at West Germany. By contrast, the virtues of the "peace-loving" East Germany were hymned. Above, from the front cover of the Hungarian weekly *Ország Világ* (Budapest), April 22, 1959, two young East Germans; the paper speaks of their glowing faith and optimism in their country's great future.

Communist Party . . . although today some of the Albanian leaders behave towards us like the man . . . whose first act when he got into power was to stab those closest to him in the back."

Tito also dwelt on what he labeled a "program crisis" in the Communist world: "Exactly 20 years ago the 18th Party Congress of the Soviet Union decided to draw up a new program . . . but its work never bore fruit. At the 19th Congress [1952] a new commission was appointed, and at the 20th Congress [1956] yet another . . . but the program has never materialized."

By contrast, he said, the Yugoslav Communists understood the necessity to introduce "new measures . . . in production and social life. In 1949 and 1950 . . . measures were undertaken toward decentralization . . . the gradual transference to a freer market, the introduction of the element of economic stimulus in working collectives and so on." In a mood of self-congratulation, the Yugoslav leader said that Moscow itself was imitating some of the "revisionist practices for which they have criticized us so much. This refers, above all, to a certain decentralization in the administration and economy of the Soviet Union and some other Socialist countries. . . . Our reality shows that Socialism is nobody's monopoly." (Radio Belgrade, April 19.)

Czechoslovakia Replies to Tito

As might have been expected, Tito's slur on the role of the Czechoslovak Party on the eve of World War II did

Current Developments—Area

not pass unnoticed. An article in the Party daily, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), April 23, vigorously denied Tito's assertions and went on to accuse the Yugoslav leader of slandering "the memory of 25,000 Czechoslovak Communists who fell in the struggle against the occupiers."

The Yugoslav Communists, however, were quick to correct this interpretation, explaining that Tito was not referring to the Czechoslovak victims, but rather to "the correctness or incorrectness of the line taken by the Czechoslovak Communist leadership" at that time. (*Kommunist* [Belgrade], April 30.)

Further elaboration on the thesis that the Soviet bloc was, in fact, copying Yugoslav methods in agriculture and administration appeared in a speech delivered by Vice-President Edvard Kardelj, May 5, at a plenary session of the national front group, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. After quoting a series of remarks from Soviet Premier Khrushchev which Kardelj maintained were nothing but imitations of Yugoslav ideas, the Yugoslav leader quoted Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Communist Chinese statements criticizing the Yugoslavs for the same ideas. For example, according to Kardelj, Khrushchev at a December 1958 meeting of the Soviet Party's Central Committee had criticized the standard practice of paying farm workers by the day; in October of that year, however, the Bulgarian Central Committee organ, *Partiyen Zhivot*, had attacked the Yugoslavs for abolishing this very same "work-day" system.



Lhasa: the Dalai Lama's Palace ringed by the Himalayas. The picture appeared with an article in the Czechoslovak weekly *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), April 18, 1959, by a Czech who had been in Tibet in 1955. Among other things, he said: "The frightened reactionary elements of the Tibetan aristocracy resorted to the rebellion in order to frustrate the awakening of the Tibetan people from ancient darkness."

Kardelj concluded that "it is really wonderful how the same things, if they happen in Yugoslavia, are called revisionism, but they are not revisionism if they take place in some other Socialist country." (*Borba* [Belgrade], May 6.)

Albania Sentences Yugoslav "Spies"

Two groups, each containing eight "spies," were tried and sentenced in Shkoder, Albania. The first band was accused of sabotaging Albanian collectivization programs; one man was executed, one had his death sentence commuted to 25 years of imprisonment, and the others were imprisoned for shorter terms.

The second eight were also accused of espionage. Of this group, a Catholic priest was given the death penalty and duly executed. These executions apparently represent the first time such severe measures have been taken by either country in their periodic round-ups of "espionage agents." (*Radio Tirana*, May 11.)

A new trial of five Albanian "spies" opened in Skloplje, Macedonia on April 22. (*Nova Makedonija* [Skloplje], April 23.)

Quarrel with Romania

Romania and Yugoslavia clashed over the provisions of a new trade protocol signed in Bucharest on April 13. The Yugoslavs complained that they had signed it even though Romania would not agree to continue shipment of crude oil as in the past. On April 22 the Romanian Ministry of Trade denounced the "tendentious news" appearing in the Yugoslav press and maintained that under the Brioni agreement of October 1956 Romania had agreed to export both crude oil and refined products. However, in 1958 Yugoslavia "imported the whole quota of 70,000 tons of crude oil but refused to accept more than 1,000 tons of refined products out of the 36,000 tons stipulated. At the same time Yugoslavia refused to make any delivery of raw copper to Romania [as provided in the agreement]. Therefore, Romania could not agree to supply crude oil to Yugoslavia in 1959, but committed itself . . . only to the delivery of 95,000 tons of refined products." (*Radio Bucharest*, April 22.)

Trade Union Congress Held

Continued proof that the Yugoslav-Soviet bloc "cold war" had not reached the crisis stage was seen in the list of delegations sent to the Fourth Congress of the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation, which began in Belgrade, April 23. All the East European nations, except Albania, were represented. (*Radio Belgrade*, April 22.)

Relations with Iraq

In the wake of the Iraqi revolution last July, the Soviet bloc was quick to recognize the new regime and to offer material assistance. In December a three-year trade agreement was signed between Iraq and Czechoslovakia, in which Czechoslovakia would deliver mainly textiles, machinery, glassware and refined sugar, receiving, in turn, cotton, oil and agricultural products. (*Radio Prague*, De-

cember 16.) In March, another trade agreement was signed between Prague and Baghdad, which included the delivery of Czechoslovak equipment for the construction of a shoe factory with an annual production capacity of one million pairs. (Radio Prague, March 18.)

A trade agreement was also signed between Iraq and Bulgaria on February 4. Bulgaria, in this case, was to provide mining equipment, machinery for the building of a chemical industry, ships, electric and diesel motors, medicines, glassware, textiles, sugar, concrete and other products, and would import from Iraq primarily cotton, dates, wool, barley and other agricultural products. A similar agreement was concluded between Iraq and Poland on January 4; Romania and Hungary sent delegations to Iraq in early April to explore other possible economic agreements.

Cultural delegations have also been exchanged between Iraq and many of the East European nations. On April 11, Hungary concluded a cultural agreement with Iraq, which provided for an exchange of scholarships, scientists and artists. (Radio Budapest, April 11.) A six-member Czechoslovak delegation, headed by Minister of Culture Frantisek Kahuda, left for Iraq on April 24 for a two week stay, and an agreement providing for a student exchange program was signed between the two countries, May 7. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], May 9.) An exchange of Iraqi and Bulgarian delegations resulted in the signing of a cultural agreement on April 8. (*Trud* [Sofia], April 10.)

Iraqi Communists Attack Yugoslavia

A delegation of the Iraqi Communist Party led by Salem Adil, Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, visited Bulgaria between February 24 and March 3. In the joint communique, published in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), March 6, after fulsome praise for Premier Kassim, the Iraqi revolution and the Iraqi Communists, the statement concluded by assailing "Yugoslav revisionism":

A Skyscraper, Brigitte Bardot, the Atom Bomb

"PIPELINE TROUSERS' is the sign on the price tag of a pair of trousers in a shop window which young people stand looking at with longing in their eyes. How modern it is to wear such trousers!

"What does the word 'modern' mean? If we had a Gallup poll to inquire among the various strata of our society some of the answers would be that 'modern' is identical with Western or, rather American. A skyscraper, Brigitte Bardot, the atom bomb, calypso and indecipherable painting are all understood as modern. . . .

"This attitude—i.e., living for today, without perspective, completely indifferent—exists; it is active and affects people, particularly those who consider as 'modern' everything which comes from overseas." (*Nepszava* [Budapest], April 19, 1959.)

The Common Touch

THE DOMINANT POSITION of Russians in the political and economic life of the Baltic States causes much resentment, not only among the people but also in the ranks of the native Communists. The Latvian Party's First Secretary, Janis Kalnberzins, summoned courage at a recent Party Congress to scold his Russian colleagues for not taking the trouble to learn the Latvian language. He maintained that in order to "strengthen the link between the Party and the masses" leading functionaries should be able to speak both Russian and Latvian. "Unfortunately," he continued, "some comrades don't want to understand the significance of this. But it is undeniable that instructions, discussions and speeches will impress the people only if delivered in their native tongue." (Radio Riga, January 13, 1959.)

"The representatives of the two Parties state that the efforts of contemporary revisionism, aimed at diverting the Communist and Workers' Parties from the path to Marxism-Leninism, have suffered a complete defeat. They condemn Yugoslav revisionism under the form of 'National Communism,' 'Arab Communism,' etc., which continues its attempts to cause a schism in the fraternal relations between the Communist and Workers' Parties . . . and other patriotic and democratic forces in the Arab and other countries which . . . are marching along the path of their own national independence."

UAR Attacked

With the increasing influence of Communists on the Iraqi government, the UAR has opened a barrage of criticism directed at Iraqi Premier Kassim and the Communist Party throughout the Arab world. In reply, the USSR and the East European countries have alternately attacked the United States and the West for inciting the UAR, or attacked President Nasser and the UAR directly. An example of the first approach comes from Radio Moscow (in Arabic), April 23: "Now we are witnessing [an attempt] by the West to exploit the hostile campaign of the UAR against the Soviet Union and to isolate that country from supporting the Socialist camp."

An offensive against the UAR, however, has appeared more and more frequently in the Soviet bloc radio and press. On April 21, Radio Sofia explained "Why the UAR Is Against Iraq" in the following way:

"Since the democratic forces prevailed in the internal developments of Iraq, the Egyptian bourgeois . . . have started a slanderous campaign against Iraq and the Arab Communist Parties. In this respect, the attacks have been incredible. In a speech in Damascus, President Nasser said that he would continue to foment uprisings similar to the Mosul revolt until the Kassim government was overthrown. Some newspapers in the UAR have declared that Iraq has already been occupied by Soviet armies. . . . They even went so far as to state that the center of the international Communist movement, which until now was in Bulgaria, has been transferred to Iraq."

Arabs Quarrel in Czechoslovakia

As a footnote to the struggle between the UAR and Iraq, a West German newspaper reported a fight between UAR and Iraqi officers studying at the military training center at Hradec Kralove, Czechoslovakia. Apparently one barrack was completely demolished and four UAR officers were injured.

Khrushchev's Birthday

Not since the death of Stalin has such extravagant praise been heaped upon one man, in this case, Soviet Party leader and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, on the occasion of his 65th birthday, April 17. All the East European press carried articles assessing Khrushchev's personal qualities, "his close ties with the masses," his "closeness to the people," etc. Hungary, in particular, found the reasons for praising the Soviet leader reinforced by the fact that Khrushchev's birthday coincided with his visit to Hungary a year ago when he had warned the workers that "in the event of a counterrevolution . . . the armed forces of the Soviet Union will always be prepared to provide help."

The Party journal, *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), April 17, recalled his visit with nostalgia: "He was here just one

year ago and used the time of his visit, which seemed to us so short, to become acquainted with our country, our working people, our joys and our cares, to help us with benevolent suggestions of what kind of aid the Soviet Union was prepared to offer us. . . . We will not forget his words when he called upon us to remember the lessons of the counterrevolution in Hungary, and to work toward reinforcing the people's power so that the enemy will never again be able to trouble the building of Socialism."

The tone of the Polish articles on Khrushchev differed from others in the bloc by frequently stressing the fact that Khrushchev brought about "relations based on equality." *Sztandar Mlodych* (Warsaw), April 17, declared that "we owe to Khrushchev the new climate of mutual relations between the countries of the Socialist camp," and that "all the past evil relations between Poland and the Soviet Union have disappeared like pimples on one's face — irrevocably and without trace."

Vatican Ruling Attacked

A particularly heated blast against the Vatican was contained in an article in the Hungarian Party organ *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), April 3, on the Pope's new ruling forbidding Roman Catholics to vote "consciously and freely" for Communists or those in coalition with Commu-



AN EXHIBITION of the works of young Soviet painters and sculptors opened recently in Warsaw. Much of the Polish press comment was markedly cool, particularly toward the sculpture. The main Party daily *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), April 14, for example, remarked: "If among the paintings and graphic works it is possible to notice the influence of great painters upon the younger generation, such is not the case with regard to the sculpture. . . . [It] is generally realistic, but it does seem to be threatened with the danger of succumbing to naturalism or squeamish stylization. It lacks the elasticity and just that youthfulness represented by the paintings and graphic works." Left, an entry in the exhibit, "The Eaglet," portraying a heroic young Soviet partisan astride his faithful and gallant steed. (Photo *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* [Warsaw], April 15-21, 1959.)

In the field of ideological criticism of art, there are still repercussions from the art show of work from the "Socialist camp" which was held in Moscow some months past, at which the Polish paintings, strongly influenced by modern Western trends, caused much scandalized comment. The Bulgarian Party organ *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), April 12, pontificated: "As is well known, the Polish section of the exhibit had a great number of paintings which followed the path of Western bourgeois art. Attempts were made by Polish artists to defend this manifestation as something new, as the expression of a super-refined esthetic culture for which there is room in Socialist culture. . . . It was convincingly shown, however, that this trend in art contradicts not only our Communist ideology, but the foundations of art as well."

nists. The journal stated that although religion may be freely practiced in Hungary, Pope John XXIII prohibited Catholics from voting for Communist candidates or for parties supporting Communists, even if these parties do not profess principles contradictory to Catholic dogma. The writer went on to claim that "in 1939 the Vatican banned a series of writers and philosophers from Dante to Spinoza (*sic*), yet Pope Pius XII blessed the German and Italian Fascists while saying no word against the racist principles which exterminated millions of people—including Roman Catholics—in death-camps. . . . Only the Socialist countries turn the Ten Commandments, such as 'Thou Shalt Not Kill, Steal' . . . into social requirements to destroy the basis of crime."

In Poland, the Party paper *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), April 17, in commenting on the Vatican edict, stated that "religious authority is being used to support" Church-approved candidates for the Sicilian Parliament. The journal called this "an attempt to throttle the freedom to vote."

POLAND

Struggle in the Circles

Buried in the speeches and resolutions of the Third Party Congress last March were hints of a new drive to establish Party control over the peasantry. Though the Congress forsook any renewal of past attempts to collectivize agriculture by force, it resolved instead to "mold the Socialist consciousness of the peasant masses" by working through the independent peasant organizations known as agricultural circles. The circles stem from pre-Communist times when they functioned as spontaneous peasant organizations for mutual assistance (including the purchase of fertilizer and tools); during the Stalinist years they almost completely disappeared, but were reborn after October 1956 with the approval of the Gomulka regime. There are now said to be 16,500 of them, with 457,000 members and they include 15 percent of Poland's farmers. The Congress resolution on agricultural policy said that the Party must see to it that "the peasant masses are the masters of these organizations" and prevent them from being controlled by "speculative elements and elements hostile to the policy of the People's Government." First Secretary Gomulka added that the Party must be prepared to use "administrative measures" to achieve these ends.

The meaning of the latter phrase (which is generally a euphemism for force) was explained by an article in the April issue of the Central Committee's organ for Party activists, *Zycie Partii*. Discussing a meeting of the agricultural circle in the village of Binkow, it said:

"A sharp conflict arose at this meeting between the chairman and his clique and a group of peasant members of the circle who had 'dared' to set up a machine team and ask for credit [to buy the machine—Ed.] against the wishes of influential rich peasants in the circle.

"The chairman, instead of giving a report on the work of the circle, permitted himself a violent attack on the

peasants who did not agree with his and his friends' political orientation. . . . The meeting, in which old rightist loudmouths took the lead, was a victory for them only in appearance. For that very evening a group of United Peasant Party members [allies of the Communists—Ed.] and Communists met in the apartment of one of them . . . and, in the face of this situation, resolved to form a new agricultural circle.

"The following day, 19 peasants applied for membership in this new circle. Most of them left the old circle. . . . Within a few days six more peasants went over to the new circle. The new circle . . . was officially approved by the district. The district authorities also dissolved the old circle, since less than 15 members remained in it.

"Peasants in Wlosciejewki settled with rightist elements in the same way. . . . A similar method of isolating rightist elements and village rich men who have laid their hands on power in the agricultural circles and are using it for their private advantages is also maturing in other areas."

Another article in the same issue was equally explicit. Deploping the fact that the circles had not yet taken on a "mass character," it said:

"The most attractive aspect of the agricultural circles for most peasants is the machine teams and groups. And sure enough, various forms of such groups and teams have been established in almost every village. However, most of them—it is impossible to collect data—have nothing to do with the real thing. . . . They are simply speculating and capitalist groups behind which hide one or more crafty and rich, or newly rich, inhabitants of the village. . . . For the good of the cause, we must quickly eliminate



A Polish complaint about confusion and procrastination in following the dictates of the recent Third Party Congress. Title: "The Views of Citizen Tortoise."

Trybuna Literacka (Warsaw), April 19, 1959



Anything But Politics

The April 26 issue of the Warsaw weekly *Kierunki* revealed that students' cabarets (which flourished greatly after the October 1956 change) are now under the "protection" of the regime-run youth organization ZMS, and have eliminated political matters from their satirical skits. A number of such cabarets were closed down for some months last year. Here, scenes at the Warsaw students' cabaret Stodola.

Photos from *Swiat* (Warsaw), April 19, 1959



all speculating capitalist groups from the villages. Basing ourselves on the healthy opinion of most villages, we should therefore make an honest verification of all suspicious 'enterprises.' "

Peasants Favor Independence

Most of the circles at present are in localities where they existed before the war, chiefly in the western part of the country. The Party is faced with the problem not only of controlling them but of establishing new circles where there is no tradition of them, in the face of peasant suspicion that the purpose is to use the circles as a base for a new collectivization drive. A poll conducted in January by the Polish Radio's Institute for Surveying Public Opinion found that, of 1,138 private farmers questioned, only 36 percent thought that joining agricultural circles was the best way to increase farm production. About 61 percent favored complete independence, and only 4 percent thought that joining collective farms would help to raise production. The strongest sentiment for agricultural circles was among the 119 who had received their farms in the postwar land reform, of whom 44 percent favored the circles. The least interest was shown by settlers in the former German territories (161), of whom only 27 percent favored the circles. Opinions of the others, including 764 who had inherited their farms, 68 who had purchased them and 21 who had received them in the prewar land reform,

reflected the overall average. The report said that there was a general belief that agricultural circles were only a first step toward collectivization. (*Zycie Gospodarcze* [Warsaw], April 19.)

Campaign Against Church

All Warsaw newspapers on April 21 carried a Polish press agency report that the Jesuits in Warsaw had been engaged in illegal trade. Allegedly, they had imported a long list of goods, including 1,500 pounds of plastics, 200,000 razor blades, five tons of cocoa and 36 chinchillas, in the first ten months of 1958. Furthermore, according to the Polish reports, the Jesuits reported a value of between 2 and 3 million *zloty* in their tax returns for the previous year, "while in reality their income was more than double that amount." State authorities are apparently now demanding an additional 9 million *zloty* from the Jesuits.

Western sources reported recently that a decree dated February 25, 1959, suspended various tax exemptions granted to the church in 1957. Under the new regulations, fund-raising outside the church for construction will be illegal, and if fund-raising is conducted inside the church, 60 percent of the amount collected will have to be paid in taxes. In addition, taxation on priests' salaries has been drastically increased.

Youth Conferences Held

During the month of April, two youth organizations held meetings in Warsaw apparently designed to strengthen the bonds between the Party and the rising generation. The Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Socialist Youth Union (ZMS), the regime's main youth organization, convened on April 4 and 5. At this time it was revealed that the Party's influence among youth in the universities was particularly feeble: out of the 260,000 members of the youth group, only 4,000 are university students. The ZMS leadership, however, expects better results in the forthcoming recruiting campaign, since the new scholarship policy requires a close examination of the student's "social attitude" in determining the amount of the stipend. As the Secretary of the ZMS put it: "hostile, anti-social and demoralized individuals are not deserving of State aid."

One of the primary tasks for the members of the ZMS will be the formation of "voluntary" labor groups which

in 1959 will include some 14,000 youths, including 4,000 students. (*Sztandar Młodych* [Warsaw], April 4-5.)

Congress of Polish Scouts

Double the size of the ZMS, the Polish Scouting Movement (ZHP), closely controlled by the Party during the Stalinist period, was allowed to reassume much of its pre-war tradition after the upheaval in 1956. In the last year or two, however, a process of renewed "Socialization" has begun. As testimony of the importance the regime attaches to this movement, no less than seven members of the Politbureau as well as five Ministers were present at the ZHP Congress, April 18-21. Party leader Gomulka himself addressed the meeting, and underlined the task of the movement: "the leading motive of the activities of Polish Scouts should be the winning over of youth for Socialism." (Radio Warsaw, April 19.) Further evidence that the scouting movement has lost its independent character was this statement over Radio Warsaw (April 21): "The ZHP acts under the ideological leadership of the [Polish Communist Party] and educates youth in the spirit of Socialism."

"About the Universal Library"

THE REMARKS BELOW, by the well-known Polish journalist K. T. Tocplitz, concern a projected series of inexpensive books, under the name "Universal Library," to be put out by a State publishing house. They are a plea, and, it would seem likely, a successful plea, for a free intercourse of ideas between the Communist and non-Communist world; they indicate the degree to which intellectual life in Poland, despite certain increasing rigidities, remains remarkably free.

IT SEEMS to me that we should begin with an attempt to answer the questions: What is the function of the Universal Library? For whom and why do you want to publish it? . . . For a reader who has never had anything to do with culture? Or for a reader already somewhat prepared, one who has the habit of reading but is cut off from books by the high price and exclusive character of some publications? The latter, I believe. We cannot aim the series at the raw reader. We cannot make a primer of it. An untrained reader does not reach culture through books, but through newspapers, films, television or radio. Books appear later in his life, and books of the type which should be found in the Universal Library even later. The experience of similar series in the West shows that they provide reading material for the mass of readers who do not specialize but are conscious participants in cultural life. . . .

In educating a Socialist receiver of culture, we have two roads to choose from: either to provide him with ready-made, indisputable patterns to follow and with schematized thought-schemes, or to teach him independent thinking. The first of these alternatives was tried a few years ago—with definitely negative results.

Thus the method of providing ready-made patterns must now give way to another method which emphasizes not a fast, direct and immediate didactic result but independence of thought. And independence of thought arises above all from conflicting attitudes and a variety of problems with which we will provide the reader of the Universal Library. Therefore not Marxist writers alone should be found there, but also other progressive writers. And not only works in which there is immediate propaganda gain, but also books treating the complexity of human problems. I must emphasize that the published list of the first 20 volumes of the Universal Library fulfills, to a certain degree, these demands.

I believe that while talking about these matters we must realize clearly that contemporary culture—and also Socialist culture, or even especially Socialist culture—is in a state of constant unrest; it is a melting pot in which dissolve many factors far from final crystallization. We can already say about some of them that they will not leave a permanent trace and will evaporate. Others will undoubtedly leave their mark on contemporary art and life. I believe that it would be a mistake to offer only "sure things" to the reader—things which would be undoubted, proven and in general harmless and morally insignificant.

If the Universal Library is to reach the active mass of recipients of living culture it must have controversial and discussion-arousing books as well as important, impossible-to-ignore authors like Sartre, like Faulkner and Camus, and, certainly, Hemingway. Only when those books are introduced together with the works of Sholokhov or certain books by Ehrenburg (all those works omitted in the first list) will the reader be provided with a full picture of the front on which the battle for contemporary humanist culture is being fought. (*Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw], March 24, 1959.)

Protestant Leader Arrested

A former administrative official of the Methodist Church has been arrested, accused of illegally establishing a new religious society, "The Church of Christ," with the assistance of leaders of this Church in the United States. (*Trybuna Ludu*, May 3.)

American "Agents" Arrested

According to Radio Warsaw, April 26, two "agents of the American intelligence service," Klara and Rudolf Herman of Gliwice, were unmasked by the security organs of the Ministry of Home Affairs. They are to appear before a military tribunal.

Polish-Soviet Friendship Celebrated

The fourteenth anniversary of the signing of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Pact was solemnly observed in Warsaw, April 21. The main speaker at the occasion was Edward Ochab, a member of the Politburo and Minister of Agriculture (and Party leader before Gomulka), who paid tribute to the Soviet Union for aiding Poland "in the reconstruction after the Second World War." A similar celebration was held in Moscow. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], April 22.)

HUNGARY

Supplying the New Collectives

Last winter's collectivization drive nearly doubled the land in collective farms. The Central Statistical Bureau's report for the first quarter of 1959 (*Nepszabadsag*, April 16) stated that at the end of March Hungary had 4,490 collective farms with 523,000 members and 1,659,000 hectares of land (31.1 percent of the total arable land). The status at the end of December had been: 2,776 collective farms, 144,500 members and 848,000 hectares.

The rapid increase has caught the regime embarrassingly short of the machinery, fertilizers and building materials necessary for the large-scale agriculture it envisages. After scouring the Communist bloc for assistance, the government announced that, under an agreement signed in Moscow on April 24, the USSR would supply an additional 12,000 agricultural machines during the next four months. These were to include 2,000 40-horsepower tractors, 500 combine harvesters, 420 ensilage combines, 2,000 sowers, 2,000 fertilizer spreaders, 2,500 plows and 1,000 cultivators. According to Deputy Minister of Agriculture Matyas Szoke, the tractors and harvesters had originally been intended for the virgin lands in Kazakhstan and Siberia. (Radio Budapest, April 24.) Hungary is also importing tractors, fertilizers and building materials from other Communist countries, and attempting to increase its own output. According to an article in *Nepszava* (Budapest), April 18, the total stock of tractors by next fall will be 31,000 instead of the 28,000 originally planned.



A map showing the major industrial projects to be carried out in Poland between now and 1965. Symbols represent: 1—electric power plants; 2—coal mines; 3—iron ore and sulfur mines; 4—machinery plants; 5—merchant marine; 6—steel mills; 7—chemicals; 8—textile mills; 9—leather industry; 10—railroad electrification. The map does not include all of the new schemes, e.g., the oil refinery to be built at Plock and the oil pipeline that is to run from the USSR to Berlin.

Tygodnik Powszechny (Cracow), April 12, 1959

Terrorist Methods Attacked

Further condemnation of the "cult of personality" coupled with severe criticism of the extra-legal methods employed by the police during the Stalinist period appeared in the Party's theoretical journal, *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), March issue. Reviewing the book, "In the Watchtower of Legality," by Geza Szenasi, a well-known Stalinist and currently Attorney-General, Imre Marko, a member of the Party's Central Committee, made the following criticisms:

"The author alludes several times in his book to the legal errors committed prior to the counterrevolution. . . . Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to point to the faults. We have to look for the 'why,' the cause which led to them. . . . Infringements of the law, according to Comrade Szenasi, 'were not the result of the deliberate or blood-thirsty intentions of individuals; the grave mistake was the use of capitalistic methods of prosecuting crimes.' This statement, in my opinion, is not quite right: the basic cause of the infringements of law is traceable to the cult of personality, the lack of principles and the general political blunders resulting from dogmatism, rather than the reasons stressed by the author."

Church Leaders Swear Allegiance to State

Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religious leaders have finally taken the oath of loyalty to the Constitution. This was originally demanded in a decree of July 1951 and the demand reinforced in a decree of March 1957 which made State approval mandatory for certain high church ap-

Current Developments—Hungary, Czechoslovakia

pointments. This year, another decree passed on April 6 stated that any churchman who had not yet taken the oath was required to do so within 60 days.

Those Catholics taking the oath were Archbishop Joseph Grosz, acting head of the Hungarian Catholic Church; the Bishops of Pecs, Csanad, Szekesfehervar, Szombathely, and four other high ranking prelates. Among others present at the oath-taking ceremony were Istvan Dobi, head of State. (Radio Budapest, April 24.)

A few days later, seven leading Protestant clergymen took the oath, including Tibor Barta, Presbyterian Bishop of the Trans-Tisza region, Bishop Zoltan Kaldy of the South Lutheran Church District, and Zoltan Fekete, Superintendent of the North Lutheran District. (Radio Budapest, April 27.)

According to Radio Budapest, April 28, eleven prominent members of Hungary's Jewish community also took the oath. These included Endre Sos, President of the National Council of Hungarian Jews, and the Honorary President of the Council, Dr. Laszlo Fleischmann.

Hungarian-Soviet Friendship

Officially, Hungarian-Soviet friendship is flourishing. During the month of March, according to *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), April 24, "one thousand Hungarian-Soviet Friendship Clubs were organized. . . . Much help was given to this development by the various mass organizations such as the Patriotic People's Front and the National Council of Trade Unions."

Bloat in Budapest

FOR SOME YEARS NOW, the Hungarian regime has been attempting to stem the disproportionate growth of Budapest, accented by the managerial and bureaucratic centralization in the capital. This attempt, according to a recent statement, has failed. *Esti Hirlap*, a Budapest daily, March 12, said that in 1957, 45.6 percent of the country's industrial workers (in "State-managed industry" alone) lived in Budapest, a figure contrasting with the 31.3 percent of such a highly centralized city as Vienna. The article went on:

"A few years ago, certain measures were taken to check the influx of people to Budapest. Thus, only people with a special license were permitted to move there. This did not have the desired effect, however, as industrial plans required manpower and the councils were therefore compelled to issue the required licenses in almost all cases. Thus, year after year, the population of Budapest increased by 44,000, that is, by the size of a provincial town. In this respect Budapest is the 'leading capital,' as even Paris, with its population of 5 million, has an average yearly increase of only 32,630. In Amsterdam it is as little as 6,750, in Brussels 4,824 and in Prague 2,647.

"Furthermore, we failed in transferring people to provincial posts. 2,752 State employees moved to the country in 1957, but 4,735 came to Budapest. . . ."



Hungarian Army troops, in their Soviet-style uniforms and in Soviet-style formation, parading in Budapest on April 4 during the ceremonies marking the fifteenth anniversary of the "liberation" of Budapest.

Photo from *Jovendonk* (Budapest), April 5, 1959

Imprisonments Denied

Western press reports during late March and early April that the Hungarian government had imprisoned repatriates who had been promised amnesty if they returned were categorically denied by Laszlo Gyaros, the regime's press chief. At a Budapest press conference, April 10, he stated: "What concrete evidence do [the Western journalists] present in their effort to gain credit for their canard? . . . We have never wanted the Western reporters to agree with us, but we expect them, as far as facts are concerned, to keep to the most elementary rule of journalistic and human ethics, the truth." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], April 11.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reform in Education

On April 22 and 23, the Party's Central Committee discussed the pending reform of the school system in accordance with the directives of the 11th Party Congress. (See *East Europe*, July 1958, pp. 42-44.) The school attendance laws have been changed twice since 1948—the last reform being in 1953, when compulsory attendance was reduced from 9 to 8 years and preparatory university education from 13 to 11 years. The new ruling will provide com-

Current Developments—Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria

pulsory secondary school education for 9 years, pre-university training for 12 years. The main inspiration behind this reorganization appears to be the Soviet school system which stresses "polytechnicism"—practical on-the-job training—which in turn furthers production and the building of "Socialism." The Czechoslovak model will allow children to combine learning and work in the elementary schools where handicrafts, work in school workshops and on school grounds will begin. After the age of 15, work will be performed in plants and on State and collective farms; at the same time the youth will continue his vocational or academic training for three more years if he wishes to enter a university.

In the final resolution published in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), April 24, the regime also made it clear this new training would include a thorough study of "Marxism-Leninism" in order to prepare the students for "a happy life and work in a Communist society." (For other developments in secondary school education, see *Bulgaria*, below.)

Continued Stalinization of Cultural Life

Official praise for the March Conference of the national Writers' Union (see *East Europe*, April, p. 49) came from Party boss Antonin Novotny in his speech at the National Front Conference, held in Prague, April 24. He lauded the Writers' Conference because "it had taken a critical viewpoint toward the Second Writers' Congress of 1956." It was this session, held two months after the 20th Soviet Party Congress, which had demanded a more liberal attitude toward literature and art. Now, however, the pendulum has swung back; after the Composers' Congress in February, the Congresses of Architects, April 15-17, and the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge (April 19-19), all of which stressed conformity to "Socialist ideology and morality," Novotny invited artists to take to heart "the critical comments" revealed at these conferences "and to draw their conclusions from them." In case some of the conclusions might prove to be the wrong ones, Novotny made it clear exactly what the role of the artist should be: "A literature must be created which will effectively support the Party's effort to complete the revolutionary rebirth of the entire society." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 25.)

Former Theology Students Sentenced

Former theology students, expelled from school because of alleged "anti-State" activities, were accused of organizing a "Vatican-controlled" underground movement called "The Serfs" in order to seduce youths from allegiance to the regime-sponsored Czechoslovak Youth Association. Although the date of their trial was not mentioned, *Smena* (Bratislava), April 11, announced that it had been held recently in Nitra, Slovakia, and that the 14 defendants had received prison terms ranging from one to eight years.

Anniversary of Pioneers

On April 24, the Tenth Anniversary of the founding of the Pioneer organization (for ages 9-15) of the Czechoslovak Youth Union was celebrated. In an editorial in *Rude*

Pravo (Prague), April 23, the Pioneers were praised for having done "14.5 million hours of voluntary brigade work . . . since 1957, collected more than 16 million kilograms of waste paper, nearly 52 million kilograms of scrap metal . . . [and] cleaned 3.5 million old bricks." The Pioneers now number 962,337. (Radio Bratislava, April 26.)

BULGARIA

Compulsory Deliveries Abolished

In conformity with the program outlined by First Party Secretary Zhivkov at a Central Committee meeting in January, the regime announced on April 29 that it was abolishing the old system of compulsory farm deliveries on May 1. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, April 30.) In their place it will institute a system of contractual purchasing similar to that adopted in recent years in the USSR, Hungary, and to some extent in other countries. The amounts to be delivered under contract will be fixed by the local people's

Polish Repatriation Statistics

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION on the repatriation of Poles from the Soviet Union and elsewhere appeared in *Przegląd Kulturalny* (Warsaw), March 5:

"In 1955, a total of 8,520 [were repatriated], of whom 6,429 came from the USSR; in 1956, a total of 33,240, of whom 30,786 came from the USSR; in 1957, a total of 95,275, of whom 93,872 came from the USSR. And in 1958, a total of 86,883 of whom 85,865 came from the USSR. In January 1958, 2,601 people were repatriated to Poland, of whom 2,539 came from the USSR.

"After the sudden intensification of repatriation in 1956, another peak year followed, after which the number of repatriates began to decline. During the period covered by the report, the largest number of people repatriated from Western countries and countries of the People's Democracies was recorded in 1956. Apart from the Soviet Union, the largest number of repatriates—1,770—came from France; this was followed by 1,266 from the German Federal Republic, and 1,021 from Great Britain.

"The majority of repatriates settled in the Western Territories. Only a small proportion of them were directed to the city of Poznan and the provinces of Bialystok, Poznan and Katowice. The largest number was absorbed by the city and province of Wroclaw, and the provinces of Szczecin, Zielona Gora and Olsztyn. A total of 55,960 rooms were allocated to the repatriates in the years 1955-58.

"In the years 1957-58, 7,752 families settled on private farms, 29 on cooperative farms, 4,473 on State farms, and 290 families found employment in forestry."

Current Developments—Bulgaria

councils "on the basis of the State economic plan and by taking into consideration the type of production of the given collective farm and its true potentialities." The new contractual prices given in the decree are more than twice as high as the old compulsory quota prices, but considerably below the prices for deliveries in excess of quota and about half the free market prices (in *leva* per kilogram):*

	Old Prices		New Price
	Compulsory Quota	Above Quota	Free Market
Ordinary wheat	.55	1.60	2.40
Hard wheat	.70	—	—
Rye	.48	1.30	—
Barley	.45	1.40	2.10
Oats	.48	1.30	—
Corn	.45	1.35	2.00
Beans	—	3.50	—
Sheep milk	1.19	2.56	—

Average prices for livestock previously under compulsory quota were raised as follows (in *leva* per kilogram, live weight): cattle and buffalo, from 3.80 to 5.00; calves, from 4.80 to 6.00; sheep and goats, from 3.70 to 4.00. The net effect of the price changes will apparently be an increase in the average income of collective farms, varying according to the extent to which a farm had previously been able to overfulfill its quota.

The decree also abolished payments in kind for the services of machine tractor stations and flour mills to the collective farms. The farms will henceforth pay for these services in cash.

Black Market in Agriculture

A serious lack of control over the commercial activities of Bulgaria's collective farms (which now embrace almost all the country's agriculture) was revealed by Deputy Minister of Home Trade Lalyu Ganchev in the Ministry's publication *Socialisticheska Targovia* (Sofia), April 21. He wrote that many of the farms are evading their contractual deliveries to State purchasing organs in order to sell their produce directly to factories, local markets and other unauthorized buyers at higher prices than those paid by the State. During April there was "a serious shortage of meat" in the larger cities and towns because "the managers of collective farms, instead of delivering the assigned quantities of lamb to meat enterprises for slaughter, sell part of it in various illicit ways." In the first quarter of the year, he said, State purchases of milk and milk products were more than 16 million liters below the planned amount, egg purchases were short by 63 million eggs, and the pork supply lagged by 50 percent.

"It really is strange that these anti-State manifestations are permitted by the chairmen of the collective farms, who have been entrusted by the Party and the People's Government with the great task and responsibility of strengthen-

ing our economy and strengthening the State discipline governing orderly trade relations between town and village."

Charges that the collective farms were openly evading their obligations have been made before. At the Fifth National Conference of Collective Farms in December 1957, both Premier Yugov and First Party Secretary Zhivkov admitted that the collectives were openly violating their contracts for delivery of fruit, vegetables and dairy products. Since then the number of collective farms has decreased from 3,450 to 625, through amalgamation, but this has apparently not made them easier to control.

Educational System Reorganized

In an apparent reflection of the Soviet system of secondary school education which combines learning and work, the Party's Central Committee, after a meeting on April 21-22, announced a draft program for a "closer linking of education and the training of youth for productive labor." Like the recent Czechoslovak school reform (see above), the secondary school system will require 12 years of pre-university



A Polish-East German film company has finished a science-fiction film called "The Silent Star," based on a Polish novel, dealing with a voyage by spaceship to Venus. The ship's crew is an international one: the doctor (above) is a Japanese woman, the engineer is Polish, the communications specialist a Negro, the biochemist Chinese, the pilot German and the atomic physicist American.

Photo from *Przyjazn* (Warsaw), April 26, 1959

* Compulsory quota prices from *Izvestia* (Sofia), July 17, 1956, and *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), March 27, 1958. Surplus and free-market prices from *Izvestia*, March 1, 1955, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 27, 1958 and *Financi i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 10, Nov.-Dec. 1956.

versity training. At least one-third of this time, however, will be spent "in material production." Furthermore, special instructors in Marxism-Leninism will be used throughout the schools. In this way, "the entire educational training and work activities will . . . instill in [the student] the high moral principles of a Socialist society—fidelity to Communism and hatred towards its enemies." The program is to begin during the 1959-1960 scholastic year and is to be completely operative in 4 to 5 years. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], April 25.)

Chervenkov Heads Science Council

First Deputy Premier Vulko Chervenkov, former Party boss and Premier during the Stalinist period, 1950-56, has been appointed Chairman of a new State Council for Science. (Radio Sofia, May 6.)

ROMANIA

Nationalism Denounced

Since the Hungarian Revolt in 1956 there have been signs of continued unrest in the universities of the Autonomous Hungarian Region; recently, at the National Conference of the Union of Students' Associations (February 19-22), a proposal to abolish separate minority schools was made. (See *East Europe*, April, p. 55.) Now it appears that another meeting was held to discuss the above-mentioned conference at the Tirgu Mures University in the Autonomous Hungarian Region. At this time, the students were urged to "master the Romanian tongue" and "fight rotten bourgeois nationalism."

Laszlo Keremen, a professor of the university, while speaking on the role of the schools in liquidating "nationalistic-chauvinistic influences," also confessed that he, himself, had had an "insufficiently firm attitude at the time of the Hungarian counterrevolution," but that now he was "using every opportunity to explain to his students the justice of Party policies." (*Scinteia Tineretului* [Bucharest], March 25.)

Collectivization Booming

According to Radio Bucharest, April 22, the "Socialist sector" in agriculture grew by 300,000 families and 850,000 hectares of agricultural land in the first three months of 1959. More than two-thirds of the families (214,000) were said to have joined collective farms, while the others joined the lower-order agricultural associations. The figures indicate a stronger drive to collectivize agriculture than last year, when 397,000 families joined the "Socialist sector" but only 47,000 took the collective road. (*The New York Times*, May 22, reported that the "Socialist sector" had grown by over 5 million hectares since the beginning of 1959, comprising 9.4 million hectares, 65 percent of agricultural land.)

Minister Dismissed

Less than two weeks after three Deputy Premiers were relieved of their ministerial functions (see *East Europe*, May, p. 54), Petre Costache, Minister for Problems of

Bricks for the Kiddies

"CHILDREN'S LITERATURE is an important factor in the education of the growing generation. . . . The problems of our children's literature are inseparably connected with the educational problems of the new man, the builder of Socialism and Communism. In the last 15 years our writers of children's books have endeavored to build—brick by brick—a solid foundation for the correct development of children's literature on the path of Socialist realism. Cast aside are the irrevocably old and erroneous concept of 'lack of ideas' in children's literature. In reality, the partisans of 'pure' art, under the camouflage of 'lack of ideas,' were poisoning the children with religious tales, with verses for 'little white angels' and other similar attributes of bourgeois literature.

"Even to this day, incompetent scribblers in the United States ply their traffic in children's delicate souls and offer them clumsily written booklets with such 'attention-getting' titles as 'Mrs. Balfour's Assassins,' 'The Black Hand' and 'The Green Dragon,' in which there are all kinds of stories of murder, robbery and 'flying saucers' with atomic loads. The aim of these books is simply to distract the attention of the little readers from the important problems of our time and to prepare them for prison, where the hypocritical preachers of 'Christian' humility will definitely undertake their perdition.

"Our Party, leader in everything, has given its assistance to our writers of children's books. The December 30, 1953 Decree of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on the state and tasks of children's literature . . . pointed out the important tasks for its future development. And in the last five years our children's literature has really . . . passed to a higher artistic level. But these successes are not fully satisfactory as yet. We see that children's literature does not keep pace with Socialist construction, with educational problems, it has not succeeded in reflecting the stormy growth of life, it lags behind the most substantial tasks of our epoch." (From the Bulgarian Party daily, *Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], April 19, 1959.)

Local State Administration, was removed from his post. No reasons for the action were given. (Radio Bucharest, April 21.)

Israel Criticized

Although there has been no official announcement that the Jewish emigration from Romania has largely stopped, the flow of refugees has been reduced to a trickle since early March. (See *East Europe*, April, p. 54.) The journal *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), April 17, attempting to paint a black picture of the miseries of those who had succeeded in emigrating, reprinted what was claimed to be a report published in an Israeli newspaper, *Maariv*, on the

despair of the new immigrants, "unable to find a job" and "starving."

Some Emigration Permitted

In early May, Western sources in Vienna reported that Romania had lifted emigration bars for non-Jewish citizens who had relatives in the United States or other countries outside Europe, and that during this period some 150 Romanians had arrived in Vienna; a few of the arrivals were apparently Jewish.

Composer "Exposed"

For "having slandered the peaceful work of the people and their new life," the composer Mihail Andricu, a State Prize winner and member of the Romanian Academy, came under heavy fire from Mihail Beniuc, First Secretary of the Writers' Union. According to the literary review, *Contemporanul* (Bucharest), May 1, Beniuc accused the composer of having a hostile attitude "toward our country and the regime," and virtually demanded that he be liquidated: "For the Academy and the Union he represents a shame; he soils the intellectuals of our country. . . . This stain must be removed; it must disappear."

ALBANIA

Price Concessions to Consumers, Farmers

In a decree effective April 28, the Albanian regime cut prices on food and other consumer goods and raised the prices it will pay farmers for their produce. The retail price cuts ranged from 12 to 21 percent on various kinds of bread and flour, from 3 to 10 percent on milk and dairy products and from 5 to 10 percent on cotton garments, thread, rope, aluminum utensils, nails and glass. There were cuts of 12 percent for macaroni, 17.6 percent for potatoes and 10 percent for soap. Prices paid to farmers for their compulsory deliveries were raised as follows: wheat, 100 percent; rye, 133 percent; corn, 117 percent; beef and mutton, 200 percent; and wool, 100 percent. Compulsory quotas were removed from beans, rice and eggs, which will be purchased under contract in the future. Compulsory deliveries were abolished for the private plots of collective farmers. Arrears in compulsory deliveries and taxes were forgiven all farmers who had joined collectives by May 1.

The announcement added that the land under cultivation in Albania had increased by 72 percent since 1938. At the end of 1958, 63.2 percent of the farmers belonged to collectives, which had 76.2 percent of the cultivated land. (Radio Tirana, April 27.)

The Unhappy Medium

IN ANOTHER VICTORY for the forces of Communism, the Czechoslovak regime put on trial and convicted five persons for spiritualistic activities, including conversations with dead Communists. *Prace* (Prague), March 26, reported on the affair:

"Satellites were orbiting in space, but Mrs. Kujalova produced miracles worthy of the Middle Ages. In her apartment spirits from the other world showed up quite willingly. . . . From time to time a Communist ghost made his appearance and confirmed how deeply he had erred while alive, and how only the other world had opened his eyes. Moreover, treatment by magnetism was also possible at these seances and this was said to help against ulcers.

"For seven years Kujalova evoked spirits. She was the circle's medium. The spiritualist seances were held in private apartments, in a summer cabin and in any place where the selected company could have privacy to enjoy themselves and their spirits. The activities of the sect of spiritualists are forbidden in our country.

"These evening sessions were crowded with spirits and through Mrs. Kujalova these spirits talked. And how! The medium Kujalova predicted a war which would take place in the East, so that we here would live through it cozily. During the time of the counterrevolution in Hungary she predicted that something similar would also happen in our country. She advised her patrons to buy up supplies. And when the prophecy did not work out, this was the fault of the insufficiently informed spirits.

"The motive of the activities of these spiritualists was in essence only the desire for the return of capitalism in our country. The nonsense from their seances was sent to allied souls—spiritualists—in other cities. They kept special notebooks on their activities as documentation of their 'resistance' activities for future times.

"All this was duly evaluated by the criminal bench of the Regional Court in Hradec Kralove. Who were these worthy people? Anna Kujalova considered herself a being with supernatural faculties and drew her 'wisdom' from the spiritualist magazine *Psyche* which she received from the US. Mrs. Lingerova, the daughter of a kulak, whose son fled to Austria, could not forget the easy life of a little woman who does not have to work. The spirits were expected to tell her when these times would return. Mr. and Mrs. Vrbata and the technical official Hladik never owned factories or big estates, it is true, but due to the medium Kujalova the spirits promised them fulfillment of their petty bourgeois dreams; this did not cost the spirits one cent.

"All were sentenced according to their deserts. The heaviest punishment went to the medium—four years' imprisonment and loss of civil rights for five years."

On The Boards

BELOW IS a partial listing of the major attractions playing in Prague and Budapest during April 1959, according to the local newspapers:

Prague, week of April 19-26 (*Literarni Noviny*, April 18, 1959):

Tyl Theater (drama section of the National Theater): August Night (Frantisek Hrubin, contemporary Czech); The Servant of Two Masters; Autumn Garden (American); Don Juan; Saint Joan (Shaw); The Entertainer (English); The Commissar; The Return (new Socialist-realist).

D-34: Mandragora (Machiavelli); discussion with E. F. Burian on Modernity; Between Life and Play; The Post-Office Miss; the Crossroad; Distances; Good Morning; Hope (all Socialist-realist).

Chamber Theater: Women's Ways; The Flight; The Last Act (Erich-Maria Remarque); The Theater of Kl. Gazułova; Torquato Tasso.

S. K. Neumann Theater: Turbulent Feasts; The Third Pathétique (Soviet); Life of the Insects (Capek); A View from the Bridge (American); How the Contrabass Landed in Heaven (prewar Czech comedy).

ABC Theater: Nasredin (Czech, Communist); Jezinky (old comedy); Heavy Barbara & Caesar (popular prewar comic sketches).

Budapest, week of April 4-10 (*Szinhaz*, April 3, 1959):

National Theater: Smoke-filled Skies*; The Merry Wives of Windsor; Peer Gynt; The Tragedy of Man; Bank Ban (Hungarian classics).

Jozsef Katona Theater: Strange Woman on an Island; Pygmalion (Shaw); Mandragora; A Hole in the Biography ("Socialist" comedy); The Summer of the 17th Doll (Austrian).

People's Army Theater: People of Budapest; Such a Love (Czech); My Family; The Rainbow (Soviet); Lysistrata; The Rainmaker (American).

Madach Theater: Puntilla (Brecht); The Marriage of Figaro; The Devil's Disciple (Shaw); The Long Road (Hungarian, Populist).

Jozsef Attila Theater: Nostalgia for the Fatherland; Tell Me the Truth in a Lie; Happiness Where Are You? (Soviet); The Gardener's Dog; Let Us Divorce; The Rope Dance (American?).

Jokai Theater: The Tempest (new, anti-Revolt); Yellow Lily (Hungarian pre-Communist); The Crown of Creation.

* This new play is by Jozsef Darvas, one of the pro-Communist leaders of the Peasant Party's left wing, and is apparently a confession of the treacherous role he played during the 1956 Revolt. It opened in Budapest at the end of March 1959.

peasants' outlook and way of life cannot be reconciled with the Communist road, the road of collectivization. The events which by now have become historical facts demonstrate that the peasants know and even feel that their place is on the side of the workers and that the Red Star lights their path. The mistakes, the distortions, the use of force, were not the faults of the regime; they were committed by some unenlightened individuals. . . ."

There were also several new plays "dramatizing" the fate of the escapees in the West. A play called *The Whirlpool*, produced in a provincial town, depicted two girls forced into the clutches of the North African white slave traffic after their flight from Hungary. The reviews of this play were uniformly derisive: one said that the character of the girls was such that they undoubtedly would become prostitutes if they had stayed at home. The play closed.

A tightening up of ideological requirements was implicit in a mass meeting of the "organizers of the theater-going public," reported in *Nepszabadsag*, September 4. The "organizers" are Party activists who lecture on current and future theater productions, indicating to the public what should be seen and the "ideological significance" of the various plays. The report said that the organizers were instructed to emphasize "those plays which will influence workers to transform themselves into Socialist men."

A check of some 16,000 licenses held by actors and other performers throughout Hungary was announced in *Esti Hirlap* on January 10, 1959.* (At the same time there

were unconfirmed reports of a large-scale purge of the staff of the Budapest Opera).

With the entire theatrical profession, the acting corps in Hungary was considerably affected and reduced by the 1956 Revolt. The Revolutionary Council of Actors, formed on October 25 during the Revolt, was one of the most stalwart forces on the side of the freedom fighters. After the suppression of the Revolt, in mid-November and again in December, the Council members pledged not to appear on a stage in Hungary until Soviet troops had departed.

30 to 40 actors, among them several of the most prominent, were arrested for their participation in the Revolt. The director of the Miskolc Theater, Gabor Foldes, was executed. Over 50 actors and singers fled to the West, including the leading players of the Budapest National Theater, Eva Szorenyi and Sandor Szabo (who is in New York and scheduled to appear in a Broadway play this Spring).

A long article in *Nepszabadsag*, October 26, 1958, conceded that most of the actors who escaped to the West were materially well off, but dwelt on their alleged homesickness (which they are obliged to conceal "for fear of being accused of having a nostalgia for Communism") and the difficulties of pursuing their profession in a foreign language. "Although cars and refrigerators are scarce in Hungary, here an artist is a human being, not a commodity," the article pontificated.

The Hungarian theater was dealt a crippling blow in both material and spiritual terms by the failure of the Revolt. The continuing silence of its leading playwrights, the scattering of the performers, and the wariness of the Kadar regime indicate that no revival of a living Hungarian theater is likely for the present.

* These licenses (necessary for anyone working in the theater) are issued by the Ministry of Culture. This bureaucratic practice was begun in the first years of Communist rule; it is apparently unique to Hungary in the area.

Texts and Documents

RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD PARTY CONGRESS

The following are major extracts from the overall Resolution of the Polish Congress, taken from Trybuna Ludu, March 21. The theses are generally orthodox, particularly in foreign policy, yet also leave leeway for a continuation of some of the unique aspects of Polish reality, such as "voluntary" collectivization, and some freedom in art and science.

THE THIRD PZPR Congress fully approves the political line presented by Comrade W. L. Gomułka in his report to the Central Committee. The present political line of the Party, as outlined by the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee [in October 1956] and developed at subsequent plenary sessions . . . has passed the test of practice.

Guided by that political line, the Party has: consolidated the unity of its own ranks and tightened bonds with the working class and the nation; driven back attacks by the reaction . . . to undermine the people's democratic system; overcome the dogmatic and sectarian errors which previously hampered Party policy; destroyed the revisionist and opportunist trends which threatened to disarm the Party ideologically in the face of its class opponents; spread democracy within the Party and Socialist democracy in the country, consolidated the rule of law, and strengthened the prestige of the people's government.

The Party has undertaken effective and fruitful measures to overcome disproportions between the development of the economy and the rise of the living standards of workers and employees; it has improved the system, opening a vast field of initiative for the working class and economic and Party cadres; secured a more rapid development of agricultural production, improved the position of the countryside and, by eliminating distortions in the relations between the People's State and the countryside, strengthened the worker-peasant alliance. The Congress states that, thanks to this policy, the implementation of the present Five Year Plan is proceeding successfully in all basic fields of the economy, thus creating foundations for the further Socialist development of the country. . . .

The Party has strengthened . . . its solidarity with fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties and consolidated the unity of the Socialist camp. . . .

The Party has increased Poland's prestige in the international arena and raised

our country's contribution to the fight for peace. . . .

East and West

The characteristic feature of present times is competition between . . . Socialism and . . . capitalism. . . . This competition occurs in all sectors of social and political life. Of decisive importance . . . is the Socialist countries' attempt to attain a higher labor productivity and per capita production than the most developed capitalist countries. The economy of all countries of the Socialist system is expanding rapidly. . . . They have already achieved a level of economic development which enables them to foresee that in the next seven years overall industrial production of the Socialist system, embracing one third of the world's population, will surpass half of world production. Of decisive importance . . . will be the Soviet Union's catching up with and surpassing the United States . . . in per capita industrial and agricultural production. . . . The historic importance of the 21st CPSU Congress [February 1959] . . . is that it has mapped out a concrete and realistic plan for implementing this task within the next ten to twelve years, thus opening a new stage in the competition between the two systems.

The rapid and uninterrupted development of industrial production is the general law of development of Socialism. . . . A diametrically opposed line of development characterizes the world system of capitalism. The rate of production development in capitalist countries is several times lower than that of Socialist countries. . . . The instability of the capitalist economy is increasing. . . . Life has refuted once and for all the theory of the possibility of a crisis-free development of capitalism. . . .

The growth of the forces of Socialism, the decay of the colonial system, and the sharpening of internal social contradictions of capitalism, have resulted in a further increase in the general crisis

of the capitalist system. In this situation, the economic and cultural development, as well as the living standard . . . in countries of the Socialist system is of the greatest importance for developing and spreading Socialism in the world.

The systematic and inevitable changes in the disposition of world forces to the advantage of the Socialist system create ever more favorable conditions for the . . . preservation of universal peace. War is in contradiction to the essence of Socialism. . . . So far, the aggressive imperialist forces of the capitalist world have stubbornly opposed all peaceful efforts of the Socialist world by their cold war policy . . . which came into being as part of the struggle against Socialist States, and the idea of Socialism in general. . . . In answer to the cold war policy, the Socialist countries have united their forces and developed their economy and defense potential on the principle of mutual assistance and cooperation; they have concluded the defensive Warsaw Pact; while the Soviet Union . . . has overtaken the capitalist world in the field of . . . rockets and nuclear weapons. . . . Not only has there been no weakening of the Socialist camp, but on the contrary, the Socialist camp has shown itself to be superior to the imperialist bloc.

Following the failure of the cold war policy, it is possible to see . . . that the only alternative for the present-day world is the policy of peaceful coexistence between countries of different social systems, a policy supported by all Socialist countries. The greatest obstacle to the triumph of the principles of peaceful coexistence is the aggressive character of the policy of reactionary circles in the US, whose principal ally in Europe is the German Federal Republic.

The German Problem

The German Federal Republic was created after the Western countries' violation of several fundamental clauses of the Potsdam agreement. . . . Today, it is the main promoter of the cold war. It is also the country most intensely engaged . . . in claiming Polish territories and territories of other Socialist countries. . . . In the eastern part of Germany, the German Democratic Republic . . . has based relations with its neighbors on principles of friendship and peace.

Of greatest importance in the peaceful policy of the GDR is its recognition of the eastern frontier of Germany . . . the Oder-Neisse. In West German war policy, the fact particularly dangerous to peace is its failure to recognize this fron-

tier and its demands for its revision.

West Germany . . . aims at liquidation of the GDR, camouflaging its intentions with the perfidious slogan of so-called free elections throughout German territory. . . . The only correct solution of the German problem . . . is the Soviet proposal for a peace treaty with Germany, as well as the GDR proposals for the setting up of a confederation of the two German States. . . .

The Congress . . . demands that Poland take part in all international conferences dealing with a peace treaty with Germany.

The Congress is of the opinion that, as a result of the Western powers' and West Germany's refusal, a peace treaty will have to be concluded with Germany, represented by the GDR. The conclusion of a peace treaty and the implementation of the justified Soviet project for turning West Berlin into a free city is in the most vital interests of Poland, as well as those of the German people and of peace and security in Europe.

"Peaceful Coexistence"

The aggressive policy of imperialism is being opposed in capitalist countries by another trend, a trend to eliminate the threat of a destructive atomic war and to coexist peacefully with the Socialist world. Acting in support of this trend is the world peace movement and the growing pressure of public opinion demanding . . . that controversial international problems be solved through East-West negotiations. . . .

The basic force opposing the imperialist war policy is the working class and the international Communist movement . . . which constantly comes forward with . . . proposals for the correct and realistic solution of controversial problems and for the liquidation of troublespots in various parts of the world where the embers of war are being fanned by imperialism.

Poland has made an appreciable contribution to this peaceful policy in creating a plan for an atom-free zone in Central Europe, which has met with the approval of many politicians and ruling circles in the West and with the support of public opinion.

The Polish People's Republic is inseparably linked with the great community of Socialist States. The Congress states that fraternal friendship and alliance with the USSR are the foundation of Poland's foreign policy. They consti-

tute the essential, lasting, and permanent elements of this policy. . . .

Approving the foreign policy of the Polish People's Republic, the Congress declares its support for: the proposal for a summit meeting between East and West to discuss all controversial problems; the demands of the nations for cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and absolute prohibition of production and use of these weapons; the plan to create an atom-free zone in Central Europe, put forward by the Government of the Polish People's Republic; the proposals concerning disarmament, put forth by the USSR; all constructive moves aimed at an international relaxation. . . .

The Congress declares its solidarity with the liberation struggle of nations oppressed by imperialism and deems it necessary to continue developing friendly relations with the nations which have regained their independence. The Congress is of the opinion that the basic directive of Polish foreign policy is the consolidation of the unbreakable unity of the Socialist camp on the principle of mutual assistance, equality, and solidarity. . . . The unity of [the international Communist movement] is based on principles of proletarian internationalism formulated in the Declaration of 12 Parties at the Moscow Conference of 1957. The Declaration has become a signpost for the activities of all Communist and Workers' Parties, including our Party.

USSR Leads "Equals"

Only the League of Yugoslav Communists has found itself outside the international Communist movement as a result of its revisionist attitude directed against the unity and solidarity of the Communist Parties and Socialist countries.

In the international Communist movement there are no 'superior' and 'subordinate' Parties. They are all equal and independent. . . . The leading position among Communist Parties of the world belongs to the CPSU. History itself has placed it in this position . . . since, under its leadership, the first and most powerful Socialist State . . . was founded. The great prestige enjoyed by the CPSU . . . does not mean that it imposes its will on other Parties. Each Party is sovereign and governs itself. Each Party is exclusively responsible to its working class and nation for its policy and for the fate of the cause of Socialism, but all the Parties together, in their sense of responsibility

for the unity of the international Communist movement, are guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism. These principles are common to all Communist and Workers' Parties. Faithful to these principles, each Communist and Workers' Party adapts its activities to the specific conditions in its country shaped by historical development. . . .

Economic Policy

The chief political factor in the successful implementation of the Five Year Plan is the working masses' confidence in and support of Party policy. . . . The Congress approves the program for the further development of the Socialist economy and for raising the living standard of the population included in the directives of the economic plan for 1961-1965. By 1965, industrial production should increase about 50 percent as compared with 1960, and about 80 percent as compared with 1958.

The Congress considers it correct that the development of the production of means of production should keep a little ahead of the growth of production of consumer goods, and states that the basic . . . solution of social and production problems . . . cannot after all be achieved in conditions of small commodity production.

The uninterrupted increase of agricultural production, the growth of prosperity and culture in the countryside . . . can only be assured through the Socialist transformation of the countryside on the basis of cooperative farming. . . . The moulding of the awareness of the peasant masses in this direction requires that the struggle for increasing agricultural production be closely connected with a steadfast Party effort to spread everywhere and develop the Socialist sector in agriculture. . . .

The cooperative farming movement will not develop by itself. Great and patient political organizational work by the Party and its allies are indispensable to this development. . . . The Congress states that the implementation of the next Five Year Plan will bring about further fundamental progress in the development of our country and will constitute a contribution, worthy of our nation, to the peaceful competition between the Socialist system and the capitalist system. . . .

The Congress states that the chief political task of the Party consists in rallying the entire working class and all the working masses . . . to the tasks of building a new Socialist system, on the

basis of achievements in the economic development of the country. The best school of Socialism for the working masses is their own participation in governing, in managing enterprises in villages, in the people's councils, in various types of economic and social organizations. For this reason, the process of Socialist democratization, apart from a correct economic policy, must indicate the main direction of the Party's efforts. . . . An indispensable condition of Socialist democratization and a basic factor in strengthening the People's State is the strengthening of the guiding influence of the Party in all fields of life.

Our Party exercises political leadership in the State not by itself but together with the allied parties, ZSL [United Peasant Party] and SD [Democratic Party] within the framework of the National Unity Front, whose program is the broad platform of lasting cooperation of all political forces of Socialist democracy in our country. The leading role of our Party in the National Unity Front means neither the giving of orders to the allied parties, nor the transformation of the latter into transmission units of the Party. On the contrary, it means the independence and proper initiative of every party, a common struggle against centrifugal right-wing forces, common responsibility for the implementation of a common program, joint participation in exercising power in People's Poland. . . .

State and Church

The Congress states that a condition for strengthening the social basis of the People's Democracy is the political unity of the masses in their work for Poland—a unity which overcomes artificial divisions, primarily the division between believers and non-believers. No political dividing line is drawn by the Party within the community according to attitude towards religion. The Party judges the attitudes of citizens . . . exclusively by their relation to Socialism in practice. Our Party is guided by the principle that the State should treat matters of religious belief and practice as the private affair of each citizen, and that it should guarantee full tolerance in matters of religion and freedom of conscience.

Our Party opposes all attempts at fomenting religious fanaticism. The Church . . . is separated from the State and can function freely only on condition that it recognizes the social system existing in Poland, and only if it acts in

accordance with the Polish *raison d'état* and in compliance with the laws of the Polish People's Republic. Religious activities must under no circumstances be used for political purposes, for antagonizing believers and non-believers, for attacking the policy of our Party and of the people's government. The Party and people's government want no war with the Church. The Church, however, must confine itself to matters of faith and renounce hopeless attempts to fight Socialism.

"Socialist Legality"

In shaping the People's State, the Party is invariably guided by the principle of democratic centralism. . . . The Congress approves the changes introduced in recent years in the system of government and administration which . . . reduced the size of the administrative machinery and considerably expanded the prerogatives and independence of the people's councils and Socialized enterprises. The Congress also states that in the process of Socialist democratization a foremost role was played by creating workers' self-government and increasing the importance and role of the trade unions. . . . The Party organizations are obliged to set the course of work for workers' self-government and its organs, as well as to insure the correct apportioning of competence between workers' self-government and the administration of the enterprises. The general coordination, representation and generalization of the experience gained by the workers' self-government belongs to the trade unions. The participation of trade union organizations in self-government makes it easier to harmonize their two basic functions: the organization of the workers' production activity, and the protection of their interests and rights. . . . The trade unions participate in solving problems of the national economy—in particular, they participate in decisions on the distribution of the national income. . . .

The education of the younger generation, which already constitutes a creative force within Socialist construction, is of great importance to the Party's future. A particularly vital role in this respect is being played by the political-ideological youth organizations—ZMS and ZMW [The Union of Socialist youth and the Union of Peasant Youth]—as well as the ideological-educational organization ZHP [Union of Polish Scouts]. . . .

The people's government must always act in accordance with the law. It must

be severe with regard to enemies of Socialism, as well as to all kinds of offenders. At the same time it must act in a consistent, just and effective manner in defense of public order and community life. The Party has decisively put an end to violations of the rule of law and to abuse of authority. No innocent person can be punished or persecuted in our country. The opportunity to claim one's rights is assured to all citizens.

The struggle for the consolidation of Socialist justice . . . also calls for a vigorous struggle against unwarranted liberalism, which finds its expression in the light treatment of activities directed against the State and in a loss of the class approach by some organs of the administration of justice . . . as well as in toleration for malversation and thefts of public property. Protection of public property requires sharper measures. It is of enormous importance that the Party conduct a constant struggle against the plague of malversations and create among the public an atmosphere of relentless struggle against corruption and thieving.

We should oppose the suppression of honest criticism and prevent persecution of those persons who unmask malversations, fight cliques, watch over justice. The Party organizations and authorities should protect persons who have the courage to fight evil—all sorts of chicanery and persecution on the part of bureaucratic elements infected with the big-boss spirit. . . . The Party authorities must have a decisive influence on and control over the entire State machinery. . . .

It is necessary constantly to perfect the work of the militia and the organs of public security. Their role is of extreme importance in assuring security to every citizen and to the People's State . . . in preventing and prosecuting all sorts of hostile, anti-Socialist, subversive and espionage activities.

Defense Measures

The Congress also regards as very important the task of strengthening the defense potential of the country, and particularly the combat potential of the Polish Armed Forces, the task of raising the professional and political standards of officers and other ranks, of tightening the bonds between the Armed Forces and the nation, instilling in all soldiers a spirit of utter devotion and dedication to Peoples' Poland, to the defense of the security and integrity of its frontiers in the spirit of comradeship . . . with the

Soviet Army and the allied Armed Forces of the Socialist countries.

The Party, leading all organs of the people's government, must not for a moment take its hands off the tiller and weaken its political control. It is not for the Party to govern directly, to take the place of any organs of government and administration, but the Party constitutes the backbone of the State, it must set the course for activities in all areas of government, social, and economic life. . . .

Science and Art

The aim of Party activities in the field of science is to insure full victory for Marxism-Leninism as the methodological basis of all Polish science. Therefore, the Party deems it necessary to give its widest support to the development of scientific research conducted from Marxist positions. Lectures dealing with subjects on world outlook or on general matters of ideology, with subjects of philosophy, sociology and economics, should be attended by all students of higher schools and should be conducted exclusively in the spirit of Marxism. The Party stands for freedom of scientific discussion and for the solving of scientific disputes by the scientists themselves. It also insures conditions of work to non-Marxist scientists. The Party will not, however, tolerate attitudes hostile to Socialism or the use of . . . scientific publications for attacks on Party policy and the Socialist system. A fundamental duty of Marxist scientists . . . is to [uphold] Marxist ideas against bourgeois theories, undertake research and educate new, young Marxist scientists in all fields of science. . . .

The present cultural policy, freed from dogmatic mistakes, insures scientists, artists, writers and intellectuals all opportunities to develop research, financial assistance . . . [and] freedom of artistic search without administrative interference in matters concerning their work. . . .

The Party struggles . . . for an art, particularly a literature . . . accessible to the working people, an art and literature expressing their social strivings. Such literature the Party considers worthy of wide popularization. The Party also supports all progressive works, which broaden the horizon of human thought, shape the people's moral attitude and sense of beauty. The Party deems it correct to publish works of artistic value by ancient and contemporary authors, even if they do not represent Marxist ideas but serve the cause of man's liberation, as well as

artistic works meeting the other needs of the people—such as entertainment, relaxation and so forth. . . .

The successful implementation of the Party's cultural policies is at the present time encountering obstacles in the form of revisionist and bourgeois-liberal political tendencies—popular among [certain] creative circles—under whose influence there has appeared a certain number of works with harmful anti-Socialist ideological expressions, and a group of activists from creative organizations has taken action to assure publication of these works. . . . The main task of the Party on the cultural front should be the final elimination of anti-Socialist influences and revisionist tendencies in creative milieus and organizations, as these tendencies are at present . . . the main obstacle in the Socialist development of Polish Socialist culture. . . .

The creative character of Marxism-Leninism is based on the skillful application and realization of its principles in the conditions of each country and each historical stage. The negation of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, tested in the class struggle, is one of the main traits of departure from Marxism, which we call revisionism.

Revisionism

The negation, however, of the concrete, national conditions for the class struggle and the neglect of specific qualities of the historic situation is one of the traits characteristic of that departure from Marxism which we call dogmatism. The Party combines its principled fidelity to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism with a creative application of them under concrete historically developed national traditions. . . .

Our Party's links with the 20th CPSU Congress [February 1956] are unusually important and had a positive effect on the transformation of the Party's activity. They were expressed in decisive resolutions of the Eighth Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. These resolutions resulted from the political and social needs of our country and were defined by the concrete situation in Poland. Nevertheless, they would not have been possible without the 20th CPSU Congress. . . .

The Eighth Plenum finally and decisively overcame sectarian errors in previous Party activity, which came to the fore in the atmosphere of the cult of the individual, and which consisted chiefly in limitations of Socialist democracy and inner Party democracy, as well as in

allowing violations of the Socialist rule of law. . . .

The Congress states that the theses in resolutions of the First PZPR Congress [1948] on the existence of a right-wing nationalist deviation in the Party were unfounded and erroneous and annuls its decisions in this matter. . . . The Eighth Plenum put an end to the transitional but serious, political crisis in the Party and in the relations between the Party and community. . . .

Revisionism is in the present stage the main danger for the Party because of its objective connection with the anti-Socialist aspirations of the internal and foreign bourgeois social forces. The danger of revisionism, whose representatives were not numerous but very noisy, resides in the fact that it dissolved the Party's ideological unity from within and sowed distrust in Communism and the Party's guiding role . . . seriously harming the Party in a difficult period. International reaction, including certain emigre circles, counted on revisionism, since they thought that with its help they might destroy the unity of our Party and weaken it . . . to prepare the 'second stage' leading to the restoration of capitalism. . . .

The revisionists, fencing with pseudo-left-wing phraseology, most often accepted the basic elements of Social Democratic ideology, treating as revolutionary its old, worn-out theses . . . such as idealization of bourgeois parliamentarianism, slogans of integral democracy, and hostility . . . toward the Leninist concept of the Party line. . . .

Revisionism has pushed many honest but ideologically weak comrades into the ranks of dogmatists, who with the help of a demagogical clatter presented themselves as allegedly the only authentic defenders of Marxism and Communism. Dogmatism in theory gave birth to sectarianism in policy, and particularly to tendencies to solve disputes among the people's masses by administrative means, though these disputes can and should be solved through correct policy and discussion. The majority of comrades who at one time succumbed to disorientation and closed themselves in the shell of dogmatism have been influenced by the correct political line of the Party and are now again keeping step with the Party.

The unity of the Party constitutes a great achievement. . . . This unity must be strengthened and must never be violated and weakened. . . .

The Congress considers that in the field of Party work, the following tasks are coming to the fore: first, to overcome

the lag in the Party's ideological-educational work, developing a broad offensive of Marxist-Leninist thought, of our Socialist ideas; second, to improve the quality of the composition of Party membership through a constant influx into its ranks of leading people from the working class and other groups of working people, with a simultaneous jettisoning of . . . the ballast of alien and uninterested persons; third, to consolidate the leading position of our Party through the perfection of the methods of directing the

People's State; fourth, to concentrate the main attention of Party organizations on implementing the program for the development of People's Poland approved by our Congress, and particularly the realization of economic tasks. . . .

Faithful to the banner of proletarian internationalism and the unshakable unity of the Socialist camp, our Party has been and will always remain faithful to the Polish working class, to the Polish nation. . . . The historic task of our gen-

eration is to build Socialism in our country. Socialism gave Poland independence; Socialism alone guarantees the independence, security and further all-round development of our motherland. Our Party, in directing Socialist building, draws its strength from the indefatigable energy of the Polish working people and believes in their wisdom and will to transform our motherland into an economically and culturally highly developed country, into a flourishing Socialist country.

A Chronology of the Communist Party in Poland

December 16, 1918: Worker's Communist Party of Poland (KPRP) formed by merging the Social-Democratic Party of the Polish and Lithuanian Kingdom (SDKP & L) and the Polish Socialist Party—Left (PPS-Left).

February 1919: KPRP becomes an illegal, underground group.

August 1923: Second KPRP Congress in Moscow, reversing the Party's traditional "un-Leninist policy" of "re-pudiating Poland's independence," accepts the necessity for a Polish State.

March 1925: Third KPRP Congress in Minsk (Soviet Byelorussia) summoned under the slogan, "Bolshevization of the Party." Party's name changed to the Communist Party of Poland (KPP)—Section of the Communist International.

September 1927: Fourth Congress in Moscow. Split in the Party's ranks following Pilsudski's *coup d'état*: the issue was whether to cooperate with the democratic opposition parties in Poland or to go it alone.

August-Sept. 1930: Fifth Congress in Leningrad. Party's purpose declared to be defense of the USSR against foreign intervention.

1938: KPP disbanded and liquidated by the Cominform.

January 1942: Communists launch underground activities in German-occupied Poland. The restored Party changes its name to Polish Workers' Party (PPR).

November 1942: Wladyslaw Gomulka nominated PPR Secretary General.

August 1948: During a plenary session of the Central Committee Gomulka is accused of "rightist deviations"; this action is followed by dismissal from his post and subsequent arrest and imprisonment in 1951. Boleslaw Bierut becomes Party chief.

December 1948: First postwar national Party Congress. Polish Workers' Party (PPR) merges with the left wing of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and titles itself United Polish Workers' Party (PZPR).

March 1954: Second PZPR Congress in Warsaw. Bierut remains Party leader.

October 1956: Bloodless "revolution" in Warsaw. Gomulka rehabilitated at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee and elected First Secretary, despite Soviet threats of armed intervention. New Party line under the slogan, "the Polish road to Socialism."

May 1957: Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee. Party divided into factions. Gomulka introduces middle-of-the-road policies aimed against both "dogmatists" and "revisionists."

October 1957: Tenth CC Plenum orders the "verification" of Party members to overcome apathy and to purge the Party ranks of "revisionist," "dogmatist" and criminal elements.

March 1958: Eleventh CC Plenum, devoted chiefly to economic problems.

October 1958: Twelfth CC Plenum prepares for the Third Party Congress in March 1959.

Recent and Related

The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, by John A. Armstrong (*Praeger*, \$6.00). A scholarly case study of the structure and function of the political elite in the Ukraine. The study concentrates on the "middle level" of the apparatus, on the broad stratum of officials below the Central Committee level who play an important role in decision-making procedures and in the interpretation and implementation of decisions. During his recent visits to the USSR the author was able to acquaint himself with some usually inaccessible sources of information. Although limited to the study of one particular case, the Ukrainian bureaucratic apparatus, the book provides a great amount of material indispensable for the understanding of the structure and functioning of the Soviet social system, which—as the author emphasizes—is neither a "classless" society nor an amorphous mass dominated by one autocratic ruler. Bibliography, index.

Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt & Truman, 1941-45 (*Dutton*, \$7.50). On the basis of material in Soviet archives, publication of the wartime correspondence between the Heads of State of the US, Great Britain and the USSR was undertaken in the Soviet Union in 1957. The present English edition is a book of more than 700 pages. The first portion presents correspondence between Stalin and Churchill, which deals with a wide range of vital topics—from the opening of a second front and British aid to the USSR to strategic planning and the highly delicate and complex problems of the times. The second part of the book contains correspondence between Stalin and the wartime Presidents of the US, Roosevelt and Truman. The subjects range from convoys and international aid in weapons and supplies to preparations for great international conferences and the progress of the war in all theatres.

The Enemy, by Tibor Meray (*Criterion*, \$3.00). The author is one of the best known Hungarian writers of the younger generation, who escaped after taking part in the 1956 Revolt and is now living in Paris. "The Enemy" describes how Comrade Vincent Nemeth of the Hungarian Party attempts to detect and eliminate a counterrevolutionary traitor. Time and again the truth eludes him, until he comes to a dramatic and unexpected climax.

Visa for Poland, by K. S. Karol (*MacGibbon & Kee*, London, 18 shillings). A mixture of personal reminiscences, bits of Polish history (particularly of the history of the Polish Communist Party), and analyses of the events and forces which led to the Polish October 1956 upheaval. The author, who was born in Poland and brought up in a leftist milieu, has Communist sympathies. In 1939 he went to the Soviet Union and was thoroughly disappointed by what he found there, but after his return to Poland in 1946 he nevertheless actively supported the new regime. After the condemnation of Gomulka in 1948 he became an exile; he now lives in the West and writes for *L'Express* in Paris and the *New Statesman* in London. He visited Poland after October 1956 and this book is, to some extent, a result of these visits. Particularly interesting are the sections devoted to personal experiences and information concerning the history of the Polish Communist Party and its evolution. The author's picture of prewar Poland and his analysis of the forces shaping current events in Poland and throughout the Soviet orbit are of much more doubtful value.

Comrade Venka, by Pavel Nilin (*Simon & Schuster*, \$3.75). Written during the temporary thaw after Stalin's death, this novel was a bestseller in Russia. The hero is an idealistic young member of the Soviet secret police in Siberia in the early Nineteen Twenties. Venka's assignment is to find and destroy a gang of bandits and in so doing he is exposed to the cruelty of police terror and realizes the futility of killing—no matter in whose name it is done. Nilin's book was serialized in Russia's leading literary magazine, despite its criticism of the secret police and its methods.

Yugoslavia's Way, by Stoyan Pribichevich (*All Nations Press*, \$4.50). A review of the Yugoslav Communist program which provides: a theoretical formulation of the general laws of "Socialist development" and of the specific forms of the "revolutionary process" in Yugoslavia; an analysis of the attitudes of the Yugoslav Communists to the problems of economic, social and political (internal and international) relations. "Yugoslavia's Way" is a source book for those seeking general information on the economic and political structure of the country, its federative setup, its Workers' Councils, etc.

Journey to the Beginning, by Edgar Snow (*Random House*, \$5.00). The author, who for twelve years was a newspaper correspondent in the Far East and is now a widely-quoted specialist on China, India and Russia, presents in this book his personal and political history. Taking the reader from the background of his Missouri childhood through his travels and adventures in Manchuria, Russia, India and Europe, he also describes people who helped to shape the world, the forces of nationalism and the changing aspects of colonialism ranging over four continents. Index.

Main Street, USSR, by Irving R. Levine (*Doubleday*, \$4.50). Correspondent Levine, who for the past three years has broadcast from Moscow for NBC, got the idea for his book from a weekly radio program in which he answered questions sent in by US listeners about the everyday operations of the Soviet system. The result is an informative, anecdotal, journalistic report on Russia today, ranging from remarks concerning her economic growth and political structure to descriptions of table etiquette, the Moscow subway, television, fashion and Soviet cultural standards. Illustrated with eight pages of photographs taken by the author.

Legal Sources and Bibliography of Czechoslovakia (*Praeger*, \$6.00). One of the series of bibliographies prepared by the Mid-European Law Project and published by the Mid-European Studies Center. The basic material is presented in five chapters preceded by an introduction which outlines the origin of the Czechoslovak legal system. In chapter 1 official legal sources are described, chapter 2 is dedicated to legal writings, chapter 3 lists Czechoslovak legal periodicals, and chapter 4 describes books, pamphlets and articles published in other languages. Chapter 5 lists the most important statutes published from 1945 to 1957, arranged by subject. Index.

Middle East in Crisis, by Carol A. Fisher and Fred Krinsky (*Syracuse University*, \$5.00). Selected documents dating from 1888 through 1958, pertaining to the current struggle in the Middle East, comprise the major portion of this book. An introductory essay traces the cultural, geographic, and political developments in that area, with cross-references to the documents. Glossary-index.



East Europe
Free Europe Committee, Inc.
2 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.
Return Postage Guaranteed

Sec. 34.66, P.L. & R.

**U. S. POSTAGE
PAID**

New York, N. Y.
Permit No. 13933

UNIVERSITY MICROFILM
313 NO FIRST ST
ANN ARBOR MICH
ATTN STEVENS RICE
5168 7-57

*Form 3547 Requested
Forwarding postage guaranteed*



Printed in U.S.A.